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Woodrow Wilson Versus Henry Cabot Lodge: The Battle over the League of Nations, 1918–1920

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American Presidential Statecraft

Abstract

This chapter highlights the foreign policy conflict that centered on the question of whether the United States should join the League of Nations. The battle pitted President Woodrow Wilson, the primary architect of the League, against its leading opponent Senator Henry Cabot Lodge the Republican majority leader and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge bested Wilson in this battle. The Treaty of Versailles, and with it the League of Nations, was rejected by the US Senate. As a result, the United States refused to play a role in preventing the conquest of Europe by Adolf Hitler during World War II until it was almost too late.

Why did Wilson fail to sell the League of Nations to the Senate? What characteristics of statesmanship did Wilson display as well as lack?

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Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Appendices

For Further Reading

Excellent single-volume biographies of Woodrow Wilson are provided by August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson (1991). H. W. Brands, Woodrow Wilson (2003); John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2009); and A. Scott Berg, Wilson (2013). See also the collection of essays Cooper edited, Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (2008).

For psychologically based biographies, see Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (1964) and Edwin A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography (1981). The Georges’ response to Weinstein appears in their Presidential Personality and Performance (1998). See also Thomas T. Lewis, “Alternative Psychological Interpretations of Woodrow Wilson.” Mid-America 65 (April–July 1983): 71–85.

Wilson’s philosophy of international relations is discussed in Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (1959); Norman Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (New York: 1968); Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft (1991), and his Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (2002); John M. Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt; David Steigerwald, Wilsonian Idealism in America (1994); Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (1992); and Malcolm D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy (2008). For a critique of Wilson’s idealism by a realist statesman, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994). For a critique of realism and defense of Wilsonian idealism, see Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (1999).

See also three books by the preeminent Wilson scholar, Arthur S. Link: Wilson (1947), Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (1979), and Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World: 1913–1921 (1982); The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson (1971). Link also is the editor of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (1966–1994).

For the Versailles Peace Conference, see Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (2002); Arthur Walworth, America’s Moment: 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (1977) and his Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (1986); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (1987); and John Milton Cooper, Jr. Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (2001).

For Henry Cabot Lodge, see John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (1965); Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (2002); Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (1925); William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (1980); and David Mervin, “Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations,” Journal of American Studies 4 (February 1971), 201–216.

For the ratification battle, see Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (1945); Thomas W. Ryley, A Little Group of Willful Men (1975); Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (1970), and his, ed., Wilson and the League of Nations: Why America’s Rejection? (1967); Herbert F. Margulies, The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy in the Senate (1989), and his “The Moderates in the League of Nations Battle: An Overlooked Faction,” Historian 60 (Winter 1998): 273–287; Edward B. Parsons, “Some International Implications of the 1918 Roosevelt-Lodge Campaign against Wilson and a Democratic Congress,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 (Winter 1989): 141–157; Stuart I. Rochester, American Liberal Disillusionment in the Wake of World War I (1977); and Elizabeth McKillen, “The Corporatist Model, World War I and the Public Debate over the League of Nations,” Diplomatic History 15(Spring 1991): 171–197.

The alleged conspiracy surrounding Wilson’s illness is examined in Phyllis Lee. Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House (2001).

For the historiography of Wilson’s diplomacy, see David Steigerwald, “The Reclamation of Woodrow Wilson?” Diplomatic History 23 (Winter 1999): 79–99; Marc Trachtenberg, “Versailles after Sixty Years,” Journal of Contemporary History 17 (July 1982): 487–506; Jonathan M. Nielson, American Historians in War and Peace: Patriotism, Diplomacy, and the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (1994). The most recently published collection of historiographical essays is Ross A. Kennedy’s A Companion to Woodrow Wilson (2012).

Documents

Document 1. League of Nations Covenant, 1919 (excerpt)

Article 10. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. … It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace.

Article 12. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. In any case, under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13. The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration….

Article 14. The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council….

Article 16. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

Source: Avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/league.asp.

Document 2. Wilson Praises the League of Nations Covenant, February 14, 1919 (excerpt)

Wilson was selected the chairman of the commission that drafted the League of Nations Covenant. The following is an excerpt of the explanatory speech Wilson made immediately after the Covenant was read to the delegates:

The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was unable to see the variety of circumstances with which this League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan all the machinery that might be necessary to meet the differing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of this document that it is not a straitjacket but a vehicle of life.

A living thing is born, and we must see to it what clothes we put on it. It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called upon to make definite.

It is a definite guaranty of peace. It is a definite guaranty by word against aggression. It is a definite guaranty against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin.

Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared, and its powers are unmistakable. It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for cooperation in any international matter.

Source: 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Document No. 389, pp. 12–15. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ww38.htm.

Document 3. Wilson Explains Articles 10 and 11 of the League Covenant, Indianapolis, Indiana, September 4, 1919 (excerpt)

We engage in the first sentence of Article X to respect and preserve from external aggression the territorial integrity and the existing political independence, not only of the other member states, but of all states. And if any member of the League of Nations disregards that promise, then what happens? The Council of the League advises what should be done to enforce the respect for that Covenant on the part of the nation attempting to violate it, and there is no compulsion upon us to take that advice except the compulsion of our good conscience and judgment. So that it is perfectly evident that if, in the judgment of the people of the United States, the Council adjudged wrong and that this was not an occasion for the use of force, there would be no necessity on the part of the Congress of the United States to vote the use of force. But there could be no advice of the Council on any such subject without a unanimous vote, and the unanimous vote would include our own, and if we accepted the advice we would be accepting our own advice. … I therefore want to call your attention … to Article XI … the favorite article in the treaty, so far as I am concerned. It says that every matter which is likely to affect the peace of the world is everybody’s business, and that it shall be the friendly right of any nation to call attention in the League to anything that is likely to affect the peace of the world or the good understanding between nations.… There is not an oppressed people [that is, nation] in the world which cannot henceforth get a hearing at that forum. … The one thing which those who have reason to dread, have most reason to dread, is publicity and discussion, … and the opinion of mankind.

Source: Addresses of Woodrow Wilson (1919), 19–28.

Document 4. Henry Cabot Lodge Attacks the League of Nations, August 12, 1919 (excerpt)

I will go as far as anyone in world service, but the first step to world service is the maintenance of the United States.

I have always loved one flag and I cannot share that devotion [with] a mongrel banner created for a League.

You may call me selfish if you will, conservative or reactionary, or use any other harsh adjective you see fit to apply, but an American I was born, an American I have remained all my life. I can never be anything else but an American, and I must think of the United States first, and when I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this I am thinking of what is best for the world, for if the United States fails, the best hopes of mankind fail with it….

The United States is the world’s best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her power for good and endanger her very existence. Leave her to march freely through the centuries to come as in the years that have gone.

Strong, generous, and confident, she has nobly served mankind. Beware how you trifle with your marvelous inheritance, this great land of ordered liberty, for if we stumble and fall freedom and civilization everywhere will go down in ruin.

We are told that we shall “break the heart of the world” if we do not take this league just as it stands. I fear that the hearts of the vast majority of mankind would beat on strongly and steadily and without any quickening if the league were to perish altogether….

No doubt, many excellent and patriotic people see a coming fulfillment of noble ideals in the words “league for peace.” We all respect and share these aspirations and desires, but some of us see no hope, but rather defeat, for them in this murky covenant. For we, too, have our ideals, even if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism.

Our first ideal is our country, and we see her in the future, as in the past, giving service to all her people and to the world. Our ideal of the future is that she should continue to render that service of her own free will. She has great problems of her own to solve, very grim and perilous problems, and a right solution, if we can attain to it, would largely benefit mankind….

Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and better and finer, because in that way alone, as we believe, can she be of the greatest service to the world’s peace and to the welfare of mankind.

Source: Congressional Record, 66th Cong., Ist sess., pp. 3779–3784. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/lodgeleagueofnations.htm.

Document 5. Wilson Answers His Critics, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, September 8 (excerpt)

I cannot understand the psychology of men who are resisting it [the treaty]. I cannot understand what they are afraid of unless it is that they know physical force and do not understand moral force. Moral force is a great deal more powerful than physical. Govern the sentiments of mankind and you govern mankind. Govern their fears, govern their hopes, determine their fortunes, get them together in concerted masses, and the whole thing sways like a team. Once get them suspecting one another, once get them antagonizing one another, and society itself goes to pieces. We are trying to make a society instead of a set of barbarians out of the governments of the world …. America can stay out, but I want to call you to witness that … the peace and good will of the world are necessary to America. Disappoint the world, center its suspicion upon you, make it feel that you are hot and jealous rivals of the other nations, and do you think you are going to do as much business with them as you would otherwise do? I do not like to put the thing on that plane, my fellow countrymen, but if you want to talk business, I can talk business. If you want to put it on the low plane of how much money you can make, you can make more money out of friendly traders than out of hostile traders. You can make more money out of men who trust you than out of men who fear you.

Source: Addresses of Woodrow Wilson, 81–90.

Document 6. The Lodge Reservations, 1919 (excerpt)

  1. 1.

    In case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article [Article 1], the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations … have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal … may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

  2. 2.

    The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country … under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which … has the sole power to declare war … shall … so provide.

  3. 3.

    No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22 … except by action of the Congress of the United States.

  4. 5.

    The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of Nations … any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to … the Monroe doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is … wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations.

  5. 7.

    The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the assembly and the council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission. … No person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the treaty of peace … except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

  6. 9.

    The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations … unless and until an appropriation of funds … shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

  7. 10.

    If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the council of the league … it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

  8. 14.

    The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote.

    Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge’s Reservations, U.S. Congress, Nov. 19, I919 Congressional Record, part 9, vol. 58, 8777–8778.

Document 7. President Wilson to Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, November 18, l9l9 (excerpt)

You were good enough to bring me word that the Democratic Senators supporting the treaty expected to hold a conference before the final vote on the [Henry Cabot] Lodge resolution of ratification and that they would be glad to receive a word of counsel from me. … In my opinion, the resolution in that form does not provide for ratification but, rather, for the nullification of the treaty. I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification. I understand that the door will probably then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification. I trust that all true friends of the treaty will refuse to support the Lodge resolution.

Source: Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 58, 8768.

Notes

  1. 1.

    Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (1964), 6–13.

  2. 2.

    Mario R. Dinunzio, Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President (2006), 2.

  3. 3.

    Edwin A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography (1981), 15–18. John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2009), 19–20.

  4. 4.

    James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 3rd ed. (1985), 88.

  5. 5.

    George and George, 8.

  6. 6.

    Story of Panama, 11–12.

  7. 7.

    Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson, 14. See also Edwin A. Weinstein, James William Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, “Woodrow Wilson’s Personality: A Reappraisal,” Political Science Quarterly 93 (Winter 1978), 585–598. For the response of the Georges, see Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, “Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link,” Political Science Quarterly 96 (Winter 1981), 641–665 and “Comments on ‘Woodrow Wilson Re-examined: The Mind-Body Controversy Redux and Other Disputations,’” Political Psychology 4 (1983), 307–312. See also their Presidential Personality and Performance (1998).

  8. 8.

    Cooper, Wilson, 21.

  9. 9.

    Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson, 14.

  10. 10.

    W. Barksdale Maynard, Woodrow Wilson: Princeton to the Presidency (2008), xi.

  11. 11.

    Barber, 101–102.

  12. 12.

    Cooper, Wilson, 10.

  13. 13.

    Barber, 51.

  14. 14.

    Barber, 51.

  15. 15.

    James D. Startt, Woodrow Wilson and the Press: Prelude to the Presidency (2004), xi–xiii.

  16. 16.

    Barber, 54–55.

  17. 17.

    Barber, 58–59.

  18. 18.

    Barber, 90–91, 101.

  19. 19.

    Cooper, Wilson, 22.

  20. 20.

    Malcolm D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy (2008), 5. Dinunzio, 3.

  21. 21.

    John B. Judis, The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (2004), 77, 80.

  22. 22.

    Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, (1979), 96. Arthur Link, et al., ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (1966–1994), (hereafter cited as PWW), 47: 620–622; 48: 285–288.

  23. 23.

    Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (1925–1927), 5: 6–16.

  24. 24.

    Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations (1953), 143, 273.

  25. 25.

    U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1917, Supplement: The World War (1932), 1: 24–29. Baker and Dodd, 5: 155–162.

  26. 26.

    David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (1928), 1: 243–260. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3: 236–237. Baker and Dodd, 5: 343.

  27. 27.

    The text of the League of Nations Covenant appears in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (1947), 13: 69–106. (Hereafter cited as FRUS: PPC).

  28. 28.

    Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (1984), 612.

  29. 29.

    Albert Shaw, ed., The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson (1924), 2: 852. Daniel Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 19141920 (1965), 108. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918, Supplement: The World War (1933), 1: 381–383. PWW, 51: 347, 351, 416–419.

  30. 30.

    The text of the Treaty of Versailles appears in U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (1947), 13: 57–76. (Hereafter cited as FRUS: PPC).

  31. 31.

    Norman Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (1968), 159–160. FRUS: PPC, 3: 972–974,1002; 5: 700, 527–528. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3: 494.

  32. 32.

    Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, 102.

  33. 33.

    Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomat: A Look At His Major Foreign Policies (1974), 129.

  34. 34.

    Shaw, 2: 773, 821.

  35. 35.

    Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (1925), 146–147, 201–202.

  36. 36.

    Foster Rhea Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, 18981954 (1955), 119–120. John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War (1969), 134–142.

  37. 37.

    Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, 110–111.

  38. 38.

    Smith, The Great Departure, 182.

  39. 39.

    Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (2002), 164.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    William Lawrence, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biographical Sketch (1925), 17–19.

  42. 42.

    Judis, 36.

  43. 43.

    Zimmermann, 174.

  44. 44.

    Brands, 100.

  45. 45.

    Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (1945), 70. Widenor, 326.

  46. 46.

    Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., December 21, 1918, 57: 727. Widenor, 295.

  47. 47.

    George and George, 277–278.

  48. 48.

    George and George, 277–278.

  49. 49.

    Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (2002), 136.

  50. 50.

    Lodge, 146–148. George and George, 278–279.

  51. 51.

    Baker and Dodd, 5: 451. Smith, Great Departure, 135. Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (1961), 281–297. Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 19191933 (1979), 9.

  52. 52.

    Lodge, 172–177.

  53. 53.

    Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, 115, 120.

  54. 54.

    Barber, 17.

  55. 55.

    Bailey, 259.

  56. 56.

    Barber, 17.

  57. 57.

    Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (1970), 87. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, 122–123. Kurt Wimer, “Woodrow Wilson Tries Conciliation: An Effort that Failed,” The Historian 25 (August 1963), 419–438.

  58. 58.

    Lodge, 165–177.

  59. 59.

    For a text of the reservations, see Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., November 19, 1919, 58: 8773 and 66th Cong., 2nd sess., March 19, 1920, 59: 4599.

  60. 60.

    George and George, 292–293.

  61. 61.

    Shaw, 2: 890.

  62. 62.

    Shaw, 2: 833.

  63. 63.

    Frank Ninovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (1999), 75. Hamilton Foley, Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations (1969), 201.

  64. 64.

    New York Times, September 10–11, 1919. George and George, 296.

  65. 65.

    Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson as I Know Him (1921), 447–448. George and George, 298.

  66. 66.

    Edith Bolling Wilson, My Memoir (1938), 284–285.

  67. 67.

    New York Times, September 28, 1919.

  68. 68.

    Cooper, Wilson, 554–555.

  69. 69.

    Brands, 149.

  70. 70.

    George and George, 301.

  71. 71.

    Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 19181920 (1932), 395.

  72. 72.

    Edith Wilson, 296–297.

  73. 73.

    George and George, 302.

  74. 74.

    George and George, 303–304.

  75. 75.

    House Diary, February 18, 1920 and April 3, 1921, cited in George and George, 306.

  76. 76.

    PWW, 2:455 George and George, 307.

  77. 77.

    Smith, The Great Departure, 197, 122.

  78. 78.

    John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (1965), 398.

  79. 79.

    Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 288.

  80. 80.

    Ambrosius, Wilsonianism 137.

  81. 81.

    George and George, 11–12, 311.

  82. 82.

    Louis Auchincloss, Woodrow Wilson (2000), 31–32.

  83. 83.

    Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, “Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link,” in George and George, Presidential Personality and Performance (1998), 77–144.

  84. 84.

    Link, Wilson the Diplomat, 129.

  85. 85.

    Link, Wilson the Diplomat. 133.

  86. 86.

    Cooper, Wilson, 560.

  87. 87.

    Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Woodrow Wilson’s Health and the Treaty Fight, 1919–1920,” The International History Review 9 (February 1987), 73–84.

  88. 88.

    Magee, 113–114.

  89. 89.

    John G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy, 2nd. ed., (1985), 27.

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Powaski, R.E. (2017). Woodrow Wilson Versus Henry Cabot Lodge: The Battle over the League of Nations, 1918–1920. In: American Presidential Statecraft. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50457-5_3

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