Abstract
In this paper I highlight some of the problems of the Kelsenian conception of legal interpretation. The analysis has two main theses. The first maintains that Kelsen has no unitary concept of legal interpretation because with these words he would refer to very different activities which cannot be gathered in a unitary understanding. The second thesis – not completely independent from the former – is that Kelsen would not even have a unitary concept of the indefiniteness of Law. Finally, I try to offer an explanation for this deficient portrayal of interpretation given its central position for the understanding of Law. This explanation is based on Kelsenian moral skepticism, which also lies at the centre of his claim of the purity of a legal theory.
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Notes
- 1.
Paulson (1990) nevertheless considers that three stages can be seen in Kelsen’s interpretation of the Law.
- 2.
Kelsen (1949: xiii–xvii).
- 3.
- 4.
The exceptions to this duality between creation and application can be found at both ends of the pyramid: at the apex (the drawing up of the constitution) we only find creation of Law; while at the base (application of rulings by administrative bodies) there would only be application.
- 5.
In this sense he even goes so far as to say “Authentic interpretation may even attribute to a legal norm a meaning which a non-authentic interpretation could never dare to maintain. That is to say, by authentic interpretation a legal norm may be replaced by another norm of totally different content” (Kelsen 1949: xv).
- 6.
Although it is not specifically expressed that this is a final number, that is the conclusion at which one can arrive, at least apparently, from his text (Kelsen 2005, 350).
- 7.
Kelsen admits that is not easy to determine what the will of the legislator is (or, for example of the parties in a legal case) but he considers that, despite the difficulties posed thereby, one cannot rule out the possibility of investigating such a will using sources other than linguistic expression itself. cf. Núñez Vaquero (2011).
- 8.
Kelsen hardly pays any attention to this third defect in this chapter dedicated to interpretation; he limits himself to making a slight reference to it and does not even go so far as to indicate how this defect works as a cause of indefiniteness.
- 9.
Cf. In this sense Kelsen (2005, 350), where he states that “the indefiniteness can be intentional” (My emphasis).
- 10.
Bulygin would agree with Kelsen’s basic theory: in all cases there exists indefiniteness in the legal norm to be applied, although he also admits – thus admitting that Ruiz Manero (1990) is right – that Kelsen has not sufficiently justified his position. The argument that Bulygin relies upon in order to render Kelsen’s theory coherent is that of the vagueness of all legal norms (Bulygin 1995).
- 11.
I have dealt with this distinction between interpretation activity and the activity of development and precision of the Law, in Lifante Vidal (2006).
- 12.
In this same sense, Paulson (1990) affirms that Kelsen lacks both a descriptive theory and a normative theory of legal interpretation.
- 13.
However, this theory, which is generally attributed to Kelsen, must be clarified. Cf. Atienza (2013,195–197).
- 14.
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Vidal, I.L. (2017). Kelsen and Legal Interpretation. In: Langford, P., Bryan, I., McGarry, J. (eds) Kelsenian Legal Science and the Nature of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51817-6_8
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