Abstract
This paper is based on the assumption that the most plausible metaphysics behind the scientific image of the world is causal realism. A theory of causality is defended within the framework of the new mechanical philosophy, and therefore, in terms of mechanisms. This theory is substantiated on properties, dispositions and powers. In sum, the paper aims to show that causality operates through mechanisms formed by entities whose properties have the power or disposition to affect other properties (through interactions), thereby producing certain effects; and this is what causation means. The analysis is situated within new dispositionalism, but shies away from new essentialism, showing that a causal ontology of properties (causal powers) can be sustained without recourse to essentialism.
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Notes
- 1.
Causality is a notion intrinsically connected with the notion of time (Agazzi 1980, 299).
- 2.
I am referring to Mumford’s paper (2009, 94–111), although he uses the term ‘powers’ there, not mechanisms.The expression appears in the title of the paper (‘Passing powers around’).
- 3.
Laws are merely covariations, and causal explanations are based on mechanisms.Therefore, as Andersen argued recently, mechanisms in fact replace laws. See Andersen (2011, 325–331). She argues this point in her response to Leuridan’s work (2010), in which the author held that mechanisms depend on laws, rather than replacing them.
- 4.
In Mayntz ’swords, ‘the main difference between a mechanism approach and a covering law approach is that … “laws” are basically general statements about covariation’ (Mayntz 2004, 240–241).
- 5.
Therefore, the ‘search for mechanisms means that we are not satisfied with merely establishing systematic covariations between variables or events’ (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 7).
- 6.
Mechanisms can explain both types of regularities (robust and unstable).
- 7.
- 8.
Entities comprise a vast range of very different objects, from massive bodies such as stars and galaxies to fundamental particles such as quarks, photons, neutrons and neutrinos.
- 9.
The debate between the proponents of the two positions is quite interesting. See its reconstruction in Tabery (2004).
- 10.
Salmon (1984, 275) affirms that ‘mechanisms are composed of processes and interactions’.
- 11.
In Glennan’s words (1996, 51), ‘analysis of causal connections in terms of mechanisms is only meaningful when there are ways (even if indirect) of acquiring knowledge of their parts and the interactions between them’. Salmon and Glennan are examples of authors who defend the two main positions on mechanisms, although there are other positions as well, for example that of Torres (2009).
- 12.
Glennan (2002) maintains this division in his systems approach to mechanisms.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Regarding causal processes, Salmon (1984) considers two cases to be particularly important: those in which there are shared causes for two or more effects (this goes back to Reichenbach’s common cause principle) and those in which there are two causes for the same effect (both cases can also exist together). This entails complex causal interactions, and is an interesting notion to consider when explaining improbable events and seemingly random coincidences.
- 17.
Cartwright (1989, 9) likens her conception to those of Salmon, Eells and, in particular, Spohn . She argues explicitly for the centrality of capacities, and explicitly distances from Hume, and even more so from Hempel and Nagel, while she agrees with S. Mill.
- 18.
She remarks in her introduction that her capacities might well be called either ‘propensities’ or ‘powers’ (Cartwright 1989, 9).
- 19.
- 20.
Nevertheless, too many problems remain unresolved for them to be considered to have achieved this (as Clarke shows in his critical analysis of the diverse reformulations of the conditional).
- 21.
- 22.
See Lowe (2006, 41)—although he speaks of kinds rather than types.
- 23.
Mumford’s notion (2010, 434).
- 24.
This is what Chakravartty (2008, 155) argues regarding cluster kinds (natural kinds of things without essences). However, he holds that there are kinds of things that appear to have essences, and therefore essence kinds with essential properties.
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Acknowledgements
This article has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Research Project FFI2012-33998 and Research Project (FEDER) FFI2015-64529-P).
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Gómez, A. (2017). Causation and Scientific Realism: Mechanisms and Powers without Essentialism. In: Agazzi, E. (eds) Varieties of Scientific Realism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_20
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