Abstract
Kelsen’s two basic ideas on legal interpretation are, on the one hand, its characterization as a hybrid with both cognitive and volitional elements due to the partial indeterminacy of law, and, on the other, the relationship between legal interpretation and the structural properties of the legal system (dynamic principle). Kelsen’s solution to the problem of irregular norms – the so-called “tacit alternative clause” – not only attracts accusations of decisionism but also seems to render the question of norm content and, therefore, legal interpretation, within his theory of law irrelevant. I will argue that a reconstruction of Kelsen’s thesis which renders it less open to accusations of irrationalism is possible, starting from his initial intuition regarding legal interpretation. This reconstruction is based on two arguments: (i) the distinction between the validity of a norm and the fact that the act by which it is created is a correct interpretation of the higher norm, that is, a non-reductionist concept of validity; and (ii) a functional interpretation of the “determination” of the norm content between the different hierarchical levels of the legal system.
The writting of this paper benefited from the funding of the Research Project “CONFLICTOS DE DERECHOS: TIPOLOGÍAS, RAZONAMIENTOS, DECISIONES” (DER2016-74898-C2-1-R) of the spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MEC).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Kelsen’s rejection of the traditional doctrine has not only a theoretical basis – as this doctrine ignores the volitional element that operates in every act of adjudication – but also ideological, as it hides this element, presenting every act of adjudication as being cognitive in nature.
- 3.
Chiassoni, (1990) distinguishes two periods in Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation: the first one, named naive dualism, begins in 1911, with the Hauptprobleme, and extends up to 1934, when the second period, named critical dualism, begins.
- 4.
- 5.
However, Paulson differentiates three periods within Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation: a first extending from 1911 to 1934; a second, characterized by the distinction between volitive and cognitive elements in legal interpretation, due to the partial indetermination of law, that is up to the 50s; and a third and last period, in which the balance between cognition and will disappears (Paulson 1990c: 178–80).
- 6.
And, therefore, the classical doctrine of the separation of powers (Kelsen 1925: §37).
- 7.
Guastini has highlighted the general incompatibility of Kelsen’s theory of legal science and his theory of legal interpretation. First, Kelsen neglects to mention the problem of interpretation when addressing the question of legal science. Nevertheless, as Guastini emphasizes, the latter presupposes the former, “since the identification and description of norms stricto sensu requires interpretation (at least a “pragmatic” interpretation in view of deciding whether a given sentence expresses either a norm or a statement)” (Guastini 1995: 109). Second, Kelsen does not distinguish between normative statements (sentence) and norms (meaning). According to Guastini, scientific interpretation enumerates the possible meanings of normative statements; the different norms contained in these statements. Furthermore, norms are the result, not the object of interpretation. In any case, this list cannot be a deontic statement, as Kelsen claims, unless it is just a mere repetition of norms: “actual juristic deontic sentences cannot be understood as scientific statements. They can only be understood as proposals of just one interpretation among the variety of interpretations which a norm-formulation allows for.” (Guastini 1995: 110–1). In that case, scientific interpretation would not be a cognitive activity, but a political one. Other critical considerations point in the same direction: according to Kelsen, the statements through which legal science expresses itself are not mere descriptive statements, but, given the cognitive function of legal science, they are not prescriptive statements, but statements of a third class, that is, the “descriptive ought statements”. In Ruiz Manero’s opinion, these types of statements are not distinguishable from mere prescriptions; therefore Kelsen is unsuccessful in construing this category (Ruiz Manero 1990: 56).
- 8.
The two examples of intentional indeterminacy provided by Kelsen make no reference – in contrast to Hart – to the possibility that indeterminacy may be obtained through language properties, be it ambiguity or vagueness (Lifante 1999: 68). Nonetheless, there is no reason to think that Kelsen excludes this source of intentional indeterminacy.
- 9.
Though admitting Kelsen’s justificatory deficits, Bulygin, nevertheless, finds quite sound the indeterminacy thesis: “The reason why the individual norm created by the judge is never completely determined by general norms is that general norms are always expressed in a language that contains general terms (predicates), whereas the judge has to decide a particular case; so his problem is the subsumption of certain particular facts under the predicates contained in the legal rules (general norms)” (Bulygin 1995: 14). See also Paulson (1990a: 143–4) and Caytas (2012: 14).
- 10.
According to Walter (1983), Kelsen’s vehement attacks against the traditional doctrine of the one right answer have led to wrongly considering him a decisionist, a conclusion – says Walter – that cannot be obtained from Kelsen’s own texts.
- 11.
See also Lifante (1999: 77–8).
- 12.
“Authentic interpretation may even attribute to a legal norm a meaning which a non-authentic interpretation could never dare to maintain. That is to say, by authentic interpretation a legal norm may be replaced by another norm of totally different content” (Kelsen 1949: xv).
- 13.
For some authors, this is an insurmountable problem; e.g., Weyland: “Kelsen often pursued irreconcilable aims. This is particularly true of his treatment of conflicts of norms at different levels of the hierarchy, which constitutes one of the most puzzling and controversial aspects of his theory. The inconsistencies in this case arise from the incompatibility between his desire to construct a logically coherent model of legal systems and his attempt to fit into certain anomalous aspects of legal reality” (Weyland 1986: 249).
- 14.
Taking into consideration these consequences, some authors have proposed different solutions that would be coherent with Kelsen’s theory. Following the disambiguation of the concept of validity made by Bulygin, Nino maintains the possibility of invalid norms being binding. Unlike Kelsen, Nino’s solution is characterized by the following elements: (1) the norms that “grant validity to the unconstitutional or illegal enactments do not authorize those enactments – which is what created some paradoxical implications – but merely declare that there is an obligation to apply and to observe the resulting statute”; (2) “these norms are not necessary components of every legal system. They are only positive and contingent parts of some systems, though generally they have not been explicitly enacted, but are rather generated in a tacit and customary way”; and, (3) “norms which oblige the application of illegal enactments generally discriminate between laws, contrary to Kelsen’s thesis. In addition to negative conditions like those of not being declared unconstitutional by the corresponding court, the norm in question must satisfy a certain positive condition. I think that the implicit positive condition which is generally required is quite vague but nevertheless real and operative: the norm in question should enjoy a certain “color or appearance of legality”” (Nino 1995: 227).
Also, Weyland tries to solve this problem in other ways, analogous to the factual concept of validity of legal realism: “Once we admit that Kelsen’s concept of the legal system cannot incorporate everything that has the appearance of being valid, prescriptive statements which do not satisfy Kelsen’s conditions of validity and yet have legal effects, must be deemed to be part of a wider notion of positive law and a different term must be used to describe them. I propose calling them ‘norms in force’ and define them as prescriptive statements which are deemed to be binding by legal officials because they have been issued by individuals who appear to be acting in the capacity of legal organs, even though they have not complied with one or more norms that regulate their behaviour. Norms in force are more likely to be declared invalid or to fall into desuetude than valid norms. If notwithstanding their invalidity they become efficacious and the opinione necessitatis required by Kelsen for the formation of customary law is present, they then become part of the legal system on the grounds that custom is a valid method of law creation” (Weyland 1986: 268).
Actually, both alternatives rest on the distinction between the various concepts of validity that the Kelsenian notion comprehends. Nino’s proposal differentiates between validity as a binding force and validity as conformity to the provisions of the higher-level norm (that is, as authorization and as membership to the legal system), in order to show that the first domain is wider than the second, as some norms oblige obedience and the application of invalid (not authorized) norms. While Weyland differentiates between validity as existence and validity as conformity to the provisions of the higher-level norm, her wider notion of positive law means nothing but the greater extension of the first domain which includes valid norms as well as those non-valid norms that are deemed to be binding by legal officials due to their appearance of legality.
- 15.
Duncan Kennedy maintains that the initial comprehension of a case that determines the applicable norm to the facts can be modified by the practices he calls “strategic behaviour in interpretation”, according to which it is the interpreter – and not a particular property of cases themselves – that determines if a case corresponds to one of the various possible interpretations within the frame (Kennedy 2008: 155ff.).
References
Amado, García. 1996. Kelsen y la norma fundamental. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
———. 2006. Hablando de Kelsen con Delgado Pinto. In El positivismo jurídico a examen. Estudios en homenaje a José Delgado Pinto, edited by Juan Antonio Ramos Pascua and Miguel Ángel Rodilla González, 1199–1209. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
Bulygin, Eugenio. 1991. Sentencia judicial y creación de derecho. In Análisis lógico y derecho, Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (authors), 355–369. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
———. 1995. Cognition and Interpretation of Law. In Cognition and Interpretation of Law, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio and Stanley Paulson, 11–35. Turin: Giappichelli.
Caytas, Joanna Diane. 2012. The Unconquerable Domain of Discretion in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. Washington Undergraduate Law Review IV (1): 1–46.
Chiassoni, Pierluigi. 1990. Legal Science and Legal Interpretation in the Pure Theory of Law. In Hans Kelsen Legal Theory: A Diachronic Point of View, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio, 63–73. Turin: Giappichelli.
Guastini, Ricardo. 1989. Hans Kelsen sull’interpretazione. In L’analisi del ragionamiento giuridico, edited by Paolo Comanducci and Ricardo Guastini, 121–125. Turin: Giappichelli.
———. 1995. Kelsen on Legal Knowledge and Scientific Interpretation. In Cognition and Interpretation of Law, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio and Stanley Paulson, 107–115. Turin: Giappichelli.
Heidemann, Carsten. 1997. Die Norm als Tatsache. Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens. Baden- Baden: Nomos.
Kelsen, Hans. 1925. Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin: Springer. Spanish edition: Kelsen, H. 1979 (15th ed.). Teoria General del Estado. Translated by L. Legaz Lecambra. Mexico: Editora Nacional.
———. 1934a. (1. Auflage) Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik. Leipzig/Vienna: Franz Deuticke (2. Neudruck der 1. Auflage. 1994. Aalen: Scientia Verlag). English edition: Kelsen, H. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. Translated by B. Litschewski Paulson and S.L Paulson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spanish edition: Kelsen, H. Teoría pura del Derecho. Introducción a los problemas de la ciencia jurídica. Translated by Gregorio Robles y Félis F. Sánchez. Madrid: Trotta.
———. 1934b. Zur Theorie der Interpretation. Internationales Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts 8: 9–17. [English versión: Kelsen, H. 1990. On the Theory of Interpretation (trans: Paulson, S.L.). Legal Studies 10(2): 127–135].
———. 1949. Preface: On Interpretation. In: Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: a critical analysis of its fundamental problems. With supplement, XIII–XVII. New York: Frederick A. Praeger (2000. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange)
———. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre (2 Auflage). Vienna: Franz Deuticke. Spanish edition: Kelsen, H. 1979. Teoría Pura del Derecho. Translated by R.J. Vernengo. México: Porrúa.
Kennedy, Duncan. 2008. A Left/Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation. In Legal Reasoning: Collected Essays, edited by Duncan Kennedy. Colorado: Davies Group.
Lifante, Isabel. 1999. La interpretación jurídica en la teoría del derecho contemporánea. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Losano, Mario G. 1985. La teoría pura del derecho: del logicismo al irracionalismo. Doxa 2: 55–85.
———. 1990. The Periodization of Kelsen Proposed by S. L. Paulson. In Hans Kelsen Legal Theory: A Diachronic Point of View, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio, 111–121. Turin: Giappichelli.
Luzzati, Claudio. 1990. Discretion and “Indeterminacy” in Kelsen’s Theory of Legal Interpretation. In Hans Kelsen Legal Theory: A Diachronic Point of View, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio, 123–137. Turin: Giappichelli.
———. 1995. Kelsen vs. Bulygin on Legal Interpretation: How Not to Read Kelsen through Hart’s Eyes. In Cognition and Interpretation of Law, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio and Stanley Paulson, 85–106. Turin: Giappichelli.
Manero, Ruiz, and Juan. 1990. Jurisdicción y normas. Dos estudios sobre función jurisdiccional y teoría del Derecho. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Mayer, Heinz. 2001. La doctrina de la interpretación de la teoría pura del derecho. In Problemas Centrales de la Teoría Pura del Derecho, edited by Robert Walter, Trans. L. Villar Borda, 93–107. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia.
Nino, Carlos S. 1985. La validez del derecho. Buenos Aires: Astrea.
———. 1995. Marshall’s “Logic” and Kelsen’s “Problem”. In Cognition and Interpretarion of Law, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio and Stanley Paulson, 219–230. Turin: Giappichelli.
Paulson, Stanley L. 1985. El periodo posterior a 1960 de Kelsen: ¿ruptura o continuidad? Doxa 2: 153–157.
———. 1990a. Kelsen on Legal Interpretation. Legal Studies 10 (2): 136–152.
———. 1990b. Toward a Periodization of the Pure Theory of Law. In Hans Kelsen Legal Theory: A Diachronic Point of View, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio, 11–47. Turin: Giappichelli.
———. 1990c. Some Replies to Critics. In Hans Kelsen Legal Theory: A Diachronic Point of View, edited by Letizia Gianformaggio, 173–192. Turin: Giappichelli.
———. 1998. Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18 (1): 153–166.
———. 1999. Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (2): 351–364.
Walter, Robert. 1983. Das Auslegung Problem im Lichte der Reinen Rechtslehre. In Festschrift für Ulrich Klug zum 70. Geburstag, edited by Günther Kohlmann, 187–197. (Band I). Köln: Dr. Peter Deubner Verlag.
Weyland, Inés. 1986. Idealism and Formalism in Kelsen’s Treatment of Norm Conflicts. In Essays on Kelsen, edited by Ruchard Tur and William Twining, 249–269. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cabra Apalategui, J.M. (2017). Validity and Correctness in Kelsen’s Theory of Legal Interpretation. In: Langford, P., Bryan, I., McGarry, J. (eds) Kelsenian Legal Science and the Nature of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51817-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51817-6_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-51816-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-51817-6
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)