“An end to the first ‘easy’ phase” Pakistan’s Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Deal and the Clandestine Programme’s Discovery, January 1976 to January 1977

Abstract

There was a transition in 1976 during the late-period Ford administration from non-proliferation laxity to a more active policy. During that year, British government officials also discovered the first hints that Pakistan was—parallel to its public quest for a nuclear reprocessing facility—undertaking a clandestine purchasing programme aimed at building a uranium enrichment plant. The months from signing the French-Pakistani nuclear processing plant deal to the inauguration in January 1977 of ardent anti-proliferationist Jimmy Carter, were therefore a time of flux. The complexity of international nuclear diplomacy and the difficulty of reconciling the needs of domestic and foreign policies made it an intensely complicated time for policymakers. Electoral and congressional pressure forced Ford and Kissinger to reassess US non-proliferation policy, as perceptions in Washington and London hardened around the belief that Pakistan was aiming for ‘the bomb’. Yet, there was little practical communication between the USA and the UK on ways and means to combat the problem. Washington unsuccessfully attempted to bribe or coerce Bhutto with arms sales. Britain stubbornly pursued its military aircraft deal with India, but chose not to seek commercial advantage from the Pakistani reprocessing plant deal when it became apparent that any involvement would be politically untenable and limited in profitability. The period was also revelatory as, with remarkable suddenness, it became apparent to British officials that they were dealing with two parallel Pakistani efforts to acquire fissile materials. For all concerned, 1976 was the beginning of what promised to be an intensely challenging period in international nuclear relations.