Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe pp 23–54Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Determinants of Presidential Activism

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 190 Accesses

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics ((PASTPRPO))

Abstract

This chapter reviews the existing literature on presidential activism in more detail and develops the explanatory framework for the book as well as a set of eight hypotheses. The literature review is structured by the notion of presidency- and president-centred approaches, which focus on institutions and exogenous influences and individual-level determinants of presidential activism, respectively. Thereby, it combines insights from the study of US-American and European presidents. Given the higher degree of theorisation and empirical support enjoyed by presidency-centred approaches, they are chosen as the basis for the new theoretical framework, which also draws on the political opportunity framework. Eight hypotheses on the effect of constitutional factors and variables related to the political environment are formulated to form the basis for statistical analysis and qualitative case studies. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing some limitations of the chosen approach and demonstrates how these are largely remedied by the mixed-methods research design.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This is a notion shared by the majority of definitions of regime types that take presidential powers into account (see Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1993; Krouwel 2003; Siaroff 2003).

  2. 2.

    Presidents cannot ‘choose to be popular’ (Gilmour 2002, 207) so that popularity has to be seen as a factor beyond their control rather than a president-centred variable.

  3. 3.

    A few case studies of Central and East European presidents also refer to the popularity of presidents (Jasiewicz 1997; Cholova 2013; Toomla 2013) yet only Jasiewicz (1997) links it with activism. He implies that the activism of Polish president Wałęsa led to a decrease in his public approval.

  4. 4.

    Similarly, Müller and Strøm (1999, 11) also assume that ‘votes’ can only be an instrumentally valued goal.

  5. 5.

    These spoils include material gains such as remuneration and other privileges (residence, office, official car, etc.) as well as non-material benefits, such as prestige and guaranteed public attention.

  6. 6.

    Owing to the high visibility of the presidential office, the opportunities for post-presidency spoils (for instance book contracts, speaking engagements, etc.) should be largely the same for presidents serving one term or two terms. Pensions and other privileges of retired presidents also tend to be unaffected by the number of terms served in office. However, one can assume that presidents will still prefer ‘in-office’ spoils of a second term to ‘post-office’ spoils due to their policy motivation and the material and non-material benefits of the office.

  7. 7.

    Unfortunately, there is no comparative research on such voter expectations in semi-presidential systems yet. However, Jalali (2012) shows that the incumbency advantage of directly elected presidents is often partially attributed to the fact that they can use their powers to win voters.

References

  • Aldrich, J. H. (1993). Presidential Selection. In Edwards, G. C. III., Kessel, J. H., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). Researching the Presidency. Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 23–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barber, J. D. (2009). The Presidential Character. Predicting Performance in the White House. 4th edition. New York: Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baylis, T. A. (1996). Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe. World Politics, 48(3), 297–323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bunce, V. (1997). Presidents and the Transition. In Europe, E. & Von Mettenheim, K. (Ed.). Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 161–176.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, C. M. (2009). The Presidential Veto. In Howell, W. & Edwards, G. C. III. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 362–382.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cholova, B. (2013). The Role of the President in Bulgarian Politics: The Veto as Tool for Legitimation?. In Hloušek, V. (Ed.). Presidents above Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power. Brno: Masaryk University Press/International Institute of Political Science. 233–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Raadt, J. (2009). Contested Constitutions: Legitimacy of Constitution-making and Constitutional Conflict in Central Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 23(3), 315–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dobos, G., Gylai, A., & Horváth, A. (2013). Weak but Not Powerless: The Position of the President in the Hungarian Political System. In Hloušek, V. (Ed.). Presidents above Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power. Brno: Masaryk University Press/International Institute of Political Science. 77–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1978). Échec au Roi. Paris: Albin Michel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1980). A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government. European Journal of Political Research, 8(2), 165–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, G. C. III. (2009). Foreword. In Barber, J. D. (Ed.). The Presidential Character. Predicting Performance in the White House. 4th edition. New York: Longman. iii–viii.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R. (Ed.) (1999). Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R. (2015). Studying Political Leadership: Foundations and Contending Accounts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). The Endurance of National Constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Elster, J. (1997). Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies. In Taras, R. (Ed.). Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 225–237.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frison-Roche, F. (2007). Semi-presidentialism in a Post-communist Context. In Elgie,R. & Moestrup, S. (Eds.). Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. 56–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, M. (1999). Republic of Ireland. In Elgie, R. (Ed.). Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 104–123.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour, J. B. (2002). Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto. The Journal of Politics, 64(1), 198–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Groseclose, T., & McCarty, N. (2001). The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 100–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hager, G. L., & Sullivan, T. (1994). President-centered and Presidency-centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity. American Journal of Political Science, 38(4), 1080–1103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hargrove, E. C. (1993). Presidential Personality and Leadership Style. In Edwards, G. C. III., Kessel, J. H., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). Researching the Presidency. Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 69–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haspel, M., Remington, T. F., & Smith, S. S. (2006). Lawmaking and Decree making in the Russian Federation: Time, Space, and Rules in Russian National Policymaking. Post-Soviet Affairs, 22(3), 249–275.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helms, L. (Ed.). (2012). Comparative Political Leadership. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jalali, C. (2012). The 2011 Portuguese Presidential Elections: Incumbency Advantage in Semi-presidentialism?. South European Society and Politics, 17(2), 239–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jasiewicz, K. (1997). Poland: Wałęsa’s Legacy to the Presidency. In Taras, R. (Ed.). Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 130–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Köker, P. (2013, 22 August). Presidential Term Lengths and Possibilities for Re-election in European Republics. Presidential Activism. http://presidentialactivism.com/2013/08/22/presidential-term-lengths-and-possibilities-for-re-election-in-european-republics. Accessed: 13 November 2016.

  • Kristinsson, G. H. (1999). Iceland. In Elgie, R. (Ed.). Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 86–103.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Krouwel, André. (2003). Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European countries. Acta politica, 38(4), 333–364.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laver, M. (1997). Private Desires, Political Action. An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lee, J. R. (1975). Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon. The Journal of Politics, 37(2), 522–546.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested Analysis as a Mixed-method Strategy for Comparative Research. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 435–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linz, J. J. (1990). The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linz, J. J. (1997). Introduction: Some thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe. In Taras, R. (Ed.). Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mattland, R. E., & Studlar, D. T. (2004). Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 34(1), 87–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCarty, N. (1997). Presidential Reputation and the Veto. Economics and Politics, 9(1), 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMenamin, I. (2008). Semi-presidentialism and Democratisation in Poland. In Elgie, R. & Moestrup, S. (Eds.). Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 120–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metcalf, L. K. (2000). Measuring Presidential Power. Comparative Political Studies, 33(5), 660–685.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Metcalf, L. K. (2002). Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis: Presidential Power in East Central Europe. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 26 August – 1 September 2002, Boston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe, T. M. (1993). Formal Theory and the Presidency. In Edwards, G. C. III., Kessel, J. H., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). Researching the Presidency. Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 289–336.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe, T. M. (2009). The Revolution in Presidential Studies. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39(4), 701–724.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neto, O. A., & Strøm, K. (2006). Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 36(4), 619–643.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peters, B. G. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’. London/New York: Pinter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Protsyk, O. (2004). Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree making in Russia and Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies, 56(5), 637–660.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Protsyk, O. (2005a). Politics of Intraexecutive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 19 (2), 135–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Protsyk, O. (2005b). Prime Minister’s Identity in Semi-Presidential Regimes: Constitutional Norms and Cabinet Formation Outcomes. European Journal of Political Research, 44(5), 721–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rohde, D. W., & Simon, D. M. (1985). Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A Study of Institutional Conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 29(3), 397–427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuels, D. A., & Shugart, M. S. (2010). Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers. How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009a). Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets. American Political Science Review, 103(3), 496–512.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009b). Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Democracies Compared. European Journal of Political Research, 48(5), 665–693.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2010). Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), 1415–1441.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, K. A. (2006). Rational Choice Institutionalism. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. 23–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shields, T. G., & Huang, C. (1995). Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model. Political Research Quarterly, 48(3), 559–572.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shields, T. G., & Huang, C. (1997). Executive Vetoes: Testing Presidency- Versus President- Centered Perspectives of Presidential Behavior. American Politics Research, 25(4), 431–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shugart, M. S. (1993). On presidents and Parliaments. East European Constitutional Review, 2(1), 30–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-presidential and Parliamentary Distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42(3), 287–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair, B. (1993). Studying Presidential Leadership. In Edwards, G. C. III., Kessel, J. H., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). Researching the Presidency. Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 203–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strohmeier, G. (2012). More Legitimation = more Competence? Heads of State in Parliamentary Systems in Comparative Perspective. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 6(2), 177–196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, K., & Müller, W. C. (1999). Political Parties and Hard Choices. In Strøm, K. & Müller, W. C. (Eds.). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1–35.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Tavits, M. (2008). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Toomla, R. (2013). The Presidency in the Republic of Estonia. In Hloušek, V. (Ed.). Presidents above Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power. Brno: Masaryk University Press/International Institute of Political Science. 167–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolchik, S. L. (1997). The Czech Republic: Václav Havel and the Evolution of the Presidency since 1989. In Taras, R. (Ed.). Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 168–194.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woolley, J. T. (1991). Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 279–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Psychology, Politics and Sociology, Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, United Kingdom

    Philipp Köker

Authors
  1. Philipp Köker
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Köker, P. (2017). Determinants of Presidential Activism. In: Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation