Abstract
In this paper, I analyse the metaphysical component of scientific realism. I develop and defend the view that the realist claim of mind-independence is captured by what I call ‘the possibility of divergence’, viz., the possibility of a gap between what there is in the world and what is issued (or licensed) as existing by a suitable (even ideal) set of epistemic practices and conditions. I break up the realist commitment to mind-independence into two components: irreducible existence and objective existence. I then show how various versions of anti-realism (in particular, idealism and verificationism) compromise one or both of these conditions. I also show that a verificationist version of scientific realism, though honouring the condition of irreducible existence, compromises the condition of objective existence; hence it is in conflict with the realist demand for mind-independence.
The characterization of some philosophical view concerning a particular topic as realistic has substance only by contrast with an opposing view that has been maintained or is at least imaginable.
Michael Dummett
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Notes
- 1.
The references are from Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, second edition 1734, reprinted in Berkeley (2008).
- 2.
This might sound controversial, but it isn’t. Berkeley’s chief aim was not to argue against corpuscularianism but, instead, to show that there is no argument for matter stemming from mechanical philosophy. That is, that mechanical philosophy—or the “clockwork of nature”, as he put it—is consistent with immaterialism. This “clockwork of nature” is such that “great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope” (Principles §60). His chief target then was to show that accepting that there is no matter does not entail that one has to abandon the view that there are mechanisms in nature. On the contrary, he wanted to show that if mechanism is seen as a material mechanism “without the mind” it won’t be able to produce anything anyway. For some similar considerations, see Garber (1982). For a somewhat differing view see Downing (2005).
- 3.
For Berkeley, the ‘clockwork of nature’ is the way God has chosen to produce effects in nature in a regular and orderly way. In particular, God acts in nature via laws of nature and these are ‘implemented’ by mechanisms, which embody the regular behaviour assigned to them by laws.
- 4.
A modern classic refutation of idealism is given in Musgrave (1999, Chap. 9).
- 5.
All references to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are from Kant (1998).
- 6.
For more on this see Rae Langton (1998, 6 & 143ff). Langton treats Kant as an outright scientific realist but mainly because he accepts the reality of invisible entities. She does not deal with the Objectivity Condition at all.
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Psillos, S. (2017). Scientific Realism and the Mind-Independence of the World. In: Agazzi, E. (eds) Varieties of Scientific Realism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_11
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