Abstract
This chapter combines the outcomes of quantitative and qualitative analysis and subjects them to a final comparative assessment. The results of both methodologies generally confirm the assumptions of the theoretical framework and the synthesis of results highlights five principal findings. First, the mode of presidential elections is the most important determinant of presidential activism. Second, the relationship between presidents and government and the parliamentary strength of the government were key determinants of presidents’ decisions to use their powers. Third, the size of presidents’ parliamentary representation is only relevant in conjunction with high veto override requirements or when the president’s party participates in the government. Fourth, divisions within and between government parties often weakened the government more substantially than a small seat share. Last, unfortunately no clear patterns emerged regarding the effect of presidential popularity and factors related to individual office-holders. In addition, it is concluded that, with some limitations, vetoes present a valid and reliable indicator of presidential activism.
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- 1.
Schuster-Dzurinda I was not directly included in the in-depth analysis, yet discussed in conjunction with the case study of Schuster-Dzurinda II.
- 2.
Mádl-Medgyessy is overpredicted (actual number of vetoes: 3, prediction: 9.35; ratio 0.32); Schuster-Dzurinda I is underpredicted (actual number of vetoes: 70, prediction: 30.57; ratio 2.39).
- 3.
It also highlights that the mode of election had an effect that was independent of the higher veto override threshold requirement that Slovakia introduced at the same time as the popular elections.
- 4.
Prime Minister Fico’s SMER-SD had supported Gašparovič’s candidacy, but Gašparovič had defeated the candidate of the HZDS (SMER’s coalition partner and Gašparovič’s former party) in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections (Rybář 2005).
- 5.
The results of interviews showed that after Kwaśniewski’s first successful vetoes, the government began to coordinate each larger reform project with the president before it was introduced in parliament.
- 6.
President Ferenc Mádl’s apparent preference for using judicial review requests over vetoes in particular can be interpreted as a result of this mechanism.
- 7.
Nevertheless, due to the constellation of factors towards the end of Sólyom’s term this cannot be established with certainty.
- 8.
Presidents do not generally disclose their ambitions as not to become a ‘lame duck’ in office. Yet post-factum measures, for example whether an incumbent runs again or not, are also not reliable indicators. Furthermore, as indirectly elected presidents need the support of parties, they might not run at all if the constellation of partisan forces in parliament is such that they will definitely fail to be re-elected or they might simply not be nominated again.
- 9.
It appears that formal means of coordination – such as the ‘Rada Gabinetowa’ in Poland or the presence of presidential representatives at cabinet meetings and membership in governmental committees – had less practical relevance in reducing presidential activism. One of my respondents from the Polish presidential administration explained that at times no representative of the president attended cabinet meetings ‘because they had better things to do’.
- 10.
Even the phenomenon of ‘functional’ majority governments in Slovakia does not call this effect into question. Governments that lost their parliamentary majority due to defections sometimes continued to function as majority governments thanks to informal agreements with other party groups and individual opposition deputies. Nevertheless, these agreements were informal and therefore considerably weaker than coalition agreements. Informal agreements did not create considerably more stable governments, but the ability of ‘functional’ majority governments to override presidential vetoes was slightly higher than those of minority governments relying on alternating majorities. Thus, the government’s strength can still be reliably measured by the size of its ‘official’ seat share and the finding does not call the reliability and validity of the variable into question.
- 11.
Ilves and Schuster on the other hand were previously party chairmen but cut their ties with their parties upon inauguration. Ilves and Gašparovič established very close links to other parties over time, yet Schuster failed to do so.
- 12.
As the case of the Parts government under Arnold Rüütel shows, if the president’s party participates in the government as a junior coalition partner it is still possible that its policy position is not reflected in all legislation.
- 13.
The government then either still has a majority or it is easier to find a handful of supporters from to opposition.
- 14.
Kwaśniewski vetoed 20 bills in 17 months (5.8% of legislation), whereby 16 vetoes were issued during the last four months of the government’s term.
- 15.
For instance, Slovak president Ivan Gašparovič also had a strong legal background, yet only requested judicial review twice in 10 years and signed bills which were evidently unconstitutional.
- 16.
Nevertheless, they are still considerably easier to analyse than other presidential powers whose use (be it actual or in form of a threat) cannot be as easily established.
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Köker, P. (2017). Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism. In: Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7
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