Abstract
This chapter focuses on the role of social media in galvanizing street protests, demonstrations, and other forms of democratic participation associated with the Iranian Green Movement, and examines how Iranian activists framed relevant events, norms, values, ideologies, issues, narratives, and symbols on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other websites. The political, social, economic, and technological circumstances in Iran that triggered the Green Revolution and eventually contributed to its apparent demise are investigated. In particular, the chapter explores how movement activists utilized social media to enunciate their political demands and mobilize supporters—both within Iran and around the world. Attempts by activists to achieve a frame alignment between the Green Movement and relevant indigenous (national) and transnational discursive concepts are examined. The chapter proposes that the use of collective action frames in social media was initially instrumental in mobilizing the Green Movement and contesting the dominant frames of the regime, but ultimately proved to be insufficient and even counterproductive at times in sustaining the necessary levels of popular support to topple the regime from power.
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Notes
- 1.
Estimates of the number of marchers at the initial Green Movement rallies vary from the “millions” to “hundreds of thousands” (Cross 2010, p. 173).
- 2.
By the end of June 2009, Green Movement protest marches and other demonstrations had begun to diminish significantly in size and frequency. However, the first truly unsuccessful Green demonstration took place in February 2010. As Honari (2013) explains, “The Green Movement’s plan to hijack the official rally, which was called the ‘Trojan Horse’ tactic, did not work. They could not reveal their signs during the pro-government mass rally because either they were relatively few compared to pro-government participants or they were scared to expose their green banners among a dense population of police and security agents.” (p. 159).
- 3.
See, for instance, Drissel (2011).
- 4.
For more information, see Table 1.
- 5.
In effect, movement activists are engaging in “frame lifting,” which involves shaping collective action “to match an institutionally embedded frame” (Morris 2000). Put simply, movement leaders recognize that there are important symbols, narratives, and channels already in existence that can be “lifted” from one domain to facilitate collective action in another.
- 6.
For instance, Iran has dropped from 45th place in life expectancy to 133rd place among all UN member-states since the 1979 Revolution.
- 7.
- 8.
In 2000, for instance, there were only 132,000 Iranians who had regular access to the Internet; but that number swelled to an estimated 418,000 in 2001, 1,326,000 in 2002, 11 million in 2006, and 23 million in 2009. Moreover, approximately 30 million Iranians—or 44% of the population—owned a mobile phone by 2009, which represented a dramatic increase from the recent past (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, pp. 11–13). Within the city of Tehran alone, there were 5.5 million cell phone users out of a population of 7.8 million people. In particular, students and other young adults reportedly comprised the overwhelming majority of cell phone users in Tehran and throughout Iran (Bakhtavar 2009, p. 201).
- 9.
By the time of the June election, there were an estimated 75,000 active bloggers in Iran. The Iranian blogosphere likely exceeded the size of its entire Arab counterpart by June 2009; though the Iranian Internet was heavily censored and lacked broadband access (Aday et al. 2010, p. 13).
- 10.
Such pages included posts that called for the President’s ouster and even compared him to Hitler.
- 11.
Mousavi’s Facebook page first appeared in April 2009 and was initially utilized as a “campaign tool” for the upcoming election (Cross 2010, p. 171).
- 12.
As Alizadeh (2010) notes, “The increase in turnout Iran’s elections has always benefited the opposition and not the incumbent, because it is rational to assume that those who usually don’t vote, i.e., the silent majority, only come out when they want to change the status quo” (p. 4).
- 13.
At the time, critics also pointed to many specific “absurdities” in the election tally. For details, see Alizadeh (2010, pp. 3–4).
- 14.
For instance, one tweet observed, “Basiji are breaking into homes! Gather in large neighborhood groups.” Offering important advice, many tweets made cautionary statements to Green Movement protesters, such as the following: “Due to overnight Basij attack to people’s home make sure to remove all markings from your doors.”
- 15.
For example, one tweet encouraged protesters to “remove all street signs, so shipped-in forces will lose orientation.”
- 16.
Examples included, “Tomorrow 4 p.m. Green Wave march is not canceled,” and “Mousavi & Karoubi ask supporters not to attend Friday prayers (which is being delivered by supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei).”
- 17.
For instance: “Mousavi’s supporters will take part in peaceful demonstrations today at Imam Khomeini Sq. in Tehran,” and “Please join Mousavi, Khatami and Karoubi tomorrow at 4 p.m. from Enghelab Sq. to Arzadi Sq. in Tehran for a crucial green protest.”
- 18.
Tweets explained, for example, that the Italian embassy was not accepting wounded protesters, in contrast to the Portuguese and Mexican embassies that were openly receiving and treating the injured.
- 19.
One tweet stressing the Islamic character of the Green Movement, for instance, observed, “Today most protesters are carrying the holy Quran.” And another tweet boldly asserted, “Mousavi has called for a general strike. Stay on the streets today. Keep your Holy Quran with you. It is a shield.”
- 20.
As one tweet asserted ominously, “If you don’t hear us it doesn’t mean we don’t exist, Tsunami on the way.”
- 21.
One tweet, for instance, queried, “Will the army move in defense of the people? There are voices in highest ranks calling for this.”
- 22.
One popular chant, for instance, was directed to Ahmadinejad, as follows: “Dirt and dust is you, it is you who are the enemy of Iran.” And a related slogan, often retweeted, asserted, “We are not dirt and dust, we are Iran’s nation.”
- 23.
As one tweet with the hashtag #IranElection reminded supporters: “Tonight 10,11,12, ‘Allah Akbar’ from rooftops.”
- 24.
Although this slogan referred originally to the Shah, the Green Movement effectively lifted and appropriated the frame by instead referring to Ahmadinejad and Khamenei (Gheytanchi 2010, p. 255).
- 25.
As one tweet observed in somber tones: “Mousavi we will stand beside you—we will die beside you—Allah Akbar—peace be upon all man.” Another tweet observed that the “people are prepared to die, our leaders must be prepared to lead.” And one popular movement slogan, often retweeted, connected martyrdom directly to the act of voting, as follows: “Martyred brother, we will get back your vote.” Several tweets emphasized the public recognition of recent martyrs, as follows: “Honorable people of Iran, please pay your condolences to families of martyrs from recent events by taking part in ceremonies at mosques on Thursday.”
- 26.
Examples of tweets focusing on Neda included, “Let Neda’s voice be heard,” “This is Neda! Don’t ever forget her,” and “Neda you will always remain in our hearts.” In addition, comments by Roger Waters of Pink Floyd fame were retweeted frequently by green activists, which referred to Neda as “the one in fifty million who can help us to be free—because she died on TV.”
- 27.
Announcing his appeal on Facebook, Karroubi asked protesters to assemble in Tehran’s city center at 4 p.m. on June 22. Green activists also promoted this event heavily on Twitter, thereby apparently helping to mobilize a larger number of demonstrators.
- 28.
As one tweet asserts euphemistically about the 2009 election, “The Shah’s sin was to insist that whatever he says is right, not whatever the people say.” In effect, such tweets were a strong critique of the current Iranian government, framing it as inherently corrupt, fraudulent, and dictatorial. One popular tweet, for instance, compared Ahmadinejad to the Shah, making light of Ahmadinejad’s dubious claim that he has a doctorate in engineering: “Down with the dictator, whether a shah or a doctor.”
- 29.
The related concept of “global justice” is described as an alternative globalism (or “globalization from below”) that contests the power and prerogatives of the reputedly hegemonic, market-oriented model of globalization that predominates in the world (Steger 2009).
- 30.
Mousavi, for instance, asserted the following in a public statement, which was widely disseminated on Facebook and Twitter in the aftermath of the June election: “Justice is the most significant indicator of wholesome governance … Authoritarianism will depart from the country when no one is deprived of his or her rights by the personal command of the ruler for the sole ‘crime’ of criticizing and opposing his commands and actions.”
- 31.
The celebrated Iranian filmmaker, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, for instance, explained that the Green Revolution was akin to a new civil rights movement committed to non-violent resistance—a transformative event not only for Iran, but also for Mousavi. As he observed about Mousavi in June 2009, which was posted on Facebook and other social media sites: “Previously, he was revolutionary, because everyone inside the system was a revolutionary. But now he’s a reformer. Now he knows Gandhi—before he knew only Che Guevara. If we gain power through aggression we would have to keep it through aggression. That is why we’re having a Green Revolution, defined by peace and democracy.”
- 32.
For a discussion of Martin Luther King and the Green Movement, see Ahmari (2010). As he observes, “Iran today is arguably the most vital proving ground for Dr. King’s ideas. The Iranian Green Movement has consciously transposed to its setting the techniques once used by African Americans to face down vicious white deputies and their attack dogs. In Iran the role of the southern deputies is taken up by the baton-wielding Basijis, who mercilessly veer their motorcycles into crowds and indiscriminately beat protestor and bystander alike” (pp. 173–174).
- 33.
As one tweet from June 2009 notes, for instance: “‘Truth never damages a cause that is just,’ and ‘First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they fight you, then you win.’ ~ Mahatma Gandhi #IranElection #Gr88 This is our story.” And a Facebook post from the same month combines synergistically Dr. King’s warning that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” with a stanza written by the famous thirteenth century Persian poet, Saadi Shirazi, transliterated into English as follows: “Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul. If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain. If you have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.”
- 34.
Various cautionary notes were also sounded, as one tweet intones: “Do not pick up a gun. Mousavi calls on Sea of Green not to be violent … do not sink to the regime’s level that is how we win.” Warning protesters against engaging in violent action, one tweet asserts, “The more there are riots, the more repressive action will take place, the more we face the danger of a … fascist society.” Attempting to seize the moral high ground, another tweet notes, “There is a point where condemning atrocity is a moral obligation. Massacres reach that point.” A related tweet utilizes the injustice frame of oppression, noting, “It is long after midnight and across the nation the cries of the oppressed ascend to the heavens.”
- 35.
According to Reporters Without Borders, more than 100 Iranian journalists were arrested, and at least 50 others were deported, during the 6-month period following the June 2009 presidential election (Honari 2013, p. 152).
- 36.
Officially responsible for exporting the Islamic revolution to other parts of the world, the IRGC provides financing and material support to numerous branches of Hezbollah, along with other militant groups. The IRGC even has its own air, naval, and ground forces, and thus represents a powerful parallel counterweight to the official Iranian armed forces, as well as the Council of Guardians and other theocratic organs dominated by Shiite clergy (Taheri 2009, p. 244).
- 37.
As a vast patronage network, the IRGC serves as a “fast track” for achieving political, economic, and social success in Iran. It is noteworthy that Ahmadinejad and more than half of his cabinet were IRGC members. In addition, IRGC members controlled approximately one-third of the seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), as of 2008.
- 38.
For instance, a series of pro-green tweets relayed the erroneous story of a young woman who had been raped, tortured, and murdered by police, after being arrested for chanting “Allah Akbar” on her rooftop. This report was revealed to be a hoax, but only after being disseminated extensively on Twitter and other social media (Esfandiari 2010).
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Drissel, D. (2017). The Rise and Demise of the Iranian Green Revolution: Collective Action Framing in Social Media. In: Arbatli, E., Rosenberg, D. (eds) Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy. Societies and Political Orders in Transition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51454-3_9
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