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Hegel in Dark Times: The Resurrections of Geist from the Ashes of War

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture ((PSCC,volume 25))

Abstract

As is often noted, the “Great War” did not necessarily end on 1918 in a treaty, but would linger for the following two decades to come and arguably beyond. In the philosophical arena, warring games also continued, especially within Germany and France where each nation’s “worldhistorical” mission was in crisis. Issues surrounding the fate of Western civilisation and historical progress and change played themselves out in particular with respect to the variety of critical engagements with Hegel’s philosophy after the Great War. This chapter looks at these divergent ways by which Hegel’s influence evolved in response to the impact of the Great War. In particular, the chapter focusses on how Hegel’s thought has also been both appropriated and critiqued post-1914 to legitimise but also de-legitimise political movements that took root in countries in the inter-war period from both sides of the conflict.

Ever since the world war and the World revolution the total inability of every bourgeois thinker and historian to see the world-historical events of the present as universal history must remain one of the most terrible memories of every sober observer (Gyorgy Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness)

… today this dead god, covered with insults and buried a hundred times over, is rising from the grave (Louis Althusser, ‘The Return to Hegel’)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The English translation entitled Early Theological Writings includes “Folk Religion and Christianity”, “The Life of Jesus”, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion”, “Spirit of Christianity and its Fate” and the “System-Fragment [1800]”.

  2. 2.

    According to Dilthey’s genetic-hermeneutic method, the secret to understanding Hegel lay within Hegel’s “lived experience” and philosophical Weltanschauung, and his desire for a System. As Gordon (2003: 86) explains it: “To properly study a given thinker’s concepts required a reconstruction of that person’s inner life.”

  3. 3.

    Dilthey’s and Windelband’s engagements in the “methodenstreit” over the epistemological (“nomothetic”) differences between the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft) and natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) influenced their revaluation and critique of Hegel’s metaphysics. Windelband and Ehreng were the leaders in the “Hegel Renaissance” around 1910 and in forming the Baden-Baden Gesellschaft that attracted the likes of Richard Kroner, Franz Rosenzweig and Frederick Meinecke.

  4. 4.

    Hegel’s own representation of his philosophy does not contradict this possibility (especially in the ‘Preface’ to the Philosophy of Right [2008: 15–16]), given that he never claimed to be a forwards-seeing prophet. Hegel’s thoughts about the future are not very detailed. In Philosophy of History (1956: 87), he refers to Russia and the United States of America as being “lands of the future,” but at the same time, he concedes they may only be “an echo” of the historical development of Europe.

  5. 5.

    Löwith (a soldier in World War I) wrote his book during World War II. Compare Frederik Beiser’s (2014) study of the same period, especially Beiser’s comments on Löwith (7–9); and Marcuse (1960 [1941], also 2005) for a survey of a different trajectory.

  6. 6.

    Althusser was as baffled as Löwith at the returns of Hegel in the twentieth century. He says: “If we survey the one hundred and twenty years that have elapsed since Hegel’s death, we can see that bourgeois thinkers have adopted two contradictory attitudes towards him: hostility, ignorance, and contempt down to the last decades of the nineteenth century; growing interest from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards: How is this volte-face to be understood?” (1997:174–75) Althusser makes no mention of the war.

  7. 7.

    Few commentators have attempted a history of Hegelianism in the twentieth century. Robert Sinnerbrink’s Understanding Hegelianism (2007) examines twentieth century Hegelianism according to the themes of appropriation and critique. Michael S. Roth (1988) observes a similar dynamic within French Hegelianism. Tom Rockmore (1995) argues that it was the varying textual sources of Hegel’s writings that were key to the regionalised differences of interpretation. For other discussions of twentieth century Hegelianism, see Pinkard (2008) and Beiser (2008). The impact of the Great War on Hegel studies is barely mentioned in these studies.

  8. 8.

    Fred Bridgham discusses the “ideas of 1914” campaign and how Hegel was arraigned for this propaganda by its English respondents, in spite of Hegel’s being only sparingly acknowledged by the German propagandists such as Sombart and General von Bernhardi. Losurdo (2004: 297–98) argues Edmund Burke was more influential on the “ideas of 1914” than any of the classical German idealists. However, Joseph Plenge had coined the term “ideas of 1914” before the war to symbolise a synthesis of the ideas of Hegel and Marx in terms of the Gemeinschaaft and Staatssozialisumus, in contradistinction the “ideas of 1789” of French-led Western bourgeois universalism. Löwith (1965: 126, 135) acknowledges both Plenge and Lasson, a German Hegelian, who was openly supportive of the war. In France, the philosophers of the Sorbonne (Paul Nizan’s “le chiens de garde”), Emile Boutroux and Henri Bergson were making similar claims against “German philosophy” (Hegel’s included). See Chaps. 10, 13 and 14 below.

  9. 9.

    Such criticisms of Hegel were not entirely new. Rudolf Haym in Hegel und seine zeit (1857) charged Hegel with being an anti-liberal conservative who legitimated the Prussian Restoration State of 1821, betraying the cause of German unification. Hegel’s rival Jacob Fries, an anti-semitic liberal nationalist, also accused Hegel of these apologetics. For a critical discussion of Hegel’s alleged Prussianism, see Jon Stewart (1996: 53–130), Eric Weil (1998) and Losurdo (2004: 27–29). At the time of Hobhouse’s writing, in Italy (then an Allied State), Hegel’s political philosophy was being used as a foundation for a theory of the totalitarian state by Giovanni Gentile in Theory of Mind as Pure Act (1922 [1915]).

  10. 10.

    As noted by many readers of Hegel, “actual [wirklich]” does not mean “existence [existenz]” (see Stewart 1996: 19–52; see also Hegel 2008: §270, 253—“genuine actuality is necessity”).

  11. 11.

    After completing his pre-war dissertation on Hegel und der Staat, Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Hegel arguably became heavily slanted by the war (in which he served in the German army), as his 1919 foreword and conclusion illustrate. Rosenzweig (2000:74) reflects on his dissertation there and says: “in the year 1919, the book could only be concluded; to begin it would have no longer been possible …”

  12. 12.

    These editions would inspire new studies by Richard Kroner, Theodore Haering, Hermann Glockner, Nicolai Hartmann. Even Marxists such as Gyorgy Lukács and Herbert Marcuse contributed new studies. In the same period, a new French readership for Hegel would spring up through works by Jean Wahl, Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève (see below).

  13. 13.

    Kroner draws heavily from Hegel’s Early Theological Writings, especially their romantic overtones, which he sees as part of Hegel’s quest for philosophical unity (Kroner in Hegel 1961:3). According to Heinrich Levy (cited in Gordon 2003: 91), Kroner’s “cunning” interpretation of Hegel meant that: “the ring is closed, the synthesis complete: The philosophy of reason explicated itself as the philosophy of life”.

  14. 14.

    Kroner was a chief founder and organiser of the International Hegel Society in 1930, which planned three conferences to commemorate one hundred years since Hegel’s death: The Hague (1930), Berlin (1930), and Rome (1933). There was also a conference in Moscow, unrelated to the International Hegel Society. The proceedings of the Berlin Conference are documented in the 1931 edition of Kroner’s journal, Logos: Internationalen Zeitschrift fur Philosophie der Kultur.

  15. 15.

    This problem explains why Löwith (1965: 64) and Strauss (1991) both labelled Heidegger a “radical historicist”. As Löwith argues, it was Dilthey’s neo-Hegelianism which would bring Hegel into proximity with this post-war variant of radical historicism, wherein the contingent condition of historical knowledge itself would become its own absolute. See Heidegger (1988: 14–15) with Kroner (1946: 133).

  16. 16.

    Kroner argues that Spengler’s historicism “was as much an interpretation as symptom of the agony of the German destiny in the twentieth century” (1946: 133).

  17. 17.

    It is difficult to verify Heidegger’s awareness of Kroner’s speech, but he was lecturing on the Phenomenology of Spirit (for his 1930–1931 semester at Freiburg) around the time of the Conference. Heidegger arguably made an indirect reply to Kroner when he rejected the possibility of Hegel’s System from the “problematic of finitude (1988: 38): “[w]e must repeat again and again that Hegel presupposes already at the beginning what he achieves at the end.” (1988: 18)

  18. 18.

    In 1933, Kroner as a Jewish academic was forced into exile, his chair at Kiel being filled by Hans-Georg Gadamer. As Faye (2009: 215–17) recounts, Kroner was forced to resign as director of Logos (to be replaced by Glockner) and the journal’s name was changed to Zeitschrift fur deutsche Kulturphilosophie.

  19. 19.

    See Löwith (1965: 135).

  20. 20.

    Lukács (1971: 157) explains that his return to Hegel coincided with a post-war realization, cited in the epigraph above.

  21. 21.

    Lukács was living in Berlin between 1931 and 1933. After returning to Moscow, he began researching and writing The Young Hegel in response to Nazism and the publication of Marx’s manuscripts and Lenin’s notebooks on Hegel. Completed in 1938, it was not published in the USSR and had to wait until 1948 for a West German publisher.

  22. 22.

    Of note is Lukacs’ (1975: 16–31) pointed marking out of Rosenzweig’s Hegel und der Staat. For Lukács, Rosenzweig’s interpretation encouraged post-war anti-Hegelian sentiment by reading Hegel as a “precursor of Bismarck”. Rosenzweig was able to do this, Lukacs argues, because he believed, like Dilthey, that the secret source of Hegel’s philosophical journey was the desire for spiritual union of the German volk.

  23. 23.

    Interestingly, one of the few voices in Nazi Germany to contest Schmitt’s judgment was Heidegger, who tried to inoculate Hegel against criticisms from his fellow National Socialists as the only real “philosopher of the State” in Heidegger (2014). As Faye (2009: 205, 223; cf. Bernasconi in Heidegger 2014) explains it, Heidegger’s sudden return to Hegel cannot be understood without considering his relationship to Nazism and his attempt to give the new regime philosophical legitimacy; an attempt that would inevitably sacrifice the reasonableness, spirit and letter of Hegel’s philosophy. As noted by Faye (2009) and Henning (in Stewart 1996: 61), then, it is not entirely accurate to say that all Nazis were against Hegel.

  24. 24.

    Unlike the German response inflected by Dilthey, Koyré and Kojève found Hegel’s development before Jena to be contradictory and believed the pre-Jena writings were “anti-theological”, whilst arguing for a continuity between the Jena System and the later one.

  25. 25.

    Jean Wahl, who published Le Malheur Conscience dans le Philosophie de Hegel in 1929, like the German neo-Hegelians, found Hegel’s early descriptions and key intuition of a divided consciousness profound (Baugh 2003). Following Wahl, Hyppolite also tested Hegel’s philosophy against the unhappy post-war (existentialist) consciousness. Gordon (2003: 91) connects Wahl to Dilthey and Rosenzweig’s interpretations.

  26. 26.

    See Kojève in Strauss (1991: 136).

  27. 27.

    It would be more accurate to say that Kojève was basing his interpretation here on how the chapter in the Phenomenology developed from the Jena manuscripts (see Kojève 1968: 529–75): “[t]he idea of the bloody Struggle for recognition, which engenders the relationship of Mastery and Servitude, appeared in the writings of Hegel around 1802 (System of Ethical Life, Vol. VII, pp. 445–7). But it is above all in the Lectures of 1803–1804, that Hegel insists at length on this idea. The theme returns in the Lectures of 1805–1806. And in the Phenomenology (1806) the notion of the anthropogenetic value of the Struggle and of the Risk of life is definitively evolved and formulate in a perfectly clear manner.”

  28. 28.

    These for him presuppose a God or “demiurge” that existed prior to all dialectical movement and in a sense created “man”, rather than Geist being solely a creation of human activity (Kojève 1980: 146–47).

  29. 29.

    Kojève argues that Hegel was nostalgic for the pagan ideal of the “warrior”, but he also has one eye here on the Germanist “ideas” of duty and self-sacrifice articulated after 1914. It is only once Hegel writes the Phenomenology that labour, rather than war comes to constitute the negativity of human beings. Cf. Heidegger (2014: 144, 149, 155, 185).

  30. 30.

    Despite or because of the Great War, Kojève recognised that war was not simply going to disappear. In his pre-WWII phase, his language is not unlike Lenin’s as he discusses the revolutionary “soldier-worker”, as against a bourgeois worker or capitalist (Kojève 1968: 114).

  31. 31.

    As he sees it, the war had effectively reintroduced a new war of secularised religions: liberal democracies and toleration were unable to prevent this happening (see Kojève in Strauss 1991: 233–34).

  32. 32.

    See Kojève (2004 [1944]) for his reasons for acknowledging Stalin’s “political will” as opposed to his rivals. Stalin like Napoleon was the “means” for precipitating the final end-State, whose methods were required because of the counter-revolutionary forces working against them. But during the Second World War, Kojève would acknowledge that a universal “Socialist Empire” would have to transcend Stalin’s model of “socialism in one country” (see Kojève 2000).

  33. 33.

    Kojève introduces this point first by responding to Henri Niel’s critique that the history of the nineteenth century and two world wars had “refuted” Hegel. As Cassirer commented, it was Hajo Halbourn in 1943 who first described the battle between the USSR and Third Reich as a battle between Left and Right Hegelians (1946: 249).

  34. 34.

    Kojève’s revisions, he says, were inspired by his observations of the post-WWII economic boom in the form of the “American way of life”, but also by the “barbarism” of the enforced post-historical condition imposed by Soviet socialism. These “observations” serve as the basis of Kojève’s discussion of the “Japanese way of life” as the only cultural form of resistance to the American-Soviet forms of being. See Fukuyama on the “last man” [1992].

  35. 35.

    In a sarcastic letter written to Carl Schmitt in 1955, Kojève (2001) tells his interlocutor, a former Nazi, that “Hitler was 150 years too late” to realise his plans, as history only happens “once”. He also says in passing that the Great War was an “intermission”, and that the Second World War brought “nothing essentially new”.

  36. 36.

    Kojève’s turn conceals a self-contradiction, given that he knew well that absolute knowledge cannot be “affirmed”, but only deduced if history has come to an end, and that this would entail demonstrating it only once when it is “too late” to create anything new. (Kojève 1970).

  37. 37.

    Anti-Hegelian books soon emerged from both existentialist and Marxist thinkers, beginning with Albert Camus’ The Rebel in 1951. This tendency would ferment with Althusser’s (1997) early writings on Hegel (who claimed his interest in Hegel was only a “youthful error”) and Lukács’ self-critique of his former Hegelianism (1967, Preface).

  38. 38.

    An “organized allergy” to Hegel and the dialectic meant for some of the post-structuralist movement a “reassuring certainty that the Hegelian legacy is over and done with” (Derrida in Malabou 2005: xviii–xxvi).

  39. 39.

    This idea of reconciliation plays on an idea Heidegger (1988) and Žižek (2012) adopt in different ways. Heidegger, for instance in his 1930–1931 lectures, wrote: “it is not that Hegel’s philosophy has broken down. Rather, his contemporaries and successors have not yet stood up so that they can be measured against his greatness. People managed to ‘stand up’ to him only by staging a mutiny.”

  40. 40.

    Interestingly, for Žižek (2012: 417–53), Hegel’s thoughts on war and the “rabble” in Philosophy of Right prophesy the impossibility of socio-political reconciliation or synthesis, because they are symptoms of an absolute negativity or antagonism reducible to a will to power or death drive. For Žižek, this apparently means Hegel is acquitted of all charges against him, whether it is the “pan-logicist” (or “absolute Idealist”), conservative reactionary, liberal reformist, or even proto-(utopian) communist (2012: 258–59).

  41. 41.

    Beiser (2008: 7) explains the dilemma as: “[t]he more we interpret historical figures from our standpoint and according to our interest, the more we commit anachronism, imposing the present upon the past; but the more we interpret them from their standpoint, the more we engage in antiquarianism, as if any historical facts were interesting for their own sake.”

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Jeffs, R. (2017). Hegel in Dark Times: The Resurrections of Geist from the Ashes of War. In: Sharpe, M., Jeffs, R., Reynolds, J. (eds) 100 years of European Philosophy Since the Great War. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50361-5_9

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