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Brushed Aside by Outside Progress: From Relative Decline to Colonization

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Central Asia and the Silk Road

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic History ((SEH))

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Abstract

This chapter deals with the long and uneven process of economic decline of CA and the SR, following the collapse of the Mongol Empire and a temporary recovery in the fifteenth century. The latter had benefited from new wide-ranging, although extremely violent, empire formation by Tamerlane, followed by his Timurid successors. From the early sixteenth century, increasing pressure was exerted on overland trade by European seaborne competition, following the discovery of the maritime route to India and China by the Portuguese. Meanwhile one can speak of a short-lived “mercantilist” renaissance of SR trade in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, featuring the simultaneous rule of strong political leaders (from Muscovite Russia to Mughal India) who carried out economic reforms and largely maintained peace. This was followed by renewed political destabilization, the unraveling of economic reforms, the intensification of maritime competition, and the spread of religious dogmatism. The use of artillery put an end to the political and economic power of nomadic empires in the eighteenth century. The “last glimmer” of the SR (around the beginning of the nineteenth century) brought a lease of life for what remained of traditional trade in the landlocked, newly isolated C Asian space difficult to access for modern European shipping technologies. Bukharan merchants played an important role at this stage. The mid-nineteenth century finally featured European (Russian) colonial conquest and the transformation of CA into a raw material appendage of the industrial world economy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If Admiral Zheng He’s exploration trips to the Indian Ocean, the Near East and East Africa had been successful, these ventures could have opened up a serious alternative to overland SR trade about a century earlier than it actually happened. But the great Ming explorer’s voyages were soon terminated, partly due to C Asian factors (see below).

  2. 2.

    This recalls Chinese silk production, which also constituted a national monopoly for centuries.

  3. 3.

    Timur is reported to have started out as the leader of a gang of four to five well-armed mounted roving freebooters (Ashrafyan 1998, 321).

  4. 4.

    See also the resulting Empire of Timur depicted in Map 4.1.

    Map 4.1
    figure 1

    CA during the Great Emirate of Tamerlane and the early Timurids (ca. 1375–1425)

  5. 5.

    Despite its reconstruction, Urgench never fully recovered from its devastation at the hands of Tamerlane.

  6. 6.

    Timur’s military campaigns probably entailed greater cruelty than any undertakings of similar scale he previously had, including Genghis Khan’s (Hambly (ed) 1966/1979, 164).

  7. 7.

    This once again reminds of the bitter and in most cases unresolved clashes for control of the SR in approx. the same area—the Levant—between Romans and Parthians, Byzantines and Sassanians, Mamluks and Genghisids.

  8. 8.

    This is reminiscent of some ways Tatar rule had exploited the Rus and its inhabitants, if to a lesser degree (see above).

  9. 9.

    This reminds of an institution going back to the Achaemenid Empire.

  10. 10.

    In contrast, as described earlier, while iqta holders in many cases ended up wielding long-term power over their lands, at least formally the institution of iqta was revocable and not hereditary.

  11. 11.

    Within limits, this may recall agricultural development policies of the Chinese bureaucracy.

  12. 12.

    Note the similarity of “tanga” with “dengi” (Russian) or “tenge” (Kazakh).

  13. 13.

    On the following states, see below.

  14. 14.

    Ghiyath al-Din Ali was a fifteenth-century Persian physician and scientist from Isfahan.

  15. 15.

    The subsidization of merchants by the Mongol authorities may be seen as a precursor to these activities.

  16. 16.

    Thus important territorial losses included: the lower Syr Darya valley, Transcaucasia, Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, Western Iran, Baluchistan, Punjab, and Kashgar.

  17. 17.

    Another such brotherhood was the Yasaviyya, founded in Yasy (Turkestan) in the twelfth century (see above). The Yasaviyya and later the Naqshbandia played an important role in the Islamization of C Asian nomadic tribesmen.

  18. 18.

    Just like the method of withdrawing current coins and substituting some of them with specially minted new ones, the method of selective overstriking corresponded to a confiscatory reduction of the quantity of money.

  19. 19.

    In Iranian languages (including Tajik), there is also a close resemblance between “Sart” and “Sogdian.” The one may be derived from the other (Der Groβe Ploetz 1987, 30. A., 1068).

  20. 20.

    Compare the trend toward feudal fragmentation in parts of Europe in the late Middle Ages.

  21. 21.

    For instance, in 1421 an important Timurid diplomatic and trade mission hit the SR for Beijing.

  22. 22.

    This recalls the involvement of the Mongol nomadic aristocracy and even representatives of the highest echelons of power in creating and financing trading ventures.

  23. 23.

    As explained earlier, the choice of the designation “Uzbek” probably goes back to the name of Khan Uzbek (1282–1342), one of the rulers of the Golden Horde (the former Mongol Ulus Jöchi).

  24. 24.

    To name some of the earlier nomadic invasions from a similar direction in about the same area: Massagetes and Sakas confronted the Achaemenid Empire and the Empire of Alexander in the sixth to the fourth century BCE, Yuezhi supplanted Greco-Bactria and established the Kushan Empire in the first century BCE, White Huns or Hephthalites evicted the Sassanian (Persian) Empire from parts of CA and set up their own confederation in the fifth century CE, Turkic conquerors extended their authority to the banks of the Oxus in 570 CE, and Karakhanids acquired Samanid territory and fixed the Amu Daria as their southern border in 999.

  25. 25.

    “Tashkent” means stone settlement in Uzbek language.

  26. 26.

    This reminds of initial Karakhanid treatment of their conquered former Samanid territories.

  27. 27.

    In Eastern CA the piecemeal sedentarization of the Uighurs—as opposed to the Mongols—was a comparable process.

  28. 28.

    Possibly due to quickly rising prices, the nominal value of the circulating coins declined substantially (in relative terms) and thus may have fallen below the market value of the metal the coins consisted of, thereby making it profitable to melt the coins and sell the metal.

  29. 29.

    In this sense, robbery and slavery may have even taken precedence over earning income.

  30. 30.

    Zhetysu had reverted to a typical nomadic pastoral territory. In the aftermath of the Mongol invasion, former towns and farming oases had utterly fallen into ruins (Shukow et al. 1957/1963, Band 3, 657).

  31. 31.

    Sales are attested in 1392 and 1399 (Roux 1991, 292).

  32. 32.

    Sudak had already been a Genoese port from 1266 to 1322.

  33. 33.

    For instance, a large number of adolescent Kipchak/Polovtsy males were reportedly shipped through the straits to Egypt, to be bought by the Sultan and his emirs, reared as Muslims, and trained as Mamluk servicemen (Jackson 2005, 308).

  34. 34.

    It is not without reason that Moscow has been called the “capital of five seas”: Moscow is not far away from rivers which drain into the Baltic, White, Black, Azov, and Caspian Seas.

  35. 35.

    As mentioned earlier, C Asian towns also had their “corporations” of traders and artisans, but they too did not constitute independent political bodies.

  36. 36.

    There appears to be a Mongol root of this word, namely, “ghasaghan” (obstinacy, refractoriness) or “ghazighu” (deviant, non-conform) (Martinez 2009, 96).

  37. 37.

    In any case, the Cossacks were unreliable allies for the ruler in Moscow. They participated in the large popular uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Kappeler 2001, 51).

  38. 38.

    This might also recall Muscovy’s “service nobility” created at about that time.

  39. 39.

    Genoa’s definite loss of Kaffa and thus of its direct access to the SR system after more than two centuries of presence probably contributed to the maritime trading nation’s decision to reorient its commercial ambitions toward the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Seventeen years later, the Genoese navigator Chistopher Columbus, sailing in Spanish services and searching a sea route to India unencumbered by Muslim middlemen, discovered the West Indies, and thus opened a new era in history.

  40. 40.

    This steppe route (from the Black Sea to Transoxiana or China), however, at the time was on the decline.

  41. 41.

    Khazanov points to even higher numbers of Noghay horses “exported” to Russia: While in the fall of 1527, 20,000 horses were driven into Muscovy “from the Nogai,” in 1529/1530 it was 80,000, and in 1532/1533 it was 50,000 (1983/1994, 205).

  42. 42.

    Saltpeter—a naturally occurring potassium nitrate used in making fireworks, gunpowder, etc.

  43. 43.

    This would imply that after the wiping out of agriculture in Zhetysu in the second half of the thirteenth century as a result of the Mongol invasion, (non-sedentary) farming made a humble reappearance in the region toward the end of the fifteenth or the early sixteenth century.

  44. 44.

    In this connection, a “horde” (Russian—orda) or “zhuz” (Kazakh—hundred) corresponds to something like a “tribal union” (Russian—rodovoe obedinenie) led by sultans that sometimes proclaimed themselves as khans (Oskolkov and Oskolkova 2004, 25).

  45. 45.

    This, of course, recalls the Shaybanids’ similar and practically simultaneous patronage policies, which probably were in competition with those of the Safavids.

  46. 46.

    This would invite comparison with early capitalist manufacturers and bankers in Europe.

  47. 47.

    This, in turn, could recall tiraz factories in the caliphate or karkhanas in the Mongol Empire.

  48. 48.

    For instance, Shaybani Khan’s (1500–1510) formal submission also to Muslim justice and his insistence on his role as a supporter and promoter of Sharia were typical of such Islamic precepts of a just ruler. Later on, despite the increasing identification of Uzbek elites with the sedentary regions they inhabited at the end of the seventeenth century, Genghisid rule remained intrinsic to legitimate leadership (Geiss 2003, 127).

  49. 49.

    There are, of course, counterexamples, like Genghis Khan’s and Tamerlane’s keen interest in innovations and new technologies of warfare, or the Dzungars’ strenuous efforts to set up their own firearms and cannons industry.

  50. 50.

    According to Stanziani, the Muscovy Company was the first trading company that was given a legal status (incorporated). In this respect other firms that were founded later (e.g., European trading companies of the East Indies or the West Indies) took the Muscovy Company as a model (Stanziani 2012, 106).

  51. 51.

    In his official report, Jenkinson gave a very sober description of business conditions in the Shaybanid domains of the mid-sixteenth century. In his view, trade was hampered by a multitude of factors: military and political instability, lack of rule of law, and monetary insecurity due to arbitrary acts of the regime. The English businessman particularly criticized unfavorable regulations like the ruler’s right of preemption and the high frequency of monetary reforms and confiscations. However, as Schwarz points out, there appears to have been a degree of ambiguity in Jenkinson’s stance vis-à-vis business conditions in the Uzbek Khanate, if one consults a letter that he wrote upon his return to Moscow to the agent of the Muscovy Compony in Vologda (Northern Russia). This letter actually recommends trading English cotton cloth, even if it duly warns of risks (Schwarz 2000, 13). Jenkinson was more successful in Persia (see below).

  52. 52.

    The new dynasty was called “Janid” because of its founder or “Astrakhanid” because it originated in Astrakhan on the Volga.

  53. 53.

    For instance, the mountainous principality of Badakhshan (Bactria, Northern Afghanistan) began to assume independent ways and Mir Yar Beg (the local prince) withheld the payment of taxes from the Badakhshan ruby mines. This led the Janid authorities to mount an expedition against him in 1691–1692. Mir Yar Beg was compelled to pay 2 years’ taxes, but managed to retain control of his region. Moreover, he built the city of Faizabad, henceforth regarded as the capital of Badakhshan (Pirumshoev and Dani 2003, 232).

  54. 54.

    This underlines the overall comparative weakness of the economic structure of the geographically rather isolated oasis of Khwarazm.

  55. 55.

    “Nuker” of course relates to the Mongol “nöker” (free man and warrior under Genghis Khan).

  56. 56.

    This result may have partly been due to a military ruse of the khan, who thus overcame the significant advantage the Russians had possessed, thanks to their firearms (cannons). According to a few surviving members of Bekovich-Cherkassky’s contingent, they advanced to within 120 km of Khiva, when the khan attacked them with a 24,000 strong army. After 3 days of bloody fighting, the Khivans were routed. Seeing that the enemy was very numerous, Bekovich-Cherkassky concluded that diplomacy would have a better chance of success. The khan welcomed the commander warmly, pretended to surrender to his proposed terms, and persuaded him to divide up the Russian army to dwell in separate towns in order to facilitate provisioning and the supply of forage. The Khivans then attacked the five towns one by one, slaughtering most Russians, selling the others as slaves, and executed all Russian officers including the prince (Allworth 1994, 9).

  57. 57.

    “Biy” is the local form of the Pan-Turkic title “beg.”

  58. 58.

    This, of course, recalls the deliveries of “heavenly horses” by Dayuan to the Middle Kingdom almost two millennia before, which accompanied the official “launching” of the SR (see above).

  59. 59.

    Given that the Turkmens of the Kopet Dagh area and of Khorassan connected Persia and the Uzbek Khanates economically—through slave and other trades and regional markets—the Safavid border to Sunni CA may in fact not have been as impermeable as sometimes thought.

  60. 60.

    Silk has been produced in Xinjiang since antiquity (more precisely, since the fifth century, when the technology of silk production escaped the Middle Kingdom and arrived in the Kingdom of Khotan—see above).

  61. 61.

    Due to reasons of proximity, this last factor was of course not valid for trade between China and Xinjiang, but it may well have had some validity for transit trade via Xinjiang between China and regions further afield (like Transoxiana, Khwarazm, Persia, and others), as the latter could have had recourse to alternate maritime routes.

  62. 62.

    See, e.g., the English East India Company (founded in 1600) or the Dutch United East India Company (1602).

  63. 63.

    The danger of nomadic conquests and campaigns that China (and other countries) faced in the early 1400s was real. The Ming dynasty was lucky that Tamerlane died (in 1405) immediately before his planned invasion of the Middle Kingdom. In this sense, Zheng He’s expeditions may not have been well timed indeed.

  64. 64.

    As Grousset appropriately put it: « L’antique superiorité tactique des nomades, due à l’extraordinaire mobilité, à l’ubiquité de l’archer à cheval, superiorité qui durait depuis le commencement des temps historiques, ceda devant la superiorité artificielle que l’usage de l'artillerie conféra d’un seul coup aux civilisations sédentaires » (1965/2008, 554). (“The ancient tactical superiority of the nomads, due to extraordinary mobility, to the ubiquity of the mounted archer, this superiority had persisted since the beginning of historical times. It yielded to the artificial superiority that the use of artillery had suddenly conferred on sedentary civilizations.”)

  65. 65.

    But in this latter respect, of course, there is no difference between nomadic and sedentary C Asian states straddling the weakening Eurasian trade routes.

  66. 66.

    This kind of behavior bears some—limited—resemblance to former Mongol procedures in taking possession of new territories (massacres, pillages, subdivision of the population according to the decimal system).

  67. 67.

    The Volga Route and Arkhangelsk seemed more promising than the southern maritime route as a link between England and Iran because the Portuguese had in the early sixteenth century established bases in the Persian Gulf (Bahrein 1507, Hormuz 1508) and in the Arabian Sea (Muscat 1508), which made seaborne access via the Indian Ocean to Persia more difficult for competitors. Moreover, the Levant and Egypt were ruled by the Ottoman Empire since the latter’s incorporation of the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo (1517), and in the mid-sixteenth century the Sublime Porte had also taken control of Mesopotamia, the Red Sea, the Bab-el Mandeb, and Aden, which probably rendered passage via the Near East and the Mediterranean more expensive.

  68. 68.

    This is valid for all North Asian forest peoples, except for Paleo-Siberians like the Chukchy and the Koriaks, who lived in the extreme northeast of the continent and were hunter-gatherers (Haywood 2011, 116–130).

  69. 69.

    In 1644, 10% of the czar’s revenues came from the taxation or sale of furs (Reinhard 2008, 184).

  70. 70.

    This may remind of the Western (e.g., British) view of China about a century later or the US view of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. In both cases one of the elements that probably attracted outside powers to the big East Asian nations was the opportunity for immense trading profits.

  71. 71.

    Perhaps Peter was striving to duplicate on an Indian route the success Ivan the Terrible had achieved in commissioning booming and enduring trade with Persia, in which Muscovite Russia had also served as a turntable of trade with Western Europe (in the second half of the sixteenth century) (see also Bouvard 1985, 35).

  72. 72.

    Although they were equipped with firearms, the participants of this expedition succumbed to Dzungar attacks and a winter-long siege that the far more numerous armies of these steppe nomads had laid to the fortress the expedition had built beforehand. After many participants had died of hunger and the Dzungars had taken a number of prisoners, what remained of the expeditionary corps was allowed to leave the site on a boat down the Irytsh to Russia.

  73. 73.

    The territories east of the Dnepr plus Smolensk and Kiev had been acquired by the Russian Empire from Poland in 1667.

  74. 74.

    Compare also with the above description of the spatial arrangement of agricultural activities in Bukhara under the Shaybanids in the sixteenth century (Schwarz 2000).

  75. 75.

    This dissent and separation of the Torguts somewhat resembles the dissent and separation of the Kazakhs under Zhanibek and Kerey almost 200 years earlier—with the difference that the Torguts chose to leave their region, Dzungaria, where their former fellow tribes were about the create a strong Oirat state, whereas the Kazakhs chose to discontinue their migration and not to participate in the creation of the Uzbek Khanate in newly conquered lands by their former fellow tribes.

  76. 76.

    This can be seen as a typical example of dispositional centralization and statehood as defined by Khazanov (1983/1994, 176, see also above). Geiss points out that powerful khans like Tauke were rare and owed their influence to the military threat caused by the Dzungars and the need for centralized defense (2003, 115).

  77. 77.

    Despite the Kazakh capital’s status as a religious center (and birthplace of the Yasaviyya) and despite the fact that at least parts of the Kazakh elite were of Muslim faith, the Zhety zhargy hardly incorporates elements of the Sharia. This is probably because most Kazakhs remained steppe nomads and as such were at best superficially Islamized.

  78. 78.

    Zyaket and ushur were also collected in the Khanate of Khiva in the seventeenth century (see above).

  79. 79.

    As Poujol points out, Dzungar historiography also deplores Kazakh depredations against Oirats as recurrent aggression (2000, 37).

  80. 80.

    This once more demonstrates the “billard principle” explained above. At least in the case of the invasions of 1717–1718 and 1723–1725 it can be argued that there was a third “billard ball” involved: In the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century, the Dzungars themselves had come under military pressure from the expanding Qing Empire (China), which produced a powerful push factor in the east, resulting in the “billard chain” Qing-Dzungars-Kazakhs-Uzbeks (compare also Maps 4.2 and 4.4, and see below).

  81. 81.

    Dzungar rule was formalized by the Middle and Senior Hordes’ signing of a treaty of union with Dzungaria in 1743 (Artykbaev 2007, 313).

  82. 82.

    This corresponds to the second wave of Krygyz migration to the Tienshan, about 800 years after the Kyrgyz had been expelled from Mongolia by the Khitan-Liao (see above).

  83. 83.

    In this respect, vertical (or altitudinal) nomadism resembles horizontal nomadism in that seasonal route and locations of pastures and encampments are usually clearly defined.

  84. 84.

    The non-emergence of a state is parallel to the development of Turkmen society.

  85. 85.

    Under his predecessor, Shah Tahmasp, Persia had already purchased firearms from England via the Muscovy Company (see above).

  86. 86.

    This may be interpreted as a dramatic sign of the decline of the Mughal Empire (Haywood 2011, 134).

  87. 87.

    The essential reason for the Mughal Empire’s dependence on horse imports reportedly was the difficulty in breeding horses in South Asia’s relatively humid climate (Wink 2001, 228–229; Pernau 2011, 114).

  88. 88.

    Calico—a plain woven cotton cloth printed with a figured pattern, usually on one side (Random House Websters’ Concise College Dictionary 1999, see also Glossary: some SR textiles, p. 266).

  89. 89.

    There are some parallels between Ahmad Khan and another very capable provincial military commander and founder of an empire in Afghanistan in the tenth century: As a Samanid regional commander, Sebüktegin held authority in the town of Ghazna (Afghanistan) within the rapidly declining Samanid Empire. Benefiting from weakening central power due to escalating hostilities with the Karakhanids (nomadic conquerors coming from the Eurasian grasslands), Sebüktegin usurped autonomy and independence as the ruler of a new Ghaznavid state in Eastern Afghanistan. He remodeled fiscal structures within his territory in favor of his followers, expanded his empire, and undertook numerous raids into India to exact booty (see above).

  90. 90.

    The Oirat nomadic state was led by rulers bearing the title “khongtaiji,” which more or less corresponds to “khan.”

  91. 91.

    The terms “Oirats” and “Dzungars” are here used as synonyms.

  92. 92.

    Lake Yamysh (near later Pavlodar) was already mentioned above, in connection with the Bukholts expedition (1716).

  93. 93.

    The “six towns” of Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aqsu, Uch Turfan, and Korla—see also above.

  94. 94.

    The Dzungar register recalls the Mongol census of taxpayers, their activities and wealth, carried out in all newly conquered territories of the Mongol Empire.

  95. 95.

    Since the Ili Valley is at least partly located in Semirechie, one could argue that—after the disappearance of the region’s sedentary civilization as a consequence of the Mongol onslaught of the thirteenth century—the Dzungar forced transfers of East Turkestani farmers to the Ili valley in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries constituted first steps toward the resettlement of the wider region.

  96. 96.

    This corresponds to old C Asian numismatic traditions, going back at least as far as the Kushanas (first century BCE).

  97. 97.

    For instance, high-value satins and tea were trans-shipped west and sold at a profit (Millward 2007, 93).

  98. 98.

    This phenomenon is nothing new and recalls the long-standing profitable intermediary role of the Sogdians for the Kushan state, the Hephthalites, and the Turk Kaghanate in relation to the Middle Kingdom (see above). As far as the “Bukharans” were Uighurs from East Turkestan, they may be linked to Uighur commercial and trading traditions going back all the way to the Tang era (seventh to ninth centuries).

  99. 99.

    In 1751 Tibet became a Chinese protectorate.

  100. 100.

    During the Great Northern War (1700–1721) between Sweden and Russia, Renat (1682–1744) had served in the Swedish army as a warrant officer in the artillery. He was taken prisoner after the battle of Poltava in 1709. In 1711 Renat was sent to Tobolsk where many Swedish officers were kept as prisoners of war. He entered the czar’s service, helped produce maps of Siberia for the Russian authorities, and participated in Bukholts’ unsuccessful expedition up the Irtysh river (Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Gustaf_Renat).

  101. 101.

    This third type of mission was of course also linked to the Dzungars’ (Mongols’) and Tibetans’ common Buddhist faith.

  102. 102.

    A tael is a Chinese measure of (mostly silver) currency weight of 34–38 g (depending on the region).

  103. 103.

    This may bear—remote—similarity to the (eventually successful) policy of “change through rapproachment” (German: Wandel durch Annäherung) followed by Western powers in the Cold War of the 1970s and 1980s vis-à-vis the USSR and the Eastern bloc. This policy promoted increased trade and human contacts while upholding military deterrence.

  104. 104.

    This recalls the tragedies that beset Native Americans and Oceanic populations, many of whom died not on the battlefields of European conquests but through contagion of illnesses alien to them. It also recalls the ravaging effect of the bubonic plague, “spread” by the Mongols, on Europeans (see above).

  105. 105.

    Compare the foundation of British colonial establishments in Australia as convict settlements about half a century later (Anderle et al. (ed) 1973, 421). Of course the Qing settlements in Xinjiang also recall the ancient Han dynasty military-agricultural colonies/garrisons (tuntian system) in CA.

  106. 106.

    This even corresponded to a—comparatively modest—reversal of the direction of the silver flow from China. After centuries of west-east flow from Europe to the Middle Kingdom, mostly along the maritime route, now there was a limited east-west flow along overland Eurasian routes. How much of the silver acquired by the Dzungars eventually reached Europe is unclear.

  107. 107.

    Since these nomadic or semi-nomadic conquerors originated in or were closely attached to CA itself, with hindsight one might also call their behavior “self destructive.”

  108. 108.

    Here one should add the Mongol imperial capital of Karakorum, although it lies outside CA as defined in this study.

  109. 109.

    One should add that after the demise of the Mongol Empire there were a number of Muslim middlemen, some of whom were in competition (and sometimes even at war) with each other, so that Westerners did not face an Islamic transit monopoly. For instance, there were the Golden Horde and its successor khanates (until the mid-sixteenth century), the Ottoman Empire, and the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt (until the latter was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1517).

  110. 110.

    Of course the volumes of trade via the maritime routes dwarfed those of the Northern Asian route.

  111. 111.

    Less well-financed and equipped Arab and other Muslim traders in the Indian Ocean and beyond were successively put out of business.

  112. 112.

    The dimension of this flood also had consequences for the institutional organization of the Chinese monetary and fiscal system: Uncoined silver gained importance as an alternative monetary medium to the traditional bronze coin (the “qian,” after all, dating back to the Han dynasty, see above). The Ming dynasty eventually became an active proponent of the silver economy when it converted most tax collection to silver in the “Single Whip” reforms (1580). Under Qing officials, silver flows were important for interregional transfers of tax proceeds between local treasuries (Perdue 2005, 380, 386).

  113. 113.

    Yet even Gunpowder Empires’ military might in the eighteenth century became insufficient to resist European expansion: European military technology had given superiority to the English and French East India Companies’ troops over strong Asian armies as shown in the Carnatic wars (1747–1763), which established British dominance over large territories on the Indian subcontinent and contributed to the downfall of the Mughal Empire (Habib 2003a, 337).

  114. 114.

    Once a major source of regular revenue—SR trade—had started to diminish, one could argue with Olson that the stationary bandit at least partly reverted to a roving bandit. Or in other words, a model of largely predictable taxation more or less based on the respect of rules and rights changed back to a model of plundering and arbitrary exploitation of the economy. Or put even more crudely, some regional rulers may have readopted the logic: “If you can’t get wealth from traders, rob your neighbors.” Of course this was a vicious circle similar to but more general than the one mentioned in the text above dealing with the increasing use of the sea route: Declining political stability drove down tax proceeds which further compromised stability, etc.

  115. 115.

    This should not come as a surprise. As explained earlier, the Mongol rulers (who had governed practically the entire SR network) had eliminated almost all borders and customs duties and had set up a specific transcontinental infrastructure (the Yam system) geared to facilitating and accelerating overland communication and travel, and thus holding the giant empire together.

  116. 116.

    Transit trade—conveyance of goods across a respective region (e.g., CA) without any processing, but possibly with reselling.

  117. 117.

    Tamerlane’s and the Dzungars’ attempts to regain control of trans-Eurasian trade routes failed. And the Manchu Empire (after 1758) was not willing or able to achieve such control either.

  118. 118.

    These were from the early sixteenth century, the seaborne route (around Africa and through the Indian Ocean), and from the late seventeenth century its supplement, the Siberian route.

  119. 119.

    As mentioned earlier, the Mughals’ first ruler was Babur, a Timurid prince who had fled Transoxiana from the conquering Shaybanid Uzbeks. Thus, the Great Mughals ruling India were a Timurid dynasty and their attempts to invade CA corresponded to campaigns of reconquest.

  120. 120.

    Batiste—a fine, often sheer, natural or synthetic fabric, constructed in either a plain or a figured weave (Random House Websters’ Concise College Dictionary 1999, see also Glossary: some SR textiles, p. 266).

  121. 121.

    “Turan” is here understood to correspond to the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva.

  122. 122.

    There even seems to have been a kind of division of labor: Merchants from “Grand Bukharia” were mostly active in trade with Russia and Russian Siberia, whereas “Little Bukharans” were more familiar with business with the Middle Kingdom.

  123. 123.

    In both of the latter two cases, caravan traffic from Astrakhan to Khiva in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries took about 1½ to 2 months.

  124. 124.

    This is valid particularly from the sixteenth century onward. In the following only those interlocking trade areas are mentioned whose mutual trade and exchanges were most intensive or well-known.

  125. 125.

    Partly, this is still the case today (see intermittent difficulties of Western military access to and control of Afghanistan and the tenuousness of Western presence in CA, moreover see stubborn obstacles to accessing the region’s oil and gas via pipelines from the West).

  126. 126.

    When these three states (the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Khanate of Khoqand) are dealt with together, they will henceforth be (somewhat imprecisely, but pragmatically) called “the khanates.”

  127. 127.

    This was possibly also in emulation of the British army (which however was well provided with artillery batteries) in India.

  128. 128.

    The Islamization of authority relations, as described by Geiss, would appear to embody the further development of the dual socio-political order (“Yasa-Sharia”) in CA, evoked by the same author and referred to above (Box 3.2).

  129. 129.

    The remaining Kalmyk Khanate in the Caspian Lowlands was later abolished by the czar and the minority of Kalmyks that had not migrated east in 1771, as well as their pastures and habitat were brought under the full jurisdiction of the Governor of Astrakhan. Yet the Kalmyks managed to preserve their traditional socioeconomic order in the nineteenth century, even if increasingly hemmed in and restrained by settlers and the authorities (Kappeler 2001, 47).

  130. 130.

    But this only corresponded to the reinstatement of a policy toward the Tatar elites that had by and large already been pursued from the late sixteenth century and that had been discontinued in the early eighteenth century by the reforms of Peter the Great.

  131. 131.

    Apart from cotton and cotton products, Bukharan lambskins, caftans, furs, silk, and velvet also featured prominently in the khanates’ deliveries to the czardom.

  132. 132.

    Even in the mid-nineteenth century, foreigners reportedly observed that only one in five Bukharan infantry soldiers would have a rifle, usually an ancient flintlock or musket dating from the beginning of the century (Roudik 2007, 91).

  133. 133.

    This Bukharan standing army, however, partly still depended on tribal nukers (warriors, probably derived from the Mongol term “noeker,” see above).

  134. 134.

    This practice was probably adopted from Mughal India.

  135. 135.

    Sash—a long band or scarf worn over one shoulder or around the waist.

  136. 136.

    Their total number has been estimated at 5000 to 10,000 (Schwarz 2004, 191).

  137. 137.

    In any case, the majority of Turkmens remained nomads or semi-nomads throughout the nineteenth century. Islam exerted only a limited influence on their way of life.

  138. 138.

    Some of the Russians sold in Khwarazm were apparently quite appreciated as builders of irrigation works (Osterhammel 2009/2013, 527).

  139. 139.

    Compare abovementioned possibilities of slaves regaining freedom in the Golden Horde in the fourteenth century and in Khwarazm in the sixteenth.

  140. 140.

    No relationship with the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

  141. 141.

    Khoqand’s recognition of Chinese suzerainty had two precursors in pre-Islamic times, when local rulers in Ferghana had a comparable relationship first with Han China, then with the Tang Empire.

  142. 142.

    The “Ili area” or “Ili district” is a historically important and not always clearly defined territory that essentially comprises the upper reaches of the Ili river valley between the Tienshan and the Alatau ranges, including the city of Kuldzha (Yining) and at times also the town of Zharkent (Panfilov). The Ili area is not understood to include the surroundings of the city of Almaty (Alma Ata, Verny) further downstream. The “Ili protectorate” however, which existed for about half a century following the Qing conquest of the area in 1758, comprised the entire Ili valley and Semirechie south of Lake Balkhash as well as the area surrounding Lake Issyk Koel.

  143. 143.

    Rhubarb, or more accurately, the dried yellow root of a strain of rhubarb that grows best in the highlands of Gansu and Qinghai, was much appreciated in early modern Europe as an effective astringent, purgative, and even an all-round “wonder drug,” almost as important a commodity as tea (Millward 2007, 110).

  144. 144.

    These practices recall Emir Shah Murad’s endorsement of Islam to buttress his authority.

  145. 145.

    Akmeshit was later renamed Perovsk by the Russian conquerors and Kyzyl-Orda by the Soviets.

  146. 146.

    Pishpek was renamed Frunze in the Soviet era and is today’s Bishkek, the capital of the Kyrgyz Republic.

  147. 147.

    This territory was officially still part of the Qing Empire, but had around 1820 apparently been vacated by Chinese troops that no longer had sufficient means at their disposal for upholding military presence in Zhetysu/ Semirechie. Yet the Chinese military remained stationed in its regional headquarters in Yining/Kuldzha in the upper Ili valley. The reason why the troops abandoned Semirechie (apart from the Ili area) is probably connected to the declining quality of Qing rule in the Chinese interior, growing corruption, political instability, unrest, and therefore shrinking subsidies sent to military outposts at the periphery of the empire, such as Zhetysu (Overy 2004, Map: China 1644–1839, 192; see also below).

  148. 148.

    Compare the Bukharan zakot (tax on movable property, like livestock and merchandise), the Khivan zakat (cauldron tax), or the Turkmen or Kazakh zyaket (cattle levy) (see above).

  149. 149.

    In fact, most Chinese and some other historians regard the Khoqand-China treaty of 1832 as the very first “unequal treaty” the country was compelled to sign with outside hostile powers (see also below).

  150. 150.

    Cheesecloth = light weight cotton gauze (thin and often transparent fabric) (acc. to Random House Websters’ Concise College Dictionary 1999).

  151. 151.

    Respective khans signed deeds in which they approved to become Russian subjects/citizens (priniatie rossiiskogo poddanstva) (Oskolkov and Oskolkova 2004, 32).

  152. 152.

    For the Senior Horde, this is probably only valid from the 1840s.

  153. 153.

    This remarkably resembles the Polovtsy’s nomadization routes of the twelfth century—see Sect. 3.3.4.5.

  154. 154.

    For example, in 1831 Cossaks built the fortress of Sergiopol (Ayaguz) on the banks of the Ayaguz river at the northern border of Semirechie.

  155. 155.

    This does not include tributary or vassal territories that were not possessions of the Qing dynasty, like Nepal, Burma, Siam, Laos, Tongking, Annam, Korea, the Khanate of Khoqand, and the Kazakh Senior Horde.

  156. 156.

    Although a border levy, this bears some resemblance to a kibitka tax.

  157. 157.

    From the beginning of the nineteenth century, more and more Russian businessmen accompanied Kazakh traders coming to the trading points established by the Chinese authorities and offered popular metallic articles and manufactured products (Khafizova 2007, 77).

  158. 158.

    As mentioned earlier, this model was first applied by the Han dynasty in around 100 BCE in China’s “Western territories” (of the time) comprising the Tarim Basin. The Qing dynasty founded its first military farms in eastern Xinjiang (Hami and Turfan) early in the 1700s, while still at war with the Oirats (see above).

  159. 159.

    Thus, in practice there was probably no fundamental difference to the Dzungars’ slave settlement policy in Ili.

  160. 160.

    Apparently, Altishahr begs’ taxation practices must have retained a degree of arbitrariness despite the Chinese authorities’ clampdown and tightening of regulatory reins after the Uch-Turfan rebellion (of 1765).

  161. 161.

    This silver was probably earned through transactions with soldier-farmers or through SR deals.

  162. 162.

    This may recall an element of modern interventionist agricultural policy.

  163. 163.

    “Mou” is a traditional Chinese unit of land measurement that varies with location, but commonly corresponds to 666.5 m2 (Encyclopedia Britannica).

  164. 164.

    An indentured servant (a dico) typically was an emigrant without means who was contractually obliged to render a couple of years of services to his lord of the manor in the New World who had paid his voyage.

  165. 165.

    The interruption of the SR section linking China and Khoqand in the late 1820s should have indirectly boosted alternate connections, including the Siberian route (via Kiakhta).

  166. 166.

    During the turbulent period of gaining control of Iran, however, the Qajars did not manage to gain control of the oasis of Merv. In other words, in 1790 Iran lost Merv to the invading Bukharans (see above).

  167. 167.

    Agha Muhammad was not the first Turkmen nomadic chief to found a major Persian dynasty or become a famous imperial leader. Among his Turkmen predecessors were Ismail Safavi (Shah 1501–1524) and Nadir Shah (1732–1747).

  168. 168.

    As mentioned earlier, lots of arable land in Persia had been destroyed by the Seljuks (eleventh century) and the Mongols (Hülegü Khan, second half of thirteenth century).

  169. 169.

    The largest Iranian slave market was Mashhad, the largest C Asian markets were (as mentioned above) Khiva and Bukhara.

  170. 170.

    Rupees of this standard constituted a highly valued and proven silver currency that had originally been launched in the mid-sixteenth century by the Afghan ruler Sher Shah and that had subsequently been adopted in Mughal India by Khan Akbar (1556–1605). Even after the demise of the empire, the Mughal rupee continued to serve as a model for coinages in the region (Rtveladze 2003, 459).

  171. 171.

    In the early 1800s, the popularity of Kashmir shawls was at its peak. According to Meyendorff, 20,000 were taken to Kabul every year, of which 12,000 went to Persia and the Ottoman Empire, and 3000 to Bukhara. Two-thirds of the Kashmir shawls which reached Bukhara went on the Russian Empire, many to be sold at the Nizhny Novgorod fair (Burton 2003, 419).

  172. 172.

    This would imply that, at least in some respects, Afghanistan in the early nineteenth century remained a predatory or plunder economy (not fundamentally different from its predecessor of the eleventh century, the Ghazavid Empire).

  173. 173.

    Today, Badakhshan is a province of Afghanistan.

  174. 174.

    The routes listed below of course do not include the direct connection that had been established in the late seventeenth century between Russia and China—the Siberian route (Beijing-Kiakhta-Irkutsk-Tobolsk-Moscow).

  175. 175.

    Although not noticeable as yet, this process would eventually result in the full-scale elimination of C Asian textiles from the Russian market (ibid).

  176. 176.

    This eastern expansion drive was not confined to CA; only few years after the end of the Crimean War the czardom acquired the Amur province (1858) and the Coastal province (Sikhote Alin 1860) in the Far East from China. Yet only a few years after that, Russia gave up its easternmost territories and sold Alaska (Russian America) to the USA (1867).

  177. 177.

    This argument gained weight toward the end of the nineteenth century. For the czarist regime, the eastward migration of peasants probably became a political “safety valve” of considerable significance.

  178. 178.

    Textile producers’ demand for C Asian cotton temporarily skyrocketed when supplies from overseas dwindled during the US Civil War (1861–1865) (see also below).

  179. 179.

    To give an example of the imbalance of military power reached between Europeans and C Asians in the second half of the nineteenth century: In 1864, General Cherniaev’s troops stormed the city of Aulie-Ata (today’s Taraz); victory cost them only three wounded servicemen, while the native garrison, which had consisted of about 1500 inadequately armed, weakly commanded, and undisciplined soldiers, incurred losses of 307 dead and 390 wounded. Thanks to artillery bombardment in the conquest of Khodzhent in 1865, the Russians lost five soldiers, while the defenders lost 2500 (Hambly (ed) 1966/1979, 219, 220; see also Marchand 2014, 14).

  180. 180.

    Verny (Almaty) was located near the ruins of an old Turkic settlement that had been wiped out by the Mongols (see above).

  181. 181.

    At that point, Semirechie was inhabited by nomadic pastoralists—predominantly by Kazakhs in the northern steppe territories and by Kyrgyz in the foothill areas and mountain ranges. The upper Ili valley (part of China) also featured settled farmers and town dwellers (see above). Thus—disregarding the Ili area which was not part of Zhetysu anyway and had its own specific history strongly influenced by the Middle Kingdom—Zhetysu in the mid-nineteenth century was not a settled region, except for some auxiliary agriculture, mining activities, and trade settlements.

  182. 182.

    The annexation of Semirechie was formally acknowledged by China in a border treaty of 1864 (Breghel 2003, 64).

  183. 183.

    The news of the conquest of Khiva was the first message sent to St. Petersburg from Tashkent through the newly constructed telegraph line (Roudik 2007, 79).

  184. 184.

    Kushka was the southernmost location the czarist forces reached in CA and became the southernmost point of the Russian Empire and, later, of the Soviet Union.

  185. 185.

    This bears resemblance to the post-1758 Qing treatment of Uighur society in Eastern CA.

  186. 186.

    This practice seems comparable to how Chinese settlements were set up just beside native (Uighur) city centers, e.g., in Kashgar from the 1830s.

  187. 187.

    This appears to imply a shift of meaning from the original Turko-Mongol “qishlaq” (nomadic winter camp, see above) to the Russian “kishlak” (C Asian village).

  188. 188.

    The czardom’s indirect military rule in Western CA (from the establishment of the Governorate-General in 1867 and the maintenance of the two protectorates) invites comparison with Qing indirect miliary rule in Eastern CA (notably in Nan Lu, from ca. 1760), which was not administered as a province of China proper.

  189. 189.

    “Use,” not ownership.

  190. 190.

    As mentioned earlier, cotton originated in India and has been cultivated in CA since antiquity (the Kushan era, ca. 1–200 CE), especially in the Ferghana Basin (the most appreciated variety) and in Transoxiana (Chuvin et al. 2008, 116).

  191. 191.

    This situation of being (temporarily) cut off from vital overseas deliveries by a trade embargo recalls the impact and the consequences of the continental blockade (1806–1812) on Russia’s trade with CA: Necessity or distress can trigger the emergence of new business opportunities, activities, and links that may survive even after the original cause of the disruption (the trade restriction) no longer exists.

  192. 192.

    While in 1877, 11,000 tons of Turkestani cotton were shipped to Russia, in 1915 it was more than 350,000 tons (more than 30 times as much) (Poujol and Fourniau 2005, 69).

  193. 193.

    In other words, while the discontinuation of cotton imports from America in the early 1860s was a painful shock for Russia, one or two decades later this became an official policy goal—with far-reaching implications for CA (Beckert 2014, 346).

  194. 194.

    This was not the first time oil was extracted in the czarist empire. The first oil well was drilled in Baku (Azerbaijan) in 1846.

  195. 195.

    In 1898, the Transcaspian line was extended to Tashkent, and in 1899 to Andijan (Ferghana). The same year another extension was laid to Kushka (on the Afghan border) (Map 4.6). The line Samarkand—Andijan served primarily economic interests, namely the transport of cotton. By 1906 the Trans-Aral railroad, a line linking Tashkent to Orenburg and thus to the rest of European Russia, e.g., on to Samara and Moscow, was completed. The resulting entire network (including a large C Asian “loop” leading from Orenburg via Tashkent and Merv to Krasnovodsk) had great strategic, economic and psychological significance in that it demonstrated the structural feasibility of CA’s “seamless” incorporation into the compact landmass of the bicontinental empire. This kind of integration was impossible in the case of the overseas colonies of other European powers, but not impossible in the case of the US or Canada’s transcontinental conquests and enlargements, in which the railroads also played a major role. Overall, shipments of cotton and other raw materials to European Russia, shipments of grain and finished goods in the other direction, and passenger transport in both directions (whether soldiers, merchants, businessmen, workers, civil servants, or tourists) were greatly facilitated and accelerated by trains, physically “binding” some of the czardom’s sprawling regions together. The modern infrastructural rapprochement of CA to Russia was indirectly strengthened by the fact that projects that aimed at linking Turkestan to other adjacent regions, e.g., via Afghanistan to India, did not materialize (Kappeler 2006, 147; Duby 2011: Map: L’Asie investie 1850–1914, 251; Soucek 2000, 205). Interestingly, rail links to India failed to materialize partly because of British resistance. The British apparently feared a military and economic strengthening of Russian influence in their colonies as a result of such a connection (Hofmeister 2015, 127).

  196. 196.

    Put differently, about 80% of skilled workers in Turkestan (and on the railroads practically all) were Russians (Breghel 2003).

  197. 197.

    In some respect, therefore, Bukharan Jews may have upheld the traditional role of “Bukharans” (explained earlier) as intermediaries in trade between Russia, CA, China, and (British) India.

  198. 198.

    The pattern of equal legal treatment for subjects of the Emir of Bukhara was preserved during the entire protectorate period and was inconsistent with domestic Russian legislation, which remained discriminatory toward Jews (Roudik 2007, 64).

  199. 199.

    The “regulations governing the Siberian Kazakhs” essentially dealt with the former Middle Horde, the “regulations governing the Orenburg Kazakhs” with the Junior Horde. In the 1820s, the Senior Horde was not yet abolished and formally still under Chinese suzerainty.

  200. 200.

    Up to a point, the sultan-governors were comparable to hakim begs as Qing Chinese officials, although the latter of course ruled sedentary, not nomadic populations.

  201. 201.

    The kibitka levy was nothing new, of course. A similar levy was already collected, e.g., in the Senior Zhuz under Dzungar rule.

  202. 202.

    Khobda and Or are tributaries to the Ural.

  203. 203.

    This could suggest that nomadic stockbreeding in low-precipitation grasslands (like a major part of the Desht-i-Kipchak) remained a relatively efficient and competitive activity even in the environment of a large emerging economy increasingly exposed to the nineteenth century world market (namely, Russia).

  204. 204.

    These included smaller towns, like the strategically well-situated Alexandrov Gay and Novouzensk (on the northern border of the Bukey Zhuz, about 150–200 km from the central Russian market of Saratov (on the Volga).

  205. 205.

    These uprisings may be seen to have had the Pugachev rebellion as a predecessor (in which Kazakhs also prominently took part).

  206. 206.

    As mentioned above, this tax had been introduced by the Russian administration on the former territory of the Younger Zhuz in 1837 at a level of one and a half roubles per tent/household.

  207. 207.

    The resettlement of parts of Semirechie/Zhetysu under Russian rule came about six centuries after the de-sedentarization of this region under Mongol rule.

  208. 208.

    One might ask why European mass colonization of the fertile Kazakh steppes only happened in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century—why not immediately after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 or a couple of years later, in the 1870s, when the pacification of Kazakhstan was concluded? Given the above-described substantial economic and demographic pressure building up in European Russia (the push factor), why didn’t the attractiveness of the newly won vast lands so apt for farming (the pull factor) play a role a generation earlier? Five reasons may explain why.

    Reasons related to the push factor:

    1. 1.

      As mentioned earlier, the former serfs did not immediately (after 1861) gain freedom and mobility. Due to institutional constraints and shortcomings, incisive changes only came with a delay—of possibly about two decades.

    2. 2.

      The acceleration of demographic growth in Eastern Europe only happened toward the end of the nineteenth century.

    Reasons related to the pull factor:

    1. 3.

      As also alluded to above, the specialization of nomadic stockbreeding in the low-precipitation grasslands for the Russian market turned out to be relatively efficient and profitable, at least for some time.

    2. 4.

      While the inorodtsy certainly did not benefit of the same rights as the European subjects of the czar, they had still formed part of the colonial administration set up in the steppes (the “voenno-narodnoe upravlenie”). The czarist authorities probably hesitated when they were confronted with the major social and political problems that the destruction of the nomadic Kazakhs’ lifestyle by large-scale removal and deportation of millions from the grasslands would give rise to.

    Infrastructural reason:

    1. 5.

      At the time, railroads were the quickest way to bring large numbers of immigrants to the steppe. In the 1870s, Russia was still in the early phase of building a network of rail connections in the central areas of the empire and had simply not yet reached the point when masses of European farmers could be swiftly transported east across Eurasia. The Transsiberian railroad only reached Omsk in 1894, and the Trans-Aral railroad (from Orenburg to Tashkent) was built even later (Kappeler 2006, 148). For comparison, the first transcontinental railroad of the USA was put into service and crossed the Great Plains in 1869, and Canada’s first train went all the way out west in 1885. Before these years, no mass settlement of North America’s West occurred.

  209. 209.

    Frederick Jackson Turner, US historian (1861–1932), author of the influential scholarly paper “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893).

  210. 210.

    One could consider applying this thesis—in a modified form—to Cossacks, or even better, to Eurasian nomads: Thanks to excellent mounted archery in Ukraine, Southern Russia, and CA, horseback nomads enjoyed traditional military superiority for millennia. Displaying extreme mobility in a harsh environment, these competent human beings have typically also been more open-minded and religiously tolerant than their less dynamic sedentary neighbors.

  211. 211.

    Indian populations inhabiting reservations in the USA today are recognized as “domestic-dependent nations” which possess autonomous tribal prerogatives (Rostkowski 2012, 79).

  212. 212.

    After conquering Eastern CA in the mid-eighteenth century, the Qing authorities’ approach to colonial rule left even more room to the indigenous peoples than Russia did in the nineteenth century: As explained above, indirect rule was established which rested on arrangements with the remaining traditional elites under the loose control of Chinese governors and garrisons. Notwithstanding continuous subliminal sinicization pressures on the defeated peoples, the Qing respected the culture of their new subjects and backed the integration of their upper strata into the hierarchy of the state (Reinhard 2008, 194, 197). Many of these rights were withdrawn, however, upon the incorporation of Xinjiang as a regular Chinese province (1884). But even then, some informal arrangements and de facto responsibilities survived (see below).

  213. 213.

    As Vries underlines, until the 1840s, the Middle Kingdom was the only country in the world that cultivated and exported tea (2007, 5).

  214. 214.

    Thus, in 1650, China had counted around 100 million inhabitants, in 1800 about 300 million, and in 1850 about 450 million (Overy (ed) 2004, 192).

  215. 215.

    In this way, although they were originally probably intended as emergency fiscal procurement measures, corruption and blackmail gradually destroyed institutions.

  216. 216.

    For the most part, the Russian merchants purchased Chinese brick tea, some silk, and cloth in return for which they sold livestock, hides, furs, and manufactured goods (ibid).

  217. 217.

    Given Khoqand’s militarily precarious situation just a year before the Russian invasion of Tashkent, (1865) one might have thought that the khanate was in need of all its capable military leaders to defend itself.

  218. 218.

    From a territorial viewpoint, this might be regarded a successor treaty to the Sino-Russian regional trade agreement concluded in the early 1850s (see above).

  219. 219.

    For nineteenth century merchants from British India, trade links (over the high mountain passes) with East Turkestan or more generally with CA may have become—relatively—less attractive than in earlier periods, given the major improvements and enticements of international seaborne trade.

  220. 220.

    Peter Hopkirk wrote a detailed account of this diplomatic struggle that lasted most of the century: “The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in CA” (1990/1994).

  221. 221.

    As mentioned above, from the eighteenth century advanced western trade and shipment technologies favored maritime instead of land routes and transportation, which contributed to CA’s relative isolation from early modern international commerce. The advent of railroads in the second half of the nineteenth century changed the equation somewhat. However for topographic and geopolitical reasons land access to CA remained easier from Russia (practically no natural borders) than from India (across mountainous and unruly Afghanistan or sky-high Kashmir).

  222. 222.

    The czardom also became the primary supplier of Chinese Turkestan with modern European industrial goods in the late nineteenth century (Millward 2007, 157; see also below).

  223. 223.

    Namely, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Khoqand (in the first half of the nineteenth century).

  224. 224.

    Interestingly, the concept of “cost-effective colonial administration” appears to correspond to opposite approaches in czarist West Turkestan and in Qing East Turkestan in the late nineteenth century. Whereas the Russian authorities practiced a kind of “hands-off” policy and at least in the first decades of rule over their part of CA seemed satisfied with its results, the Chinese authorities came to the conclusion that a “hands-on” strategy would save more resources—in the long run.

  225. 225.

    This was valid for Xinjiang and Mongolia, but not for the Chinese interior.

  226. 226.

    “Unequal treaty” conditions, as the Chinese would argue, therefore continued with Russia.

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Barisitz, S. (2017). Brushed Aside by Outside Progress: From Relative Decline to Colonization. In: Central Asia and the Silk Road. Studies in Economic History. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51213-6_4

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