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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics ((PASTPRPO))

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Abstract

This chapter introduces the topic of the book and outlines the scope of analysis. It asserts that despite the centrality of presidential powers to academic debates, only few scholars have focussed on how presidents actually use them. Based on existing studies, it provides a new, non-normative and less ambiguous definition of presidential activism and explains the suitability of Central and East European democracies for its study. The chapter also summarises the theoretical approach of the book which draws on variations in the institutional setting, most notably the mode of election, and changes in the political environment to explain the use of the two most common and prominent presidential powers: the power to veto legislation and the appointment and censure of governments and cabinet members. It outlines the rationale of the mixed-methods research design and presents the original quantitative and qualitative data used in the study. Finally, it offers a brief chapter-by-chapter overview of the book’s structure and supplementary material available in the appendices.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    These are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

  2. 2.

    Nevertheless, the refusal to perform such duties might arguably qualify as activism.

  3. 3.

    Although it can be argued that the Bulgarian president possesses a partial veto (Tsebelis and Rizova 2007), this right is not codified in the constitution and only present in parliamentary standing orders.

  4. 4.

    A full list of respondents is available in Appendix D. More detailed information about the interviews can also be found in Köker (2014) and at http://presidentialactivism.com/elite-interviews/.

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Köker, P. (2017). Introduction. In: Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1

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