Harry S. Truman, James Byrnes, and Henry Wallace: The US Response to Josef Stalin, 1945–1947

Abstract

This chapter portrays the bitter dispute between President Harry Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace over US policy toward the Soviet Union immediately after World War II.

Truman and Byrnes initially attempted to emulate FDR’s diplomatic approach to Stalin, which endeavored to resolve the outstanding issues that divided their two countries through give-and-take negotiations. But, for a variety of reasons, beginning in January 1946, Truman and Byrnes adopted a harder line toward the Soviets. The end result was a revival of the Cold War. Wallace publicly deplored the president’s hard-line Soviet policy, prompting Truman to fire him in September 1946. Truman also broke with Byrnes as a consequence of personal, political, and philosophical differences.

What factors were responsible for the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and the revival of the Cold War? To what extent was the statecraft of Harry Truman responsible?

Appendices

For Further Reading

There is an abundance of Truman biographies. Among the best is Alonzo L. Hamby’s Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (1995), which demythologizes Truman, noting his achievements but also portraying his shortcomings as well. The most popular of the biographies is David McCullough’s Truman (1992), which while very readable, is short on analysis. For an excellent overview and assessment of the major Truman biographies that have appeared since late in his presidency, see Sean J. Savage’s “Truman in Historical, Popular, and Political Memory,” in Daniel S. Margolies, ed., A Companion to Harry S. Truman (2012), 9–25.

For Truman’s account of his presidency, see his Memoirs, Vol. 1: Year of Decisions. (1955) and Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (1956). It should be read with more than the usual care regarding facts, dates, and interpretations.

Among the best analyses of Truman’s national security policies are Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (1992); Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 (2002); and Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (2006).

For James Byrnes’s accounts of his years serving Roosevelt and Truman, see his Speaking Frankly (1947) and his autobiography, All in One Lifetime (1958). However, the latter book says little about his tenure as secretary of state. Important secondary works dealing with the roles played by Byrnes in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations are David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes (1994); Robert Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (1982); and Patricia Dawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946 (1982).

For a sympathetic biography of Henry Wallace, see John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace. For accounts of Wallace’s impact on US foreign policy, see J. Samuel. Walker, Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy (1976); Graham J. White and John Maze. Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World Order (1995); and Richard J. Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War (1976).

A recent compilation of historiographical essays dealing with various aspects of the Truman administration is provided by Daniel S. Margolies, ed., A Companion to Harry S. Truman (2012). Among the essays included in Margolies’s compilation, Steven Casey’s “Rhetoric and Style of Truman’s Leadership” (pp. 27–45) assesses Truman’s character from the perspective of historians. Two other essays in the collection edited by Margolies deal with the historiography of the Cold War: Jeremi Suri, “Anxieties of Empire and the Truman Administration, 49–66, and Amanda Kay McVety, “The Origins of the Cold War in International Perspective,” 87–107. The historiography of another controversial topic is covered in Sean L. Malloy’s “Harry S. Truman and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Margolies, 67–86. See also Elizabeth Spalding, “The Truman Doctrine,” Margolies, 327–346. A much older introduction to the historiography of the Cold War is provided by J. Samuel Walker’s “Historians and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus,” in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (1981), 207–236. For a critical view of the revisionist historians, see Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists (2006). A summary of the major interpretations regarding the origins of the Cold War, appears in Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War (1998), 92–96.

Documents

Document 1. First Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 11 to October 2, 1945. Report by Secretary Byrnes, October 5, 1945 (excerpt)

The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers closed in a stalemate. But that need not, and should not, deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace.

In the past, I have been criticized and commended for being a compromiser. I confess that I do believe that peace and political progress in international affairs as in domestic affairs depend upon intelligent compromise. The United States Delegation acted in that spirit at Berlin. We acted in that spirit at London. And we shall continue to act in that spirit at future conferences.

That spirit is essential in international conferences where action can be taken only by unanimous agreement. When any one member can prevent agreement, compromise is a necessity. Men and women who have served on a jury can appreciate that.

Compromise, however, does not mean surrender, and compromise, unlike surrender, requires the assent of more than one party….

The peace of Europe depends upon the existence of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its European neighbors, and two wars in one generation have convinced the American people that they have a very vital interest in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

The American Government shares the desire of the Soviet Union to have governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe.

But lasting peace depends not only upon friendship between governments but upon friendship between peoples.

Source: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (1950). Reproduced in The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, “A Decade of American Foreign Policy”.

Document 2. Truman’s Memorandum to Byrnes, January 5, 1946

This is an excerpt of the longhand memorandum that Truman wrote and said he read—but in all probability did not read—to Byrnes:

My dear Jim:

I have been considering some of our difficulties. … I do not intend to turn over the complete authority of the President nor to forgo the President’s prerogative to make the final decision.

Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the President should be kept fully informed on what is taking place. … I received no communication from you directly while you were in Moscow. The protocol was not submitted to me, nor was the communiqué. I was completely in the dark on the whole conference until I requested you to come … and inform me. The communiqué was released before I ever saw it.

Now, I have infinite confidence in you and in your ability, but there should be a complete understanding between us on procedure. Hence this memorandum….

I think we ought to protest with all the vigor of which we are capable against the Russian program in Iran. There is no justification for it. It is a parallel to the program of Russia in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. It is also in line with the high-handed and arbitrary manner in which Russia acted in Poland….

There isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making. Only one language they understand is “how many divisions have you?”

I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Romania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; we should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms. … We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central government there. We should do the same for Korea….

I’m tired of babying the Soviets.

Source: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, I: 551–552.

Document 3. Excerpts from George Kennan’s “Long” Telegram, February 22, 1946

In summary, we have here [the Soviet Union] a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of the world’s greatest peoples and resources of the world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are without parallel in history….

I cannot attempt to suggest all the answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that the problem is within our power to solve, and that without recourse to any general military conflict….

As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, the following comments:

• 1. Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and the same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which a doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individuals….

• 3. Much depends on the health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is the point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale, and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit….

• 5. Finally, we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping….

Source: George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (1967), 547–559.

Document 4. Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Address, March 5, 1946 (excerpt)

It is my duty … to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. … Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts—and facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace….

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.

For that reason, the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided, or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then, indeed, catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

Source: Robert Rhodes James, Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897–1963, vol. 7: 7285–7293.

Document 5. Josef Stalin’s Reply to Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Address, March 14, 1946 (excerpt)

In substance, Mr. Churchill now stands in the position of a firebrand of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone here. He has friends not only in England but also in the United States of America.

In this respect, one is reminded remarkably of Hitler and his friends. Hitler began to set war loose by announcing his racial theory, declaring that only people speaking the German language represent a fully valuable nation. Mr. Churchill begins to set war loose, also by a racial theory, maintaining that only nations speaking the English language are fully valuable nations, called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world….

As a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost, in battles with the Germans, and also during the German occupation, and through the expulsion of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps, about 7,000,000 people. In other words, the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more than Britain and the United States together….

One can ask, therefore, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one, without having lost one’s reason, qualify these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union? …

The growth of the influence of communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal function. The influence of the Communists grew because during the hard years of the mastery of fascism in Europe, Communists showed themselves to be reliable, daring and self-sacrificing fighters against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples.

Source: Pravda interview, reprinted in the New York Times, March 15, 1946.

Document 6. Henry A. Wallace’s Madison Square Garden Address, “The Way to Peace,” September 12, 1946 (excerpt)

Tonight, I want to talk about peace—and how to get peace. … And just two days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the policy of his administration….

“Getting tough” never bought anything real and lasting—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get….

We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia. This does not mean appeasement….

For her part, Russia can retain our respect by cooperating with the United Nations in a spirit of open-minded and flexible give-and-take….

On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. We may not like what Russia does in Eastern Europe. … But whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence. This applies also to Germany and Japan. We are striving to democratize Japan and our area of control in Germany, while Russia strives to socialize eastern Germany.

The Russians have no more business in stirring up native communists to political activity in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States than we have in interfering in the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia….

Meanwhile, the Russians should stop teaching that their form of communism must, by force if necessary, ultimately triumph over democratic capitalism—while we should close our ear’s to those among us who would have us believe that Russian communism and our free enterprise system cannot live, one with another, in a profitable and productive peace.

Under friendly peaceful competition, the Russian world and the American world will gradually become more alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more and more of the personal freedoms; and we shall become more and more absorbed with the problems of social-economic justice….

I believe that peace—the kind of peace I have outlined tonight—is the basic issue, … How we meet this issue will determine whether we live not in “one world” or “two worlds”—but whether we live at all.

Source: Vital Speeches of the Day (October 1, 1946), vol. 12, 738.

Document 7. Byrnes’s Telegram to President Truman Following Henry Wallace’s Madison Square Garden Address, September 18, 1946 (excerpt)

My hope for united support of our foreign policies received a serious setback when, on September 12, 1946, while I was in Paris, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace made a speech at Madison Square Garden contending that the policy which had been approved by the President, and carried out by me, was too harsh to the Soviet Union and that a more conciliatory approach to them was necessary….

In Paris, the importance of Mr. Wallace’s Madison Square Garden speech was magnified in the minds of the representatives of foreign governments by newspaper reports quoting President Truman as saying, at a press conference, that he approved the Wallace speech in its entirety. This report stimulated widespread discussion among the governmental representatives attending the peace conference; it inspired inquiries to our representatives in various capitals. Foreign Ministers wondered whether, in my various public statements, I had correctly presented American policy.

If it is not possible for you … to keep Mr. Wallace … from speaking on foreign affairs, it would be a grave mistake, from every point of view, for me to continue in office, even temporarily. Therefore, if it is not completely clear in your own mind that Mr. Wallace should be asked to refrain from criticizing the foreign policy of the United States while he is a member of your Cabinet, I must ask you to accept my resignation immediately. At this critical time, whoever is Secretary of State must be known to have the undivided support of your administration and, so far as possible, of the Congress.

Source: James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 241–242.

Document 8. Truman Explains to His Mother and Sister Why He Fired Henry Wallace, September 20, 1946

Dear Mama and Mary:

Well, I had to fire Henry today, and of course I hated to do it. Henry Wallace is the best Secretary of Agriculture this country ever had. … If Henry had stayed Sec. of Agri. in 1940, as he should have, there’d never have been all this controversy, and I would not be here, and wouldn’t that be nice?

…Henry is the most peculiar fellow I ever came in contact with. I spent two hours and a half with him Wednesday afternoon arguing with him to make no speeches on foreign policy—or to agree to the policy for which I am responsible—but he wouldn’t. So I asked him to make no more speeches until Byrnes came home. He agreed to that, and he and … I came to what we thought was a firm commitment that he’d say nothing beyond the one sentence statement we agreed he should make. Well, he answered questions and told his gang over at Commerce all that had taken place in our interview. It was all in the afternoon Washington news yesterday, and I never was so exasperated since Chicago. So, this morning I called Henry and told him he’d better get out, and he was so nice about it I almost backed out!

Well, now he’s out, and the crackpots are having conniption fits. I’m glad they are. It convinces me I’m right.

Source: Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, 560–561.

Document 9. Truman Accepts Byrnes’s Resignation as Secretary of State, January 7, 1947

My dear Jim:

I have weighed carefully the considerations set forth in your letter of December 19, 1946, and in your letter of April 16, 1946, each emphasizing your desire to retire from the office of Secretary of State. Because I know how vital these considerations are, I must accede to your desire.

I accept, therefore, with great reluctance and heartfelt regret, your resignation effective at the close of business on January 10, 1947, or upon the qualification of your successor.

I realize full well how arduous and complex have been the problems which have fallen to you since you took office in July, 1945. Big events were then impending and the months that have ensued have presented problems of the utmost moment, with all of which you have dealt with rare tact and judgment and—when necessary—firmness and tenacity of purpose.

Yours has been a steadying hand as you have met the difficult problems which have arisen with such unvarying succession.

For all that you did during the war, and in the making of the peace, you have earned the thanks of the Nation. So I say: well done, in the hope that we can continue to call upon you for the counsel, which you can give out of so rich and varied an experience.

With every good wish,

Very sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman

Source: John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12817).

Notes

• 1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. 1: Year of Decisions (1955), 4–5. Mrs. Roosevelt’s emphasis.

• 2. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945–1948 (1977), 15.

• 3. John G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., (1985), 56.

• 4. James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 3rd ed. (1985), 223.

• 5. Barber, 218.

• 6. Truman, Year of Decisions, 139. Barber, 220–221.

• 7. Alonzo L. Hamby, “An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman,” Political Science Quarterly, 106 (Spring 1991), 33–52.

• 8. Barber, 224. Stoessinger, 56.

• 9. Stoessinger, 57.

• 10. Robert H. Ferrell, Truman and Pendergast (1999), 1–2, 6–8.

• 11. Edward McKim, Oral History Transcript, Harry S. Truman Library, quoted in Donovan, 9.

• 12. Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (2007), 93–94.

• 13. Barber, 228.

• 14. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (1965), 62.

• 15. Barber, 227.

• 16. Miscamble, 89.

• 17. Hamby, “An American Democrat,” 52.

• 18. Barber, 230.

• 19. Barber, 227, 231.

• 20. Frank Walker Diary, April 15, 1946, quoted in Miscamble, 96.

• 21. Truman speech, March 7, 1938, Appendix to the Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., part 9, p. 945.

• 22. Miscamble, 12. Elizabeth Spalding, “The Truman Doctrine,” in Daniel S. Margolies, ed., A Companion to Harry S. Truman (2012), 329–331.

• 23. Memorandum of Roosevelt-Molotov Conversation, May 29, 1942, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1942 (1961), 3: 568–569. Miscamble, 40–41.

• 24. Arnold A. Offner, “‘Another Such Victory:’ President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 23 (Spring 1999), 132. Truman, Year of Decisions, 78–82.

• 25. Truman, Year of Decisions, 85–86.

• 26. Walter Smith Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny (1969), 213.

• 27. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (1948), 902. Truman, Year of Decisions, 262–270.

• 28. Patricia Dawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946 (1979), 4.

• 29. Truman, Year of Decisions, 2–3. Ward, 5.

• 30. Truman, Year of Decisions, 2–4. Ward, 5.

• 31. Truman, Year of Decisions, 5.

• 32. Schoenberger, 262. Truman, Year of Decisions, 416.

• 33. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (1947), 207–208.

• 34. James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (1958), 313–319. Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (1982), 125–136.

• 35. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945 (1961), 431.

• 36. Messer, 136.

• 37. FRUS, 1945, 2: 815. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 331–345. Messer, 150–155.

• 38. Messer, 144.

• 39. Messer, 145. Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1946, 930–933.

• 40. Leahy Diary, November 28, 1945, quoted in Messer, 147.

• 41. Truman is quoted in Leahy Diary, December 12, 1945, and in Messer, 146.

• 42. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (1967), 284, 297–298. Kennan Diary, December 19, 1945, quoted in Messer, 155.

• 43. John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946 (1973), 523.

• 44. Richard Tanner Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency (1974), 69. Messer, 156.

• 45. Messer, 148.

• 46. Truman, Year of Decisions, 551–552.

• 47. Byrnes, All In One Life Time, 402. For an extensive discussion of the content and timing of Truman’s memorandum, see Messer, 157–166.

• 48. David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes. (1994), 489.

• 49. Byrnes, All in One Life Time, 353–355.

• 50. Truman, Year of Decisions, 552–553. Ward, 89–90.

• 51. Stalin’s speech appears in Vital Speeches 12 (March 1, 1946), 300–304. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (1972), 299–301.

• 52. Gaddis, 299–301.

• 53. J. Samuel Walker, Henry Wallace and American Foreign Policy (1976), 130.

• 54. Walker, 130.

• 55. The text of the Long Telegram appears in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (1978), 30–63.

• 56. Robertson, 487.

• 57. Messer, 188, 190, Truman’s emphases. The text of Brynes’s speech appears in Vital Speeches 12 (March 15, 1946), 326–329.

• 58. Messer, 189.

• 59. The text of Churchill’s speech appears in Vital Speeches 12 (March 15, 1946), 329–332. William Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (1982), 140.

• 60. Stalin is quoted in Moray, 50. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 3rd ed. (1976), 31–32.

• 61. FRUS, 1946 (1969), 7: 367.

• 62. FRUS, 1946 (1969), 7: 367. Messer, 267.

• 63. Messer, 185.

• 64. Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (1986), 269.

• 65. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and J. A. Morris, eds., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (1952), 58.

• 66. Arthur Schlesinger. Jr., “Who was Henry Wallace?” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2000.

• 67. Graham White and John Maze, Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World Order (1995), 187.

• 68. Barber, 237. Truman, Year of Decisions, 555–556.

• 69. Gaddis, 315, 284.

• 70. Truman, Year of Decisions, 556.

• 71. The text of the Clifford-Elsey Report appears in Etzold and Gaddis, 64–71. Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (2006), 53–60.

• 72. Henry Wallace, “The Way to Peace,” reprinted in Wallace, Price of Vision, 661–669.

• 73. Spalding, 47–53. Messer, 205–207.

• 74. Graham and Maze, 252.

• 75. Walker, Henry Wallace, 211.

• 76. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 380. Messer, 213–214.

• 77. Ward, 175.

• 78. Redvers Opie, et al., The Search for Peace Settlements (1951), 95–103.

• 79. Vital Speeches, September 15, 1946, 706–709.

• 80. Byrnes reprinted Truman’s public tribute to him upon his retirement in his memoir, All in One Lifetime, 388.

• 81. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 48–49. Messer, 220.

• 82. Messer, 221–222.

• 83. Messer, 222–223.

• 84. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 399–400.

• 85. Messer, 224.

• 86. Jonathan Daniels, Man of Independence (1950), 308–311, 316.

• 87. Messer, 232.

• 88. Truman, Year of Decisions, 216. Messer, 234.

• 89. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 353–356, 400–404. Messer, 235.

• 90. Messer, 239.

• 91. Messer, 239.

• 92. Arthur Schlessinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War.” Foreign Affairs, 46 (October 1967), 47.

• 93. J. Samuel Walker, “Historians and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus,” in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (1981) 209.

• 94. Michael Parenti, The Sword and the Dollar: Imperialism, Revolution, and the Arms Race (1989), 147–148.

• 95. Parenti, 148.

• 96. Arnold A. Offner, “‘Another Such Victory’: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 23 (Spring 1999), 128–154.

• 97. Spalding, 231. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (2005), 31.

• 98. Ward, 173.

• 99. Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945: A Reassessment,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 10: 4 (Fall 2008), 130–131.

• 100. White and Maze, vi.

• 101. Walker, Henry Wallace, 200.

• 102. Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (1992).