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Opinion Manipulation in Social Networks

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Part of the book series: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications ((SDGTFA))

Abstract

In this work, we are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by paying agents within a group to supplant their true opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0) representing extremely positive (negative) opinion. We focus on asymmetric confidence between agents. The iterative update of an agent corresponds to the best response to other agents’ actions. The resulting confidence matrix can be seen as an equivalent Markov chain. We provide simple and efficient algorithms to solve this problem and we show through an example how to solve the stated problem in practice.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An FPTAS, short for Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme, is an algorithm that for any ɛ approximates the optimal solution up to an error (1 +ɛ) in time poly(nɛ).

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Correspondence to Alonso Silva .

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Silva, A. (2017). Opinion Manipulation in Social Networks. In: Lasaulce, S., Jimenez, T., Solan, E. (eds) Network Games, Control, and Optimization. NETGCOOP 2016. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51034-7_18

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