Abstract
De Boer’s chapter addresses the main methodological issue raised by Buridan’s questions on Aristotle’s first book: the place of the De anima in the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The chapter argues that the fourteenth-century tendency to raise issues concerning the relationship of the mixture of the Aristotelian elements and the substantial form (or substantial forms) of the resulting mixed body in the context of discussions of nature of the soul culminated in Buridan’s unified natural philosophy in which the themes from De generatione and De anima supplement and reinforce each other.
I would like to thank Paul Bakker for his many valuable comments on an early draft of this material. I would also like to thank the participants of the conference on the psychology of John Buridan held at Fordham University for helping me to pinpoint Buridan’s position more precisely.
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Notes
- 1.
For these debates, see Zavalloni (1951).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
“Ideo anima quam invenimus in animali et in vegetabili est perfectio prima corporis naturalis instrumentalis habentis opera vitae” (Avicenna [SDA]: DA I.1, 29, II.61–63).”
- 5.
Among others, John Blund, William of Auvergne, John de la Rochelle, and Alexander of Hales defended the view that we have but one soul. For a (partial) list of early defenders of the substantial unity of the soul, see Callus (1939). Dales (1995) provides brief summaries of the viewpoints of these early scholastics.
- 6.
See the literature cited in footnotes 1 and 2.
- 7.
For a precise analysis of the difference between Aquinas’s approach to the question of the ontological status of the soul and those of his predecessors, see Bazán (1997).
- 8.
The list can be found in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I, n. 474, 558–560. It has recently been argued, however, that Kilwardby did not have Aquinas specifically in mind when he issued the list, but rather everyone who denied a plurality within the soul. See Silva (2012).
- 9.
See Hödl (1966, esp. 537), who convincingly shows that the various references to a Parisian condemnation of Aquinas’s position in texts from the 1270s to 1280s refer to this magisterial meeting.
- 10.
I discuss this shift in the commentaries by Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun, Nicole Oresme, and the anonymous commentator whose work is published under the title of Buridan’s Prima lectura de anima in de Boer (2013, chapters “Buridan on the Metaphysics of the Soul” and “Aquinas vs. Buridan on the Substance and Powers of the Soul”).
- 11.
In this respect Buridan differs markedly from Nicole Oresme, whose commentary on De anima shares many features with Buridan’s. Throughout his commentary, Oresme tries to evade the question concerning the number of souls in a human being. A telling example is his interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the soul in question II.1, where he offers two possible interpretations for the elements of the definition, one compatible with the unicity, and one compatible with the plurality of the soul. Compare also questions II.3 and II.4.
- 12.
Buridan lectured on De anima several times. Out of the four commentaries that have been attributed to him, two are without a doubt authentic. The first is the commentary that has been edited and translated in this series, and which seems to contain his final set of lectures, given that these are referred to in the manuscripts as the tertia sive ultima lectura. The second is an earlier commentary referred to in some of the manuscripts as the non de ultima lectura. The status of the third commentary, which survives only as a sixteenth-century edition made by George Lokert is unclear. No manuscript witness corresponding to the text has ever been found. But the views expressed in it do seem to correspond to those of Buridan. As for the fourth commentary that is sometimes attributed to Buridan (Patar 1991), there is no reason to ascribe the text to Buridan. For a full discussion, see Bakker and de Boer (2011).
- 13.
The underlying principle is that whatever inheres in an indivisible subject is itself indivisible, and hence immaterial.
- 14.
For a detailed analysis of this topic see J. Zupko (2008).
- 15.
“Et quando dicitur quod mixtum esset aeque simplex sicut elementum, concedo loquendo de simplicitate substantiali, quia utrumque esset compositum ex una materia et una forma.” (Buridan [2010, 169, ll. 2–5]). This notwithstanding, Buridan continues, we can still call the mixture more complex (compositius) than the elements, because the mixture retains the primary qualities that originally belonged to the elements even though it does not retain their substantial forms: “Tamen mixtum est compositius virtualiter, quia retinet virtutes elementorum a quibus corruptis ipsum est genitum” (ll. 5–7).
- 16.
More precisely, for Aquinas there is no difference between the process in which sensation comes about in human beings and the way it comes about in other animals. There is, of course, an important difference between the roles sensation plays in the life of a human being and in that of an animal, given that human sensation is permeated with reason.
- 17.
William de la Mare’s highly influential Correctorium Fratris Thomae, for instance, discusses the counterintuitive consequences of the unicity position in several articles, the most important of which are articles 31, 32, 48, 52, 102, 107 and 114.
- 18.
“Et arguebatur quod homo non habeat esse ab una forma substantiali tantum, quia ponere hominem habere tantum unam formam substantialem est contra sensum, item est contra rationem, item est contra fidem. Contra sensum, quia in homine mortuo ad sensum apparent eadem accidentia esse quae erant in ipso vivente. Hoc autem non esset nisi aliqua forma substantialis quae erat in ipso vivente maneret in mortuo, quia accidentia non consequuntur materiam nisi mediante forma substantiali. Sed forma substantialis quae est anima non est in mortuo homine… Hoc etiam est contra rationem, quia ratio iudicat quod unicuique agenti et actioni respondet suus terminus et effectus… Sed ad productionem hominis concurrunt duo agentia, scilicit agens naturale et agens supernaturale… Hoc etiam videtur esse contra fidem, quoniam si in homine non sit nisi una forma, scilicet anima, tunc cum Christus fuit mortuus, non remansit idem corpus numero mortuum quod fuerat vivum” (de Wulf and Pelzer [1904, 96]). For the date, see Wippel (1981, xxvii).
- 19.
“Et cum dicitur quod sensus hoc iudicat, dico quod sensum non est credendum de ydemptitate accidentium, sed solum de similitudine, quia quidditas rei solum ab intellectu percipitur et non a sensu” (de Boer [2013, 320–321]). Compare Thomas Sutton, De pluralitate formarum, VII, 575c: “Ideo dicendum quod illa accidentia non manent in corpore vivo et mortuo eadem numero, sed eadem specie: eo quod subjectum non manet idem numero, sicut contingit, quando ex vino fit acetum; manent similes dimensiones, similis etiam color, similis humiditas, in aceto quae prius in vino; nec istud est contra sensum quod accidentia dicantur non manere eadem numero. Non enim sensus potest distinguere inter accidentia omnino similia, quando sine interpolatione sunt in eadem materia, puta quod color aceti sit alius quam in vino quando vinum mutatum est in acetum” (Busa 1980).
- 20.
For a lengthy discussion of the problem, see Brito, Qq. DA, II q. 3 (de Boer 2013, 320–324).
- 21.
See John of Jandun, Qq. De an. II, q. 2, esp. 73–74.
- 22.
“Sed adhuc in substantiis est bene dubitatio propter viventia, quia ponentes quod anima sit addita alteri formae substantiali vel aliis formis substantialibus non oportet dicere quod ad generationem animalis per adventum animae aliquid corrumpatur; nec oportet dicere quod propter interfectionem animalis aliquid substantialiter generetur” (Buridan [2010, 77]).
- 23.
The remaining three initial objections are: (1) mutation is divided into two basic types in Aristotle’s Physica, namely generation and corruption, so it cannot be true that a generation is a corruption; (2) the generation of light, vision, and concepts entails no corruption; (3) in the generation of a mixture the composing elements are not corrupted.
- 24.
The rationale for grouping together plants and annulose animals is that both are able to survive division. Cut a worm in half and both parts continue to live (at least for some time). The fact that this usually works better in the case of plants than annulose animals does not seem to have bothered the commentators much.
- 25.
QDGC I, q.7, ll. 4–13: “Et credo quod sit respondendum quod si illa esset bona definitio animalis <i.e. substantia animata sensibilis SdB>, tunc quaelibet pars quantitativa animalis esset animal, sicut quaelibet pars aquae est aqua. Et sic concederetur quod unum animal esset plura animalia. Et tunc in divisione anguillae nullum animal esset generatum et nullum animal esset corruptum... Sed si dicamus quod ad rationem animalis ultra praedictam definitionem exigitur quod sit sufficienter organizatum ad recipiendum nutrimentum et ad vivendum longo tempore, tunc neutra pars ipsius anguillae esset animal” (Buridan [2010, 79]). It would be difficult to apply Buridan’s solution to plants, since in that case both parts will continue to live for a long time.
- 26.
See QDA II, q.7, n. 23–32. For a discussion of differences between the substantial and connotative uses of the term ‘animal’ and the later impact of Buridan’s analysis of this topic, see Kärkkäinen (2004). For a more general discussion of substantive and connotative terms in Buridan, see Klima (2009, 261–267).
- 27.
See Brito, Qq. DA II, q. 3. Michael (1992, 168–169) cites passages from John of Jandun’s commentary on the Physica, where the scars and wounds example is discussed (and their regeneration denied). Jandun’s discussion in this commentary is consistent with that in his commentary on the De anima. The continued presence of scars and wounds in a corpse is also discussed in Nicole Oresme’s commentary on De generatione et corruptione in a question titled “Utrum aliqua qualitas maneat eadem in generato que prius fuit in corrupto.” See Oresme, Qq. DGC I, q. 8: “Nono, quod cycatres manent etc” (Caroti [1996, 67, l. 167]). It can be inferred from the heavily abbreviated form of the argument that it was well known by the middle of the fourteenth century.
- 28.
See Aristotle, DGC II.3 330a30–b5.
- 29.
Aristotle had suggested that a transformation involving a qualitas symbola is easier than one that does not (DGC II.4 331b2–331b10).
- 30.
Buridan discusses the qualitates symbolae in QDGC II, qq. 6–9.
- 31.
“Respondeo quod qualitas symbola maneat in generato quae fuerit in corrupto. Probatur quia: si interficitur equus, invenitur caliditas in cadavere; et non potest dici quod de novo generatur, quia non posset dari modus per quem” (Buridan [2010, 226]). The second argument from the De anima, about the presence of heat in water, is also discussed in this question.
- 32.
The position that the bodily structures have their own substantial forms is usually attributed to Duns Scotus. See John Duns Scotus, In META VII, q. 20: ‘Utrum partes organicae animalis habeant distinctas formas substantiales specie differentes’ (Scotus [1997]). For discussion, see Cross (1998, 62–71). For the reception of this view in later Franciscan authors, see Duba (2012). A related view was defended by Nicole Oresme, who argued that the soul of a brute animal should be described as a heterogeneous form. See Oresme, Qq. DA II, q. 5: “Quinta conclusio est quod anima bruti est forma heterogenea, et prius fuit probatum. Et probatur adhuc quia: dat aliud esse ossi et aliud esse carni. Unde caro et os differunt specie et habent diversa nomina substantialia et definitiones; et aliud est esse carnem et esse os; igitur habent formas diversarum rationum; et illae sunt partes unius totalis animae; igitur ipsa est totum heterogeneum” (Patar [1995], 151, ll. 74–79). Note, however, that in Oresme’s view the partial forms taken together are identical to the whole soul, whereas in Scotus’s view they are present in the living being over and above the soul.
- 33.
“When seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name—no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure” (trans. Smith in Barnes [1984, 657]).
- 34.
John Buridan, QPHYS I, q. 20: “Tertia conclusio: quod materia est actus et esset actus licet existeret sine forma sive substantiali sive accidentali” (Dullaert [1964, f. 24rb]).
- 35.
It is intriguing that Aquinas pays so little attention to these difficulties. One of the very few places where he describes in some detail the succession of substantial form involved in the generation of a living being is the relatively early Summa contra gentiles (II.89, 542): “Licet enim generatio simplicium corporum non procedat secundum ordinem, eo quod quodlibet eorum habet formam immediatam materiae primae, in generatione tamen corporum aliorum oportet esse generationum ordinem, propter multas formas intermedias, inter primam formam elementi et ultimam formam ad quam generatio ordinatur. Et ideo sunt multae generationes et corruptiones sese consequentes. Nec est inconveniens si aliquid intermediorum generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur, quia intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non generantur ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur… Et ideo in generatione animalis et hominis in quibus est forma perfectissima, sunt plurimae formae et generationes intermediae, et per consequens corruptiones, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Anima igitur vegetabilis, quae primo inest, cum embryo vivit vita plantae, corrumpitur, et succedit anima perfectior, quae est nutritiva et sensitiva simul, et tunc embryo vivit vita animalis; hac autem corrupta, succedit anima rationalis ab extrinseco immissa, licet praecedentes fuerint virtute seminis.” Compare also Aquinas, De spirit. creat. q. 11 (ad rationes): “Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod generatio animalis non est tantum una generatio simplex, sed succedunt sibi invicem multe generationes et corruptiones: sicut dicitur quod primo habet formam seminis et secundo formam sanguinis, et sic deinceps quousque perficiatur generatio” (ed. Leonina, 102, ll. 300–305). My own, tentative explanation of why the causality involved in the generation and corruption of living being only became a problem after Aquinas, which I cannot develop here, is that Aquinas tried to understand living beings almost exclusively from the perspective of final causality.
- 36.
“Nota pro solutione rationum quod aliud est subiectum cui tales primae qualitates attribuuntur, et aliud est subiectum de cuius potentia educuntur et quod est per se ex natura sua receptivum earum. Nam subiectum de cuius potentia egriditur caliditas vel frigiditas passive et receptive est prima materia. Igitur si ipsa manet, quamvis forma substantialis non maneat, nihil est inconveniens tales qualitates manere. Sed subiecta quibus tales qualitates attribuuntur sunt substantiae compositae ex materia et forma propter maiorem notitiam earum. Vulgus enim non percipit primam materiam. Igitur illas qualitates sibi non attribuit, sed attribuit eas composito sensato” (Buridan [2010, 284]).”
- 37.
Buridan, unfortunately, writes little about the type of qualities that inhere directly in matter, apart from the final sentence in the quote above. Presumably qualities such as the persisting scars and wounds still found in the corpse would have to be included.
- 38.
Avicenna, Avi.PHYS, t. 1, cap. VI, 61, ll.45–58: “Sunt enim quaedam quae consequuntur materiam, ut nigredo Aethiopis, et cicatrices vulnerum et extensio staturae. Sunt etiam quaedam quae consequuntur formam, sicut spes et gaudium et potentia ridendi et cetera in hominibus… Quae vero consequuntur ex parte materiae, aliquando remanent post formam, sicut cicatrices vulnerum et nigredo Aethiopis post mortem.”
- 39.
For the dates of Giles of Rome’s works, Del Punta et al. (1993).
- 40.
Giles of Rome, Comm. DGC, f. 35va: “Ideo, quia dimensiones indeterminate magis se videntur tenere ex parte materie, alia autem vel videntur sequi formam, vel forte sequuntur materiam ut est subiecta forme, ergo qualitates (quia vel sequuntur formam, vel sequuntur materiam ut est subiecta forme) non videntur remanere eadem numero.”
- 41.
Ibid, f. 35va–b: “Quod vero addebatur de Philosopho, quod videtur velle qualitatem symbolam remanere, dici debet, ut communiter ponitur, quod remanet eadem specie, non autem oportet quod remaneat eadem numero.”
- 42.
Giles seems to follow Aquinas when he writes that the soul virtually contains the form of the mixture (f. 25rb). There is, however, some discussion of the accidents of the body when Giles discusses the soul as actus corporis (ff. 25rb–va).
- 43.
Giles of Rome, De gradibus formarum, f. 100vb “Secundum hoc ergo dicemus quia sicut in re corrupta et generata non remanet forma sed eadem materia, ita non manet realiter eadem qualitas simbola se tenens ex parte forme. Manet autem realiter eadem qualitas <corr. ex quantitas SdB> simbola se tenens ex parte materie. Et quia mollicies et alia accidentia physica quibus affecta materia nominatur caro se tenet ex parte materie poterunt eedem realiter remanere. Quare accipiendo nomine carnis eo modo quo diximus poterit remanere eadem caro numero et mortua et viva, sicut et eadem materia numero remanet in re generata et corrupta.”
- 44.
I first learned of Giles’ use of the Avicennian distinction from Wippel (1981, 223n4), who refers to Giles of Rome’s Quodlibet IV.9 (1646, 221–223), where Giles cites the relevant passage from Avicenna. According to Giles, both quantitas materiae and qualitas symbola remain numerically identical through generation and corruption.
- 45.
See Zavalloni (1951, 272–278).
- 46.
For the non-demonstrability of the inherence of the human soul, see, for instance, William Ockham, Quodlibeta septem I.10, 6339–6447: “Dico quod intelligendo per ‘animam intellectivam’ formam immaterialem, incorruptibilem quae tota est in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte, nec potest evidenter sciri per rationem vel per experientiam quod talis forma sit in nobis, nec quod intelligere tali substantiae proprium sit in nobis, nec quod talis anima sit forma corporis—quidquid de hoc sensuerit Philosophus non curo ad praesens, quia ubique dubitative videtur loqui—sed ista tria solum credimus.” Compare also Oresme, Qq. DA III, q. 4 (Patar [1995, 335, ll. 78–80]), and Ps.-Buridan QDAP III, q. 4 (Patar [1991, 42, ll. 333–38]). Marsilius of Inghen, too, claims that we cannot demonstrate the manner in which the human soul inheres in the body, as can be seen in Pluta (2000). Scotus was slightly more optimistic, but he also thought that we could neither demonstrate the immortality of the human soul, nor its origin. See, for instance, John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 43, q. 2, 46: “Potest dici quod licet ad illam secundam propositionem <i.e. quod anima intellectiva est immortalis SdB> probandam sint rationes probabiles, non tamen demonstrativae, imo nec necessariae.” For a detailed discussion of Scotus’s views on the limits of the demonstrability of the properties of the soul, see Bazán (2001).
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de Boer, S.W. (2017). Where Should We Discuss the Soul? On the Relation between the Doctrines of De anima and De generatione et corruptione . In: Klima, G. (eds) Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51763-6_2
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