Abstract
Energy security is a growing concern not only for Turkey but also for many energy-import-dependent countries. This chapter examines how the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy is constituted by material interests and ideational forces since March 2004. The chapter is divided into three sections. The section ‘Turkey’s energy security and its asymmetric interdependence with gas suppliers’ defines energy-import-dependency of Turkey and reviews the priorities in building pipeline projects since the start of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, while the section ‘Regional economic interdependence and Turkey’s energy security: ideational forces and material interests’ presents the material interests and ideational forces that constituted the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the section ‘Shared material interests in booming exports to energy-rich neighbours’ concludes with the examination of the case study to identify challenges and opportunities in enhancing the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy.
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Notes
- 1.
Other possible pipeline options passed through Russia, but Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan signed the Ankara Declaration supporting the BTC route in October 1998, with the USA holding observer status. At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Istanbul Summit in November 1999, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the USA signed the Istanbul Declaration to underscore the geostrategic importance placed on the BTC pipeline as the main export route for Caspian oil reserves.
- 2.
A natural gas sale and purchase agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan was signed in May 1999 but the project was halted because of the slow-paced political and economic reforms under former Turkmenistan President Nursultan Niyazov’s authoritarian rule, which resulted in most major Western firms financially withdrawing from the country.
- 3.
In the absence of a federal hydrocarbon law, ambiguities and omissions in the related articles of Iraq’s Constitution impedes the resolution of the dispute.
- 4.
The gas pipeline will transport a minimum of 10 bcm/year to Turkey, while the oil pipeline has a planned capacity of minimum 1 million b/d. The new oil pipeline linked a field operated by the British-Turkish venture Genel Energy and other nearby fields into the Kerkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at the Turkish border.
- 5.
The risk of international conflicts in petrostates—that is, a state in which the oil sector has a dominant role in the national economy with at least 10 per cent of its GDP—with leaders pursuing anti-status quo foreign policies are at a much higher rate on average than in other states (Colgan 2010, p. 666). Nevertheless, just being a petrostate is not sufficient to explain the correlation between oil and international conflict. Rather, a revolutionary government, defined as ‘one that transforms the existing social, political, and economic relationships of the state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions of society’, is important to explain resource-backed aggression (Colgan 2010, p. 666). Accordingly, oil has an important role in secessionism and intrastate conflict (Le Billon 2012). Moreover, ideational factors which guide efforts to foster regional economic interdependence underestimate a structural problem for democratisation in petrostates. The structure of the rentier economy in petrostates combined with the repression effect is well-known to be the major problem in democratisation (Ross 2012). The dependence of prominent state bureaucrats, military officials, regional administrators and businessmen on the allocation of oil revenues and resources that are strictly controlled by the political leadership and its extended network of family/tribe members impedes democratic governing institutions (Chaudhry 1997; Karl 1997).
- 6.
Due to Turkey’s claim that it does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus (RC) under the representation of the Greek Cypriot Administration, Ankara refers to this state as the ‘Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus’. For more on Turkey’s position on the RC, see Chapter 16.
- 7.
The continental shelf conflict was heightened, when drilling started in the claimed EEZ of the GCA. Turkey responded by signing a maritime border agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in September 2011. In subsequent events between 2011 and 2014, Turkey reiterated its enduring policy about the continental shelf and EEZ areas in the Mediterranean (Başeren 2015, pp. 35–45), which aims to establish an equitable regime based on the mutual consent of the littoral states (İnan and Gözen 2009, pp. 159–160). For details on Turkey’s arguments and practices in the Mediterranean Sea, see Chapter 14.
- 8.
In March 2013, Egyptian authorities decided to withdraw from the agreement, to which Israel also was a party, on grounds that the established regime violated Egypt’s continental shelf rights (‘Mısır’dan Akdeniz’de Dengeleri Değiştiren Karar’, 2013).
- 9.
Turkey’s exports to Israel increased steadily between 2006 and 2015. Exports reached US$1.5 billion in 2006, US$2 billion in 2010 and US$2.9 billion in 2014 (TSA 2016).
- 10.
Hakan Fidan served as the deputy undersecretary to the Prime Minister’s Office (2006–2009); the deputy head of the National Intelligence Service (2009–2010) and is currently the head of the National Intelligence Service. İbrahim Kalın served as the chief advisor on foreign affairs to the prime minister (2009–2012); the deputy undersecretary to the prime minister (2012–2014) and is currently the spokesman for President Erdoğan’s office.
- 11.
EMRA became responsible for organising tenders for natural gas distribution licenses in cities, while it granted BOTAŞ new licenses for gas imports, transmission and storage, which sustained the monopoly of BOTAŞ in these activities.
- 12.
For example, the deal between Gazprom and ENELKO (Cihan Kamer’s new business group), as well as the involvement of the Çalık Energy Group together with the ENI group (Italy) and two Russian firms in a consortium to construct the BTC pipeline was highly debated in the media and the Parliament (‘Bakan Arkada, Çalık Önde, İmza Masada’, 2009; ‘Gazda Kamer tartışması’, 2005; ‘İtalyan ENI’yi Çalık’a Hükümet yönlendirdi’, 2006; ‘Kanun değişti, Cihan Kamer’in önü açıldı’, 2005).
- 13.
BOTAŞ was required to transfer 10 per cent of its share of gas import contracts every year to private companies through a tendering process (i.e. the gas release program) to increase competition. The law limits the amount of gas an importer company can buy from abroad to 20 per cent of the national consumption. Similarly, the law does not allow more than a 20 per cent market share for importers, wholesalers, or distributors in the domestic gas market.
- 14.
Between 2003 and 2013, there were 29 changes to the Public Procurement Law, while the context and specific articles changed more than 100 times. In 2011, a decree issued by the government removed the autonomy of regulative agencies.
- 15.
During the JDP governments between 2002 and 2014, new business groups were apparent in the rise of ten large private firms or entrepreneurs, namely Çalık Holding, IC Holding, Cengiz Group, Ethem Sancak, Fettah Tamince, Kiler Group, Kalyon Group, Kuzu Family, Cihan Kamer and Akın İpek, which intriguingly were involved in energy production and distribution projects besides business activities in other sectors.
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İpek, P. (2017). The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004–2016). In: Gözen Ercan, P. (eds) Turkish Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50451-3_9
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