Skip to main content

French on Innocence Lost

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility
  • 387 Accesses

Abstract

In “Losing Innocence for the Sake of Responsibility” (1992) Peter French argues that the loss of innocence is required for moral responsibility and that adults have a responsibility to facilitate the child’s loss of innocence. Drawing on the work of Herbert Morris, French provides a compelling account of the knowledge that is acquired in the process of losing one’s innocence and the sorts of experiences required for its loss. Although I agree with French that moral maturity requires the sorts of conceptual knowledge he identifies, I do not think that the loss of innocence is where we gain such knowledge. I shall argue that the experience of losing one’s innocence provides a more fundamental knowledge on which this conceptual capacity is based.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Thanks to Zachary Goldberg for identifying this definition in French’s work. In later work French defines evil as the willful infliction of undeserved harm on an individual that jeopardizes that individual’s aspirations to live a worthwhile life. See Goldberg’s contribution to this volume for a discussion of this definition. The focus on an individual’s aspirations to live a worthwhile life might be problematic for those who have no aspirations—infants, severely disabled, persons on life-support? If they lack aspirations are they not subject to evil?

  2. 2.

    Thanks to Zachary Goldberg for clarifying this point.

  3. 3.

    See McKenna (2012) and his contribution to this volume for a discussion of the relationship between the capacity to engage in moral address and responsibility.

  4. 4.

    Thanks again to Zachary Goldberg for suggesting the link between a recognition of vulnerability and self-reflection.

  5. 5.

    What about cases of “affluenza”? The term was coined in the early 2000s in response to a highly publicized court case. A teenager from an affluent family killed someone in a drunk driving accident and his lawyer successfully argued for reduced charges because the child’s upbringing had been so sheltered that he couldn’t fully appreciate the consequences of his actions. Don’t we have an obligation to prevent our children from suffering from affluenza? We do. But I am doubtful that exposing them to evil is the way to prevent it. The development of empathy seems crucial in developing caring human beings. Thanks to Tailer Ransom for raising this objection.

References

  • Butler, Judith. 2010. Frames of war: When is life grievable? New York: Versos.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Peter A. 1992. Losing innocence for the sake of moral responsibility. In Responsibility matters, 29–43. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. War and moral dissonance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilson, Erinn. 2014. The ethics of vulnerability: A feminist analysis of social life and practice. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldberg, Zachary J. 2015. Moral innocence as illusion and inability. Philosophia 43(2): 355–366.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L’Engle, Madeleine. 1963. A wrinkle in time. New York: Square Fish.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1971. A circle of quiet. San Francisco: Harper Collins.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1973. A wind in the door. New York: Square Fish.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1978. A swiftly tilting planet. New York: Square Fish.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKenna, Michael. 2008. The loss of innocence and the things that remain. American Philological Association Newsletter 7(2): 5–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Conversation & responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Morris, Herbert. 1976. On guilt and innocence: Essays in legal philosophy and moral psychology. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand. 1910. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11(5): 108–128.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Deborah Tollefsen .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tollefsen, D. (2017). French on Innocence Lost. In: Goldberg, Z. (eds) Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50359-2_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics