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State, Economy, and City: A Reconstruction

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Abstract

Why did commercial cities begin to emerge in Western Europe as they did after 1100 CE? In this chapter, I review and synthesize important thinking about the evolution of commercial cities as a market economy took hold. After discussing ideas about the state in prehistory , I trace thinking about the economic functioning of communities in the ancient world , Roman World , early medieval Western Europe , and into the rise of commercial cities. I integrate the work of Abu-Lughod, Bairoch, Braudel, Cooley, Heaton, Hurd, Mann, Marshall, Power, Smith, Tawney, Tilly, and Weber. I am not so much interested in the historical accuracy of their thinking as I am in how these writers each conceptualized a process based on purposeful behavior . Of particular interest to me is the how the notion and practice of the state changed and how this affected the formation of cities. I build this review around seven themes. Continuing from Chap. 1, I see these as follows: the importance of the governance of a nation to the urban economy; occupational division of labor, command and control, and power; decentralization and entitlement within governance; the functioning of a community as settlement , trading city , or commercial city; the significance of transportation costs, the spatial division of labor , and trade; importance of networks, routes, and nodes in circuits of trade ; and the conflicted role of the city.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Other scholars include the Roman world in the ancient economy: e.g., Heichelheim (1965). Because of its importance for thinking about how European cities emerged, I have separated the Roman World in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    See Gergen (1985) .

  3. 3.

    Sets of linked trade flows, be these bilateral or multilateral.

  4. 4.

    Fukuyama (2011, pp. 31–34), in presenting evidence that chimpanzees go on raiding parties to kill off the males of nearby communities and to capture and mate females, suggests that early humans may well have exhibited similar behavior.

  5. 5.

    Fukuyama (2011, p. 53) distinguishes between a band (which he sees as more egalitarian) and a chiefdom (which he sees as more hierarchical).

  6. 6.

    See Polyani (1957, pp. 69–70).

  7. 7.

    Oddly to me, the literature largely does not mention any early communities formed by people who saw themselves as outside existing tribal or state structures: e.g., anarchists, apostates ascetics, cultists, heretics, hermits, nonconformists, outlaws , rebels, or religious zealots. An exception here is a brief mention in Weber (1899 , p. 174).

  8. 8.

    Broadly, the economy, as it existed and changed, from the dawn of humankind to the dawn of the Roman World.

  9. 9.

    Unless it intends to trade for needed goods, the state requires command and control to ensure that all needed goods get produced.

  10. 10.

    A similar point is made in Finley (1973, p. 124) where it is argued that the distinction between a “little town” and a “genuine city” is that the latter is a political and cultural center where well-born and educated could live a civilized life and dominate political life at least at the municipal level.

  11. 11.

    A city populated by consumers, such as rentiers, whose purchasing power determines the economic opportunities for artisans, trade workers, and merchants.

  12. 12.

    Absence of trade.

  13. 13.

    Shaw (1985) , for example, argues that the grand states in Egypt and Mesopotamia—wherein dispersed small social units coexisted with a centralized palace and temple—were based on a vision that tied the monarch to the cosmos as a model for all society.

  14. 14.

    A belief that one can rely on someone or something.

  15. 15.

    A similar notion underlies Harvey (2012) .

  16. 16.

    See Braudel (1981, p. 511).

  17. 17.

    Finley (1973, p. 125) refers to this as the symbiotic city (state).

  18. 18.

    Unlike Lévy (1967, p. 7) for example, my definition of trading does not include goods acquired by theft, raiding, plundering, piracy, or military expedition.

  19. 19.

    Polanyi (1957b , pp. 16–17) argues that there is no archaeological evidence of a large marketplace in any city in the ancient economy. Trade did occur, but the scale was small and not focused on the determination of a market equilibrium price.

  20. 20.

    See Lévy (1967, pp. 9–10).

  21. 21.

    For estimates of the economy of Greece (Attica) at the time, see Goldsmith (1987 , Chap. 3).

  22. 22.

    See Lévy (1967, p. 19).

  23. 23.

    See Millett (1983) .

  24. 24.

    To differentiate for the purpose of a count or list.

  25. 25.

    To favor particular individuals by freeing them from an obligation imposed on others.

  26. 26.

    A legal obligation.

  27. 27.

    Within this overall context, some cities (civitas libera) were exempted from the payment of tribute : either because of a formal treaty or by imperial decree. These were so-called free cities; in addition to being freed from paying tribute, citizens of the city might have other special freedoms.

  28. 28.

    Braudel (1981, pp. 520–522) points out the parallels between Roman towns and the Spanish colonization of the Americas over 1000 years later.

  29. 29.

    Here, a bidder is a person who bids for something at auction. In economic thought, the outcome of any competitive market can be thought to such that highest bidders obtain the product.

  30. 30.

    McGovern (1971, pp. 1150–1151) notes that a bailee was not ordinarily liable without fault under Roman law; however, the bailee could contract to be liable for any risk of loss. In contrast, Hamilton (1931 , p. 1157) notes that buyers in general had no remedy under Roman law for a defect in quality and argues this may have been because there was little trade at the time and therefore no experience with the need for protection. Husveth (1994 , p. 29) notes that common callings included haulers and shippers. McGovern (1971, pp. 1150–1151) notes that common callings also included innkeepers and livery (stable) operators.

  31. 31.

    See Arterburn (1927) .

  32. 32.

    A rate of exchange in which no party has been injured.

  33. 33.

    See Farris (1967 , p. 31). Schumpeter (1954, p. 60) argues that Aristotle wrote of the good and virtuous life for an educated leisure class that held work and business in contempt, loved the farmers who fed them, and hated the money lenders who (as they saw it) exploited them.

  34. 34.

    McGovern (1971, p. 1182) asserts that, under Roman law, ownership is not transferred to the buyer until the property is delivered.

  35. 35.

    Shaw (1985) .

  36. 36.

    Fukuyama (2011, pp. 232–239) makes that interesting argument that it was the emergence of the Roman Catholic Church in the latter half of the first millennium that promoted individualism and the breakdown of kinship ties (outside the immediate family). However, I think that Roman Catholicism merely incorporated ideas from Stoic thought that had been having an effect on social and state relations for some time by then.

  37. 37.

    See Hopkins (2002) .

  38. 38.

    See also Whittaker (1983) .

  39. 39.

    Dedication of subordinate to superior or of individual to group or cause.

  40. 40.

    Sworn loyalty of feudal tenant or vassal to a great lord.

  41. 41.

    Smith does not discuss the political status of women here.

  42. 42.

    A similar point is made in Braudel (1981, p. 486).

  43. 43.

    Heaton (1963, pp. 82–83).

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Correspondence to John R. Miron .

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Miron, J.R. (2017). State, Economy, and City: A Reconstruction. In: The Organization of Cities . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50100-0_2

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