It is Too Dangerous to be an Individual in Turkey

  • Jakob LindgaardEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Communication for Social Change book series (PSCSC)


This chapter argues that key traits of the social networks that drove the 2013 Gezi demonstrations faced a tall order not so much in relation to the heavy-handed response imposed by then PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, but vis-à-vis the reach and influence of the traditional networks that permeate Turkish society. Turkish society is shot through with both highly diverse and highly salient subnational group identities. Coupled with a concomitant tradition of a highly partisan executive state power, this has led to the advent of strong traditional networks that can vouch for the basic security, socio-economic prosperity, and recognition of identity of its network members. The highly individualized connective action of the Gezi social networks were unable to do just that. Or so the chapter argues.


Networks Individualism Identity Kemalism Nationalism Connective action 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Danish Institute for International StudiesCopenhagenDenmark

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