Abstract
Panaccio’s chapter takes on the issue of objects of thought in a purely nominalist setting, comparing Ockham’s and Buridan’s accounts of the same questions. The chapter argues that whereas William of Ockham can legitimately be branded as a linguistic externalist, Buridan’s considered position with respect to linguistic meaning is a form of internalism. In this discussion, much hinges on the precise understanding of the medieval doctrine of imposition, the mechanism whereby written and spoken symbols are subordinated to acts of thought, and how this mechanism relates individual acts of thought to their publicly recognized objects.
The research that led to this paper was generously supported by the Canada Research Chair program and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am very grateful, needless to say, to both organizations.
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Notes
- 1.
See Panaccio (2015).
- 2.
See Panaccio (2012).
- 3.
See SL I.1: “Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae […] Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum” (Boehner 1974, 7–8).
- 4.
As Ashworth (2013) insisted, the whole medieval picture of linguistic imposition was strongly influenced by the passage of the Genesis, where Adam gives names to the various kinds of animals. Adam was thus taken to be the original impositor of the animal names that subsequent speakers would use. Ockham’s view of subordination, in particular, is a generalization of this picture to all kinds of words and to all original impositors, whoever they might be.
- 5.
“Ille enim qui primo instituit hanc vocem ‘homo’, videns aliquem hominem particularem, instituit hanc vocem ad significandum illum hominem et quamlibet talem substantiam qualis est ille homo” (My italics) (Boehner 1974, 124). Unless otherwise stated, the English translations of Latin texts are mine.
- 6.
“[…] contingit aliquam vocem aeque primo plura significare, quia una impositione imponitur omnibus quibus conceptus determinatus habitus ab imponente est communis […] Talis est haec vox ‘homo’ […] quia imponens hanc vocem ‘homo’ intendebat quod significaret omnem rem de qua conceptus mentis determinatus praedicatur” (My italics) (Brown and Gál 1970, 139–140).
- 7.
“[…] voces mere absolutae possunt imponi eisdem de quibus habemus, vel alii habent, tales conceptus” (My italics) (Boehner 1974, 558).
- 8.
According to Ockham’s theory of concept formation, the simple, absolute concept of lion can only be acquired on the basis of an intuitive grasping of at least one lion.
- 9.
On this development in Ockham and its roots in Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, see Ashworth (1980).
- 10.
This principle was endorsed by Aquinas, for one, e.g. in ST Ia, 13, Prologue: “[…] unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum cognoscimus”; and it was rejected by Scotus, e.g. in Ord. I, d. 22, q. unica: “Potest dici breviter quod ista propositio communis multis opinionibus—scilicet quod ‘sicut intelligitur, sic et nominatur’—falsa est si intelligatur praecise, quia distinctius potest aliquid significare quam intelligi.” See on this Ashworth (2013).
- 11.
“[nomen] intelligenti distincte exprimit rem quamvis intelligens non eam distincte intelligat” (Etzkorn and Kelley 1979, 57).
- 12.
“Praeterea, potest aliquis imponere hoc nomen a ad significandum quodcumque animal quod occuret sibi cras. Hoc facto, distincte significat illud animal, et significabit apud omnes volentes uti voce sicut imposita est, quantumcumque illud imponens non distincte intelligat, nec forte distincte intelliget quando sibi occurret (Etzkorn and Kelley 1979, 56).”
- 13.
“[…] dico quod non distinctius significamus quamcumque rem per vocem quam ipsam concipiamus” (Wood and Gal 1990, vol. 3, 293).
- 14.
“[…] non videtur mihi quod illi dicant consequenter qui ponunt quod voces sunt signa subordinata conceptibus in significando, sicut Scotus et Ockham, et tamen quod vox aliqua distinctius significet quam conceptus […]” (Wood and Gál 1990, vol. 3, 292).
- 15.
“[…] dictiones categorematicae innatae supponere significant res aliquas mediantibus conceptibus earum, secundum quos conceptus vel similitudines impositae fuerunt ad significandum” (My italics) (Van der Lecq 1998, 39).
- 16.
“Et non est in potestate mea vel tua auferre vel mutare huiusmodi significationem communem. Sed hoc fuit in potestate primi imponentis illud ydioma vel primorum imponentium, qui ad placitum suum talibus vocibus tales significationes dederunt” (My italics) (Van der Lecq 1983, 16).
- 17.
See Lagerlund (2007). Having distinguished ‘individual signification’ and ‘common signification’ in Buridan, Lagerlund adds that these two “need to coincide for us language users to be able to communicate” (74).
- 18.
“[…] data fuit nobis virtus vociferandi finaliter ut possemus aliis significare conceptus nostros […] Et sic patet quod vox significativa debet significare audienti conceptum proferentis, et debet in audiente constituere conceptum similem conceptui proferentis” (My italics) (Van der Lecq 1998, 9).
- 19.
See, e.g. SDSOPH I: “[…] voces significativae significant passiones, id est conceptus animae, et non alias res nisi mediante significatione conceptuum. Hoc patet primo: quia subordinate [sunt]” (My italics) (Pironet 2004, 19).
- 20.
“Hoc enim nichil mihi significat per quod ego nichil intelligo, cum significare sit intellectum rei constituere” (My italics) (Van der Lecq 1983, 12).
- 21.
See Klima (2009, esp. 83–87).
- 22.
See QPI, q. 9: “[…] sciendum est, prout perfectius debet videri in septimo Metaphysicae, quod impossibile est concipere rem pure individualiter nisi concipiatur per modum existentis in prospectu concipientis, aut memorando quod fuit ita, aut tamquam demonstrative significata cognoscatur; aliter enim non fieret conceptus pro illa unica re supponens nisi per circumlocutionem, quae non esset proprie singularis, ut dictum est” (Tatarzynski 1986, 160–161).
- 23.
- 24.
“Deinde etiam de istis terminis ‘Socrates’ et ‘Plato’ dico, quod vere et proprio sunt termini individuales, quia hoc nomen ‘Socrates’ impositum fuit huic homini per demonstrationem, ut quod iste homo vel iste puer vocetur proprio nomine ‘Socrates’. Sic enim impositum illud nomen nulli alteri potest convenire nisi hoc sit per aliam novem impositionem, sed tunc erit aequivocatio” (My italics) (Tatarzynski 1986, 162). The passage is quoted by Klima (2009, 86). His translation is slightly different from mine, but nothing of importance hangs on the differences.
- 25.
See above nn. 18 and 20.
- 26.
“Isti autem modus singularium, scilicet Socrates, Plato, Aristoteles, etc. fuerunt proprie singulares habentes conceptus simpliciter singulares sibi correspondentes, quia imponebantur ad significandum res conceptas per modum existentium in prospectu imponentium, qui dicebant hoc vel hic puer vocetur nomine proprio Socrates. Sed illa nomina aliis qui non viderunt illos, non sunt iam singularia, nec habentia conceptus correspondentes simpliciter singulares. Sed sicut notat Porphyrius, dicuntur singularia illis per circumlocutionem […] ut per hoc nomen Aristoteles intelligimus hominem Graecum sapientissimum, discipulum Platonis, et consiliatorem Regis Alexandri.” (My italics).
- 27.
Reina (1959, 372, n. 21) judges Buridan’s Questions on the logica vetus to be “more prolix, but at the same time more elementary than the Summulae de dialectica.”
- 28.
“Sed tu diceres: Quomodo ego [my emendation instead of ‘ergo’—CP] possum concipere Aristotelem singulariter, cum numquam fuerit in prospectu meo? Ego dico quod non est tibi possibile, loquendo proprie, quia tu non concipis eum differenter ab aliis hominibus nisi secundum quandam circumlocutionem […] Modo licet haec descriptio secundum veritatem non conveniret nisi sibi, tamen ipsa non est proprie terminus singularis […] ita si fuisset alius qui fuisset supremus philosophus et magister Alexandri et discipulus Platonis etc. illi convenisset dicta descriptio et pro eo supposuisset. Sic autem non est de termino simpliciter et proprie singulari. Quia si hunc in prospectu meo demonstratum voco Socratem nomine proprio, non quod talis vel talis sed quia iste [my emendation instead of ‘isti’—CP], numquam alii quantumcumque simili conveniret hoc nomen ‘Socrates’, nisi ex alia impositione esset impositum ad significandum illum alium, et sic aequivoce.”
- 29.
“Sed major dubitatio est de isto termino Aristoteles, utrum sit terminus singularis et utrum correspondeat ei conceptus singularis. Et ego credo quod bene fuit terminus singularis, et impositus fuit secundum conceptum singularem, scilicet quando Aristoteles denominabatur. Dicebatur enim: iste vocetur Aristoteles. Et quia nos credimus quod secundum conceptum singularem illud nomen fuit impositum, ideo reputamus semper istum terminum tamquam singularem, tamen credo quod in nobis qui non vidimus Aristotelem non correspondet illi nomini conceptus singularis […]” (My italics).
- 30.
See above n. 24: “[…] nisi hoc sit per aliam novem impositionem […]” (from QPI, q. 9); and n. 28: “[…] nisi ex alia impositione esset impositum ad significandum illum alium […]” (from QPHYS I, q. 7).
- 31.
See Klima (2009, 52): “Accordingly, the acts of imposition in question should not always be taken to be solemn occasions of name-giving, such as baptism, nor even as the original act of introducing a new term or an old term with a new meaning to be recognized by the entire linguistic community. Indeed, the acts of imposition in question may actually be specified as any singular occasion of use of a single linguistic token by a particular user, whereby it will specify the token-concept actually subordinated to that linguistic token on that particular occasion in the mind of that particular user” (My italics).
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Panaccio, C. (2017). Linguistic Externalism and Mental Language in Ockham and Buridan. In: Klima, G. (eds) Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51763-6_15
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