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Abstract

The role that institutions played in Québec’s economic growth is rarely recognized as much it ought. Yet, the outcome of the Quiet Revolution for the institutions can help explain why this period would have such disappointing outcomes. These institutions (or voluntary associations) produce what economists and sociologists call “social capital.”

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Notes

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    Erik O. Kimbrough, Vernon Smith & Bart Wilson. “Building a Market: From Personal to Impersonal Exchange”, in: Paul Zak (Ed.), Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 280–300.

  4. 4.

    This is a case in point described by Avner Greif in “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition”, American Economic Review, 1993, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 525–548.

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    Elinor Ostrom & David Schwab. “The Vital Role of Norms and Rules in Maintaining Open Public and Private Economies”, in: Paul Zak (Ed.), Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 204–228.

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    David Beito. From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890–1967, Chapel Hill, NC, North Carolina University Press, 2000.

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    Mark Pennington & John Meadowcroft. Rescuing Social Capital from Social Democracy, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007, p. 52 (Mutual ownership and building societies).

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    L’Annuaire Statistique du Québec, Québec City, Ministère de l’Industrie et du Commerce, édition de 1947, p. 583.

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    Ibid ., p. 651.

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    Benoît Lévesque. Un siècle et demi d’économie sociale au Québec: plusieurs configurations en présence (1850–2007), Montréal, Centre de Recherche sur les Innovations Sociales à l’Université du Québec à Montréal, 2004, p. 25.

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    David Beito. From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890–1967, Chapel Hill, NC, North Carolina University Press, 2000.

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    This excerpt is taken from a translation of Beito’s article found online. David Beito. “Les pauvres avant l’État-Providence”, Le Québécois Libre, 2012 (1996), No. 291 (online): http://www.quebecoislibre.org/11/110815-3.html (Viewed 29 June 2012).

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    Ibid ., pp. 88–91.

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    Gilles Paquet. Duplessis et la croissance économique: une analyse exploratoire, Working paper, Ottawa, University of Ottawa, 1996, p. 11.

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  25. 25.

    In Manitoba – the province where residents give the greater proportion of their income to charity – annual donations average at 1 658$. In Alberta, the annual donation average is 2 251$ – the greatest of all the average gross amounts of all Canadian provinces; David Lasby. Trends in Individual Donations: 1984–2010, Ottawa, Imagine Canada, 2011. p. 9.

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    Ibid .

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  38. 38.

    Mancur Olson. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, p. 44.

  39. 39.

    Ibid ., p. 73.

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  43. 43.

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  44. 44.

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  45. 45.

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  48. 48.

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  49. 49.

    Rémunération des salariés. État et évolution comparés 2009 – Faits saillants, 2009, Québec, Institut de la Statistique du Québec, 2010, p. 3.

  50. 50.

    Michael Smith. “L’Impact de Québec Inc., répartition des revenus et efficacité économique”, Sociologie et Sociétés, 1994, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 91–110.

  51. 51.

    John Londregan. “Political Income Redistribution”, in: Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 83–101.

  52. 52.

    Niclas Berggren & Henrik Jordhal. “Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and Social Capital”, Kyklos, 2006, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 141–169.

  53. 53.

    Ibid ., p. 161.

  54. 54.

    Stephen Ansolabehere. “Voters, Candidates and Parties”, in: Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 30–31.

  55. 55.

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  61. 61.

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  62. 62.

    Our purpose here is to display accurately the general trajectory of (relative) upward or downward debt trends, rather than looking to precisely compare debt levels from a given year to the next. Government accounting methods prevent us from being able to make the latter kind of assessments.

  63. 63.

    La Dette du Gouvernement du Québec, Québec City, Ministère des Finances du Québec, 2010, p. 28.

  64. 64.

    Carmen Reinhardt & Ken Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2009.

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Geloso, V. (2017). Explaining the Quiet Decline. In: Rethinking Canadian Economic Growth and Development since 1900. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49950-5_10

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