Abstract
This chapter brings to the fore the strategic environment of the period 1957–2013 in order to explain the changes in the use of linguistic and semiotic resources of British policy makers. The need to influence the world instead of imposing the British power in specific territories, and the new competences that AF should develop are discussed in juxtaposition to the principles of emergence, autopoiesis and complexity of the cyber discourse. A resilient British nation in a complex world is the focal point of the new discourse on war. This is a conceptual change which this study defines as the cybernetisation of war, and this change is not dependent on the actual use of the respective technology, namely the Internet.
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Notes
- 1.
The Sandys defence review tried to deliver effective and affordable forces that would fulfil their roles under the pressure for extensive expenditure cuts, by proposing reliance on nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers. Nuclear deterrence was thought of as an appropriate solution to counterbalance the harsh decisions on defence cuts and this was further supported by the American example where nuclear weapons played a key role in the policy thinking of that period. Aircraft carriers would compensate for the reduction in overseas garrisons and RAF Fighter Command so as to bring power rapidly to bear in peacetime emergencies of limited hostilities. The Sandys review captured the need for comprehensive defence planning which would offer relative stability in the AF but which, at the same time, would be capable of responding quickly to technological and political changes. This thinking was in stark contrast to the practice followed until then of annual reassessments on defence policy which offered short-term solutions driven by the needs of each year. For this reason the Sandys review can be considered a revolution of its time (Navias 1996).
- 2.
The expeditionary operations after the 1957 Sandys Defence White Paper were: (i) in 1958, to Jordan to support King Hussein in suppressing a coup, (ii) in 1961, to Kuwait to support the new state in defending against territorial claims by Iraq and (iii) in 1964, to former East African colonies (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda) to help defend their independence (French 2013).
- 3.
Under Mason as Secretary of State for Defence, it was decided to withdraw all British forces from the Mediterranean theatre with the exception of Cyprus; to break up the Army’s strategic reserve division; to cut by half the RAF’s transport fleet and also to reduce amphibious forces. The commitment to airdrop two parachute battalions and supporting services was also abandoned, and the ‘airportable’ capability was to be reduced from three brigades to one. In addition, the overstretched British forces were to be recalled and confined to Europe. In 1976, the sterling crisis made it necessary to withdraw completely from Singapore (closing the Gan airbase in the Indian Ocean) and from the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa.
- 4.
Nott asked the Services to ‘build from the bottom up what sort of service would we want with the money that you have available’ (Dorman et al. 2002, p. 50). The Royal Navy, although it had been decided to equip it with the Trident system purchased from the USA, was the most affected, in that it lost approximately one-fifth of its destroyers and frigates, one aircraft carrier and two amphibious ships; ‘in total the Navy took 57% of the cuts in planned expenditure’ (Taylor 2010b). The instruction was not accepted with enthusiasm by the Services and provoked opposition to the extent that the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked for the resignation of the junior navy minister. These reductions were, to some extent, re-evaluated after the experience of the Falklands conflict in 1982. The White Paper (Cmnd. 8758 1982) on the lessons learnt from that conflict announced that the 5th Infantry Brigade was to become an airborne force with an all-arms assault parachute capability of two battalion groups (withdrawn under the Mason Review). Fearless and Intrepid were to be retained in service; the third aircraft carrier (HMS Invincible) was to be retained, and the number of destroyers and frigates was to be maintained at around 55. The White Paper concluded by signalling a return to ‘flexibility and mobility’, but as an extra rather than a central feature of force structure.
- 5.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Tom King, Secretary of State for Defence, announced the commencement of a process for reconsidering what the new strategic context was and what the appropriate British response should be. The government did not call this initiative a defence policy review and preferred to emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach: ‘it matters not what the present process is called, so long as a comprehensive approach is adopted […]. There are now fundamental choices to be made, after years of fixed assumptions and marginal adjustments. By whatever name, a full-scale review of United Kingdom defence policy is now underway’ (HC 320 1990, p. vi). In the Options for Change, the aim was for smaller forces, better equipped, properly trained and housed and well-motivated. It was more a capability-based than threat-driven effort since there was no longer a visible threat. The emphasis was more on how flexible and mobile the forces could be and how they could contribute both in NATO and, if necessary, elsewhere. The main proposals were (1) to retain four Trident submarines; (2) to reduce the air defence capability by withdrawing two Phantom squadrons; (3) to halve the forces stationed in Germany so that their reinforced strength would be two divisions rather than four; (4) to reduce RAF bases in Germany from four to two, and end the UK’s contribution to German air defence; (5) to maintain the UK’s amphibious capability and air defence contribution to NATO’s northern region; (6) to maintain three carriers; to reduce the frigate/destroyer force to about 40; a submarine flotilla of 12 SSNs (nuclear powered submarines) and four SSKs (conventionally powered submarines); (7) to re-establish a strategic reserve division; (8) to reduce service manpower by 18% over about five years to an Army of around 120,000, a Navy of around 60,000 and the RAF of around 75,000 (HC 138-I 1998, para. 32).
- 6.
New structures were inaugurated such as the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, the Joint Force 2000, a Joint Helicopter Command, and a unified logistical organisation created from the three single-Service logistical organisations.
- 7.
The New Chapter distinguished between actions to address the symptoms of terrorism and efforts to address the causes. The symptoms of terrorism would be remedied by coercion, disruption and destruction. All three of these measures were intended to be pre-emptive so as to prevent an attack being launched. The causes of terrorism would be dealt with two ways. Firstly, by trying to prevent the conditions that allow terrorist organisations to develop, including peace support operations in fragile states and assistance for increasing the capacity of states to act against international terrorists. Secondly, by directing efforts towards deterring would-be attackers and the states that harbour them ‘by making clear our capability and willingness to respond’ (Cmnd. 5566 2002, para. 65).
- 8.
The key point of these changes was the new thinking that the 2003 White Paper introduced in the conduct of military operations. ‘Effects-based’ operations was the term used for denoting a new approach to the use of force which was considered more suitable for the new strategic environment: ‘Strategic effects are designed to deliver the military contribution to a wider cross-governmental strategy and are focused on desired outcomes. Our conventional military superiority now allows us more choice in how we deliver the effect we wish to achieve. We have begun to develop our military capabilities so that we can provide as wide as possible a range of options to fulfill operational objectives without necessarily resorting to traditional attritional warfare.’ (Cmnd. 6041-I 2003, para. 4.4)
- 9.
In the 1998 SDR, IT was considered of key importance used in full remit under the new Joint forces. SDR was informed by the RMA debate developed in the USA and acknowledged that ‘the biggest change in the conduct of future military operations is likely to come not from the weapons alone but from the application of information technology to military command and control’ (Cmnd. 3999 1998., Supporting Essay Three, para. 9).
- 10.
Liaropoulos (2006) tackles the issue of what criteria must be applied to classify changes in the conduct of war as revolutions in military affairs and he offers three theoretical paradigms: the Social Wave, the Radical Transformation and Continuity and Evolution.
- 11.
The Gulf War in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) was the first military operation in which network-centric warfare was launched.
- 12.
During Brown’s years in office, in 2008, the NSS was published – ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Security in an Interdependent World’ (Cmnd. 7291 2008) – and, in 2009, there was an update to it (Cmnd. 7590 2009). At the time his government assumed power, there were two full-fledged military operations, in Iraq and Afghanistan. A new Defence White Paper was expected but, finally, the NSS fell short of fulfilling these expectations (Taylor 2008). In the NSS of 2008, the principal idea was that the government needed to adopt an overarching cross-departmental security framework if it was adequately to meet future security challenges. However, it did not manage to produce an insightful assessment of the security context or come up with new ideas about how Britain should protect its interests. The emphasis that the paper gives to non-proliferation, terrorism and failed states, in addition to ‘non-traditional’ threats to security such as environmental and societal issues, had already been acknowledged in the 2003 Defence White Paper and had been a consistent theme of the work of the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its ‘Strategic Trends’ publication. Similarly, it merely restated the need for a multilateral approach and early conflict prevention measures. More disappointingly, the NSS did not link strategic threat assessment and subsequent objectives to credible defence planning assumptions or requisite capabilities or force structures. Instead, it gives only overarching principles as far as how the government would react to security challenges. ‘On that basis it is arguable whether the NSS has any utility from the perspective of defence planning. It is certainly widely acknowledged that it does not adequately fulfil the role of a defence white paper’ (ibid., p. 86).
- 13.
The Coalition Government’s work was founded on a Green Paper entitled ‘Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review’ (Cmnd. 7794 2010) prepared by Brown’s Government. The Green Paper was a preparatory step before the delivery of the highly anticipated new SDR which, according to the announcement, would be prepared in the next Parliament (in 2010). The general election of May 2010 brought the Coalition Government to power, so the Labour Government’s initial plan for a new SDR was never fulfilled. Cameron’s Coalition Government decided to replace the SDR with a new SDSR along with a new NSS. Although Brown’s Green Paper never took the form of a defence review, its reasoning and its core ideas imbued the work of the Coalition Government on defence and security policy-making. The Green Paper was welcomed and considered to offer a solid starting point for the review process to start. In contrast to the NSS published in 2008, the Green Paper raised some strategic points on which to build: ‘that expeditionary capability is an essential element of the UK’s force structure; that the UK must maintain global influence and be able to protect sea lines of supply; that France is a potential first partner of choice and that the UK will not be able to rely on partners in the future and that the state of burden sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq will become the norm’ (Taylor 2010a, p. 16).
- 14.
During Brown’s review period, in 2009, the first Cyber Security Strategy – ‘Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Safety, security and resilience in cyber space’ (Cmnd. 7642 2009) was published. The strategy tackles, for first time, the issues of what cyberspace is, what the nature of threats in this domain is, why it is important for Britain to secure its cyber domain and what the government’s initiatives are. It was published along with the 2009 NSS and established the government’s determination to treat security in cyberspace as seriously as was the case with security in the seas in the nineteenth century and in the air in the twentieth century. The purpose of the review was to work to meet: ‘our strategic objectives of reducing risk and exploiting opportunities by improving knowledge, capabilities and decision-making in order to secure the UK’s advantage in cyber space’ (ibid., p. 22).
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Tsirigotis, A.A. (2017). Strategic Priorities for Britain After 1957 and New Perceptions of Military Power. In: Cybernetics, Warfare and Discourse . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50847-4_7
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