Skip to main content
  • 734 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter synthesizes the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Here, I reiterate the insights gleaned from the quantitative analyses, and illustrate the ways by which the case studies either support or call into question the proposed causal relationships. Furthermore, I discuss the degree of certainty with which the findings can be accepted, the generalizability of the results to advanced industrial societies, and lastly suggest avenues for further research.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Amable, B., & Palombarini, S. (2009). A neorealist approach to institutional change and the diversity of capitalism. Socioeconomic Review, 7(1), 123–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Birchfield, V., & Crepaz, M. (1998). The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 34, 175–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brady, D., & Leicht, K. (2007). Party to inequality: Right party power and income inequality in affluent western democracies. Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casey, T. (2009). Mapping stability and change in advanced capitalisms. Comparative European Politics, 7(2), 255–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cusack, T. R., Iverson, T., & Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origin of electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 101(3), 373–391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deeg, R., & Jackson, G. (2007). Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist variety. Socioeconomic Review, 5(1), 149–179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties. New York: Science Editions.

    Google Scholar 

  • Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gourevitch, P. A. (2003). Review: The politics of corporate governance regulation. The Yale Law Journal, 112(7), 1829–1880.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. W. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, England and New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hancké, B. (2009a). Introducing the debate. In B. Hancké (Ed.), Debating varieties of capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hancké, B. (Ed.). (2009b). Debating varieties of capitalism: A reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hicks, A., & Swank, D. (1992). Politics, institutions, and welfare spending in industralized democracies. American Political Science Review, 84, 658–674.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (1999). The making of a polity: The struggle over European integration. In H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, & J. Stephens (Eds.), Continuity and change in contemporary capitalism. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howell, C. (2007). The British variety of capitalism: Institutional change, industrial relations and British politics. British Politics, 2, 239–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, E., & Stephens, J. (2001). Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American Political Science Review, 100(2), 165–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korpi, W. (2006). Power resources and employer-centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism: Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists. World Politics, 58(2), 167–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manow, P. (2001). New coalitions of welfare state reform. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new politics of the welfare state. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, C. J., & Swank, D. (2008). The political origins of coordinated capitalism: Business organizations, party systems, and state structure in the age of innocence. American Political Science Review, 102(2), 181–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, C. J., & Thelen, K. (2007). The state and coordinated capitalism: Contributions of the public sector to social solidarity in postindustrial societies. World Politics, 60, 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roe, M. J. (2003). Political determinants of corporate governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soskice, D. (1999). Divergent production regimes: Coordinated and uncoordinated market economies in the 1980s and 1990s. In H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, & J. D. Stephens (Eds.), Continuity and change in contemporary captialism (pp. 101–134). New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Swank, D. (2001). Political institutions and welfare state restructuring: The impact of institutions on social policy change in developed democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new politics of the welfare state. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Swank, D. (2002). Global capital, political instiutions, and policy change in developed welfare states. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Arsenault, M.P. (2017). Conclusion. In: The Effects of Political Institutions on Varieties of Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50892-4_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50892-4_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-50891-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-50892-4

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics