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Judicial Independence in Malaysia

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The Dynamics of Judicial Independence

Abstract

This chapter examines the legal principle of judicial independence in Malaysia in two stages. First, a brief analysis of select secondary sources, including academic commentary and the views of participants in Malaysia’s legal system, distills themes that are seen by observers as important to the meaning and practice of judicial independence in Malaysia. From this starting point, the study identifies and examines a number of primary legal sources related to the themes identified, including constitutional arrangements, legislation, and reported judicial decisions. These primary sources are used to construct a narrative of judicial independence in Malaysia from the time of its independence in 1957 to the first half of 2016. While the study draws on illustrative scholarship and commentary to identify themes, its focus is on the identification and analysis of primary legal sources that reflect institutional arrangements and shed light on the interactions between courts and other branches of government. The second stage of this study considers implications and lessons learned from the experience of judicial independence in Malaysia.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., Larkins (1996), p. 618.

  2. 2.

    Although Malaysia’s population grew by more than 17 % over the most recent 10 years (from 25.8 million in 2005 to 30.3 million in 2015) its population growth rate steadily declined from 2.3 % in 2000 to 1.4 % in 2015. The country’s per capita gross domestic product has increased by 244 % during the same period ($4000 in 2000 to $9770 in 2015): World Bank (2015). With a gross national income per capita of $10,600 in 2015, the World Bank classifies Malaysia as an upper middle income economy. All amounts in USD.

  3. 3.

    Throughout this chapter, ‘Peninsular Malaysia’ refers to the part of Malaysia located on the Malay Peninsula whereas ‘Malay Peninsula’ refers to the general geographic area of the land mass south of Thailand.

  4. 4.

    Hickling (1978), p. 25.

  5. 5.

    See e.g., Bin Abas (1978), p. 167.

  6. 6.

    Tan (1997), pp. 266–267.

  7. 7.

    Wu (1999), p. xviii.

  8. 8.

    Harding (1996), pp. 7–9.

  9. 9.

    Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 (1824).

  10. 10.

    Wu (1999), p. 33.

  11. 11.

    Harding (1996), p. 13.

  12. 12.

    Ibid, pp. 14–15; Wu (1999), p. 33.

  13. 13.

    Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 (1909).

  14. 14.

    Harding (1996), p. 13.

  15. 15.

    Wu (1999), p. 26.

  16. 16.

    Harding (1996), p. 21.

  17. 17.

    Wu (1999), p. 37.

  18. 18.

    Harding (1996), pp. 21–24.

  19. 19.

    These problems included the position of the Malay rulers and questions of citizenship: Lee (1995), p. 5.

  20. 20.

    Wu (1999), p. 37.

  21. 21.

    Ibid, 39.

  22. 22.

    See Hickling (1978), pp. 8–10 who comments on negotiations and compromises made to admit these new states into the federation. Hickling argues that the principle of equality was breached from the 1963 amendments to the constitution, which created a system of asymmetrical federalism by providing special privileges in terms of citizenship, travel, and jobs.

  23. 23.

    Lee (1995), pp. 10–11.

  24. 24.

    Wu (1999), pp. 94, 322–325 and Hickling (1978), p. 4 who notes that Malaysian lawyers are trained on English concepts and principles; but see Wu (1999), p. xvii and Rashid (1978), p. 150 who argues that Malaysians have been “too much swayed” by British legal developments without appreciating the different context, especially the existence of a written constitution in Malaysia.

  25. 25.

    Malaysian Bar (1998).

  26. 26.

    Wu (1999).

  27. 27.

    Ibid, p. 58. See also Choong (2015), p. 378 who writes that the reasons for the rebranding of the Supreme Court to the Federal Court is a matter for speculation.

  28. 28.

    Quoted in Wu (1999), p. 58.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Ibid, p. 92.

  31. 31.

    Ibid, pp. 58–59.

  32. 32.

    Ibid, pp. 59–60.

  33. 33.

    Ibid, pp. 60, 125, 282.

  34. 34.

    Quoted ibid, p. 92, Hickling (1992), p. 321.

  35. 35.

    Hickling (1978), p. 6. Notably, the Lord President, who lost his office in the 1988 crisis, wrote that the constitutional evolution of Malaysia reflected ongoing adjustments to accommodate particular problems and “should not be appraised in the light of other constitutions”: Bin Abas (1978), pp. 187–188.

  36. 36.

    Hickling (1978), p. 21.

  37. 37.

    Lee (1995) and Lee (2004).

  38. 38.

    Lee (2004), pp. 224–249.

  39. 39.

    Lee (1995), pp. 2, 73–75, 100.

  40. 40.

    Ibid, pp. 74–76.

  41. 41.

    Harding (1996).

  42. 42.

    Ibid, p. 271.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, pp. 147–148.

  44. 44.

    Ibid, pp. 149–150.

  45. 45.

    Ibid, p. 150.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Razak (2011).

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    Bar Council (2014).

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Counted from the 15th reprint of the Constitution of Malaysia, incorporating amendments up to 1 May 2009.

  56. 56.

    Hashim (1962). For religious protections, see Art. 3(1).

  57. 57.

    Arts. 159, 161E(2).

  58. 58.

    Arts. 73–92.

  59. 59.

    See, e.g., Huang-Thio (1964).

  60. 60.

    Arts. 153(2), 153(8A).

  61. 61.

    Arts. 153(4), 153(7).

  62. 62.

    Section 4(1).

  63. 63.

    Section 3(1)(f) of the Sedition Act 1948, 15. Note that the authority for Parliament to impose restrictions on the “questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected” by Article 153 is explicitly authorised by Article 10(4) of the Constitution in relation to security or public order. This limitation appears in the same Article as the guarantee to free speech and expression. See also a general limitation on free speech and expression in Article 10(2).

  64. 64.

    Sections 3(2)(b) and 3(2)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948, 15.

  65. 65.

    Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Public Prosecutor, [2014] 2 MLJ 145.

  66. 66.

    Ibid, para 106.

  67. 67.

    Ibid, para 114 quoting Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia, [1997] 2 MLJ 187, p. 188.

  68. 68.

    Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Public Prosecutor, [2014] 2 MLJ 145, para 100.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, para 105.

  70. 70.

    Public Prosecutor v Azmi Bin Sharom, [2015] MLJU 594.

  71. 71.

    An Act to Amend the Sedition Act 1948, (2015), ‘Explanatory Statement’.

  72. 72.

    UN News Centre (2015).

  73. 73.

    Article 3(1).

  74. 74.

    Article 3(4).

  75. 75.

    Article 11.

  76. 76.

    Quoted in Dahlan and Faudzi (2015).

  77. 77.

    Bin Yeop A Sani (1970) cited in Indira Gandhi v Patmanathan, [2015] 7 MLJ 153, para 106.

  78. 78.

    Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor, [1988] 2 MLJ 55.

  79. 79.

    Ibid, paras 55–56.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Muhamad Juzaili Bin Mohd Khamis v Negeri Sembilan, [2015] 3 MLJ 513.

  82. 82.

    Ibid, paras 30–31.

  83. 83.

    Section 66 of the Syariah Criminal Enactment 1992 (Negeri Sembilan), 4.

  84. 84.

    Muhamad Juzaili Bin Mohd Khamis v Negeri Sembilan, [2015] 3 MLJ 513, paras 44–47.

  85. 85.

    Mei Lin (2015).

  86. 86.

    Indira Gandhi v Patmanathan, [2015] 7 MLJ 153.

  87. 87.

    Ibid, para 98.

  88. 88.

    Menteri Dalam Negeri v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop, [2013] 6 MLJ 468.

  89. 89.

    Ibid, para 104.

  90. 90.

    Ibid, para 33.

  91. 91.

    Ibid, para 36.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop v Menteri Dalam Negeri, [2014] 4 MLJ 765.

  94. 94.

    Ibid, para 47.

  95. 95.

    Ibid, para 48.

  96. 96.

    Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah, [2004] 2 MLJ 119.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, paras 13, 19.

  98. 98.

    Ibid, para 19.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, paras 19, 23.

  100. 100.

    See Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 MLJ 193.

  101. 101.

    ZI Publications Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor, [2016] 1 MLJ 153.

  102. 102.

    Ibid, para 17.

  103. 103.

    See, e.g., Stilt (2015), Saravanamuttu (2010), Fernando (2006), Fernando (2002), Martinez (2001), Article 124 and the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.

  104. 104.

    See Sullivan (2014), pp. 211–217 on the presumption against tautology in the interpretation of legislation.

  105. 105.

    Art. 32(1).

  106. 106.

    Art. 182.

  107. 107.

    Arts. 39, 40(1A), 40(2).

  108. 108.

    Art. 32(3).

  109. 109.

    Wu (1999), p. 49 and Trindade (1978), p. 102.

  110. 110.

    Arts. 66(4), 66(4A), 122B(1).

  111. 111.

    Arts. 150(2B), 150(3), 150(7).

  112. 112.

    Art. 42(1).

  113. 113.

    Art. 38.

  114. 114.

    Art. 38(2)(a).

  115. 115.

    Art. 38(2).

  116. 116.

    Arts. 39, 40A(1).

  117. 117.

    Arts. 43(1), 43(2)(a).

  118. 118.

    Harding (2012), p. 60.

  119. 119.

    Arts. 121(1) (High Courts), 121(1B) (Court of Appeal), 121(2) (Federal Court).

  120. 120.

    Art. 121(3).

  121. 121.

    Art. 128(2).

  122. 122.

    Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  123. 123.

    Sections 30 and 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  124. 124.

    Art. 128(1).

  125. 125.

    Art. 130.

  126. 126.

    See, e.g., Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1912] AC 571, where the Privy Council upheld a legislated reference procedure to the Supreme Court of Canada.

  127. 127.

    Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  128. 128.

    Art. 122(1).

  129. 129.

    Federal Court of Malaysia (2014).

  130. 130.

    Section 74(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  131. 131.

    Art. 121(1B).

  132. 132.

    Art. 121(1).

  133. 133.

    Art. 121(1A).

  134. 134.

    Ninth Schedule, List II—State List, Item 1 and Art. 121(1A).

  135. 135.

    Such as succession, marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption, guardianship, gifting, and non-charitable trusts.

  136. 136.

    For example, all banking regulation, including that related to Islamic banking, falls exclusively under federal jurisdiction: see Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v Adnan Omar, [1994] 3 CLJ 735.

  137. 137.

    Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, 355, enacted pursuant to the Ninth Schedule, List II, Item 1, which states that the Sharia Courts shall have no jurisdiction with respect to offences except as conferred by federal law.

  138. 138.

    Choong (2015), p. 382. Although beyond the scope of the study, a detailed examination of the interaction between state law and Islamic law is relevant to the conception of the judicial institution and merits further study in all its dimensions including the training of Islamic lawyers through the Department of Islamic Law at the International Islamic University Malaysia.

  139. 139.

    See, e.g., reflections in Harding and Lee (2007).

  140. 140.

    Subashini v Saravanan, [2008] 2 MLJ 147.

  141. 141.

    Ibid, para 23.

  142. 142.

    Ibid, para 24.

  143. 143.

    Hj Raimi bin Abdullah v Siti Hasnah Vangarama bt Abdullah, [2014] 3 MLJ 757.

  144. 144.

    Ibid, para 17.

  145. 145.

    Indira Gandhi v Patmanathan, [2013] 5 MLJ 552.

  146. 146.

    Ibid, para 25.

  147. 147.

    Indira Gandhi v Patmanathan, [2013] 5 MLJ 552, para 12.

  148. 148.

    Latifah Mat Zin v Rosemawati Sharibun, [2007] 5 MLJ 101.

  149. 149.

    Ibid, para 76.

  150. 150.

    See, e.g., Viran v Deepa, [2016] 1 MLJ 585, in which the Federal Court resolved a question of contested jurisdiction between the Sharia Court and the High Court.

  151. 151.

    Art. 122B.

  152. 152.

    Ibid.

  153. 153.

    Art. 123.

  154. 154.

    Art. 124.

  155. 155.

    Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, 695.

  156. 156.

    For a critical overview of the new appointment process see Bari et al. (2015).

  157. 157.

    International Commission of Jurists (2012).

  158. 158.

    Section 2 of the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, 695.

  159. 159.

    Shuaib (2011), p. 2276.

  160. 160.

    Robert Linggi v The Government of Malaysia, [2011] 2 MLJ 741.

  161. 161.

    Ibid, paras 38–40.

  162. 162.

    Ibid, paras 40–43.

  163. 163.

    Anbalagan (2013) and Lee (2013).

  164. 164.

    Arts. 125(1), 125(9).

  165. 165.

    Art. 122AB(1).

  166. 166.

    Office of the Chief Registrar (2014).

  167. 167.

    Arts. 5–13.

  168. 168.

    See, e.g., Arts. 9(2), 10(2), 11(5).

  169. 169.

    Art. 10(4).

  170. 170.

    Art. 149(2).

  171. 171.

    The Internal Security Act 1960, 82 (since repealed and replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747), the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventative Measures) Act 1985, 316, and the Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988, 340.

  172. 172.

    Arts. 150(6), 150(6A).

  173. 173.

    Harding (2012), p. 167.

  174. 174.

    Ibid, p. 170.

  175. 175.

    Art. 151(1)(b).

  176. 176.

    Malaysian Bar (2016).

  177. 177.

    1254 cases, including leave applications, were lodged during this period: Office of the Chief Registrar (2014).

  178. 178.

    Office of the Chief Registrar (2014).

  179. 179.

    Choong (2015), p. 400.

  180. 180.

    World Bank (2011).

  181. 181.

    Art. 150(8).

  182. 182.

    Arts. 32(1), 181(2).

  183. 183.

    Art. 182(6).

  184. 184.

    Arts. 63(1), 68(4). Proceedings in state legislative assemblies are also shielded from judicial review: Arts. 72(1)-72(5).

  185. 185.

    Arts. 10(2), 10(4), 63(2)-63(5).

  186. 186.

    Part III, Section 2.

  187. 187.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82.

  188. 188.

    Sections 8B and 8C of the Internal Security Act 1960, 82. Note that the Act has been repealed and replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747.

  189. 189.

    See e.g., Lee Guan Seng v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, [1992] 2 MLJ 878.

  190. 190.

    Choong (2015), pp. 372, 390 where the author, being the former Dean of Law at the University of Malaya looks at an idealistic conception of judicial independence advanced by the Federal Court in Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd v Fawziah Holding Sdn Bhd, [2007] 5 MLJ 501 (neutrality of mind and absence of any internal or external pressure) and writes: “Whether there is judicial independence in Malaysia based on the above criteria is a highly debateable question.”

  191. 191.

    Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor, [2004] 2 MLJ 517.

  192. 192.

    Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  193. 193.

    Section 1 of the Sixth Schedule.

  194. 194.

    Judges’ Remuneration Act 1971, 45.

  195. 195.

    Art. 125(6).

  196. 196.

    Art. 125(7).

  197. 197.

    Section 14 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, 91.

  198. 198.

    Arts. 125(1), 125(9).

  199. 199.

    Although these judges do not enjoy security of tenure, they “have the same powers and enjoy the same immunities” as ordinary judges of the High Court: Art. 122AB(1).

  200. 200.

    Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, 695.

  201. 201.

    Art. 127.

  202. 202.

    Ibid.

  203. 203.

    Art. 121(3).

  204. 204.

    Art. 126.

  205. 205.

    Section 1 of the Sixth Schedule.

  206. 206.

    The concept of deference and its application to the Malaysian judiciary is discussed further below.

  207. 207.

    Asian Pacific Post (2008).

  208. 208.

    Ramakrishnan (2005).

  209. 209.

    Hui Lim (2013).

  210. 210.

    Ibid.

  211. 211.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82, repealed and replaced with the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747.

  212. 212.

    See e.g., Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1989] 3 MLJ 121 and Jamaluddin bin Othman, [1989] 1 MLJ 418, discussed below.

  213. 213.

    Wu (1999), pp. 277–279.

  214. 214.

    See e.g., Lee Guan Seng v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, [1992] 2 MLJ 878.

  215. 215.

    Although it should be noted that the media is subject to extensive regulation: Harding and Whiting (2012), p. 260.

  216. 216.

    Judges’ Code of Ethics (2009).

  217. 217.

    Ibid.

  218. 218.

    Arts. 125(3C), 125(9).

  219. 219.

    Anti-Corruption Act 1997, 575.

  220. 220.

    Koshy (2013).

  221. 221.

    World Bank (2011), p. 7.

  222. 222.

    Choong (2015), p. 390.

  223. 223.

    Arts. 125(3)-125(5).

  224. 224.

    Art. 125(3).

  225. 225.

    Art. 125(4).

  226. 226.

    Art. 125(5).

  227. 227.

    Art. 125(3A).

  228. 228.

    Mageswari (2013).

  229. 229.

    Free Malaysia Today (2013).

  230. 230.

    The Malaysian Insider (2013).

  231. 231.

    Ibid.

  232. 232.

    Art. 44.

  233. 233.

    Ibid.

  234. 234.

    CommonLII (2010).

  235. 235.

    Art. 74(2).

  236. 236.

    Arts. 75, 77.

  237. 237.

    Art. 76(1). Laws passed by Parliament for uniformity or at the request of a state only come into effect when adopted by the state and thereafter can be amended or repealed by the state: Art. 76(3).

  238. 238.

    Arts. 45(3), 45(3A).

  239. 239.

    Art. 49.

  240. 240.

    Wu (1999), p. 69.

  241. 241.

    Art. 67(1).

  242. 242.

    Arts. 113 to 120.

  243. 243.

    Arts. 55(2)-55(3).

  244. 244.

    Art. 68.

  245. 245.

    Art. 43(2).

  246. 246.

    Arts. 66(3)-66(6).

  247. 247.

    The concept of deference and its application to the Malaysian judiciary is discussed further below.

  248. 248.

    See e.g., Komer (1972), pp. 34–37.

  249. 249.

    Wu (1999), pp. 267–268.

  250. 250.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82.

  251. 251.

    Emergency Regulations Ordinance 1948.

  252. 252.

    See Section 8(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960, 82 that provides for preventative detention by the discretion of the minister for periods of up to 2 years, which can be renewed repeatedly under Section 8(7). See also Fritz & Flaherty (2002) and Wu (1999), pp. 268–269.

  253. 253.

    Harding (2012), p. 172.

  254. 254.

    Cited in Wu (1999), p. 272.

  255. 255.

    UPI (2011). The Act was repealed and replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747.

  256. 256.

    Lee (1995), p. 13.

  257. 257.

    Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969. See also Lee (1995), pp. 13–14.

  258. 258.

    Constitution Amendment Act 1971.

  259. 259.

    Hickling (1978), pp. 11–12.

  260. 260.

    Palani (2011).

  261. 261.

    Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1989] 3 MLJ 121.

  262. 262.

    Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventative Measures) Act 1985, 316.

  263. 263.

    Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1989] 3 MLJ 121, para 39.

  264. 264.

    Jamaluddin bin Othman, [1989] 1 MLJ 418.

  265. 265.

    Ibid, paras 10–13.

  266. 266.

    Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989.

  267. 267.

    Wu (1999), pp. 277–279.

  268. 268.

    Section 8B of the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989.

  269. 269.

    Ibid, Section 8C.

  270. 270.

    Ibid, Section 8D.

  271. 271.

    See e.g., Lee Guan Seng v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, [1992] 2 MLJ 878 where the High Court held that a mechanical application of preventative detention provisions under the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985, 316 would result in a detention being declared as invalid by the judiciary.

  272. 272.

    Harding (2012), p. 173.

  273. 273.

    Ibid, p. 175.

  274. 274.

    See, e.g., Chap. 3 in Lee (1995), Chap. 8.7 in Harding (1996), Harding (1990), Hickling (1989), and Trindade (1990).

  275. 275.

    Berthelsen v Director General of Immigration, Malaysia, [1987] 1 MLJ 134.

  276. 276.

    Lee (1995), p. 46.

  277. 277.

    Quoted ibid., p. 47.

  278. 278.

    Lim Kit Siang v Dato Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, [1987] 1 MLJ 383.

  279. 279.

    Public Prosecutor v Dato Yap Peng, [1987] 2 MLJ 311.

  280. 280.

    Section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 593.

  281. 281.

    Public Prosecutor v Dato Yap Peng, [1987] 2 MLJ 311, p. 317.

  282. 282.

    Ibid, p. 318.

  283. 283.

    Mohamed Noor bin Othman v Mohamed Yusof Jaafar, [1988] 2 MLJ 129.

  284. 284.

    Lee (1995), p. 52.

  285. 285.

    Harding (1996), p. 145.

  286. 286.

    Ibid, p. 146.

  287. 287.

    Lee (1995), p. 53.

  288. 288.

    Ibid, p. 56.

  289. 289.

    Ibid.

  290. 290.

    Harding (1996), p. 147.

  291. 291.

    Quoted in Wu (1999), p. 61, Bin Abas (1989).

  292. 292.

    Harding (1990).

  293. 293.

    Harding (1996), p. 136.

  294. 294.

    Harding (2012), p. 203.

  295. 295.

    Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan, [2008] 1 MLJ 1.

  296. 296.

    Ibid, paras 11, 22. See, however, the dissenting judgment of Justice Hamid Sultan in Nik Noorhafizi bin Nik Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor, [2013] 6 MLJ 660.

  297. 297.

    Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan, [2008] 1 MLJ 1, para 14. The majority also reproduced a quotation from an academic source that other political systems do not separate powers as neatly as may be imagined, such as in the United States where some administrative agencies exercise judicial and legislative powers.

  298. 298.

    Ibid, para 17.

  299. 299.

    Ibid, paras 17–18.

  300. 300.

    Ibid, para 9.

  301. 301.

    Ibid, para 39.

  302. 302.

    Ibid, para 40.

  303. 303.

    Tan and Thio (2010), p. 630 and Malaysia Today (2008).

  304. 304.

    Wu (2002), p. 46.

  305. 305.

    Ibid.

  306. 306.

    Ibid, p. 47.

  307. 307.

    Ibid, p. 48.

  308. 308.

    Ibid, pp. 49, 51.

  309. 309.

    Ibid, p. 51.

  310. 310.

    Ibid, p. 57.

  311. 311.

    BBC (2012).

  312. 312.

    Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd, [2013] 3 MLJ 534. See also Khairy Jamaluddin v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim, [2013] 4 MLJ 173.

  313. 313.

    Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd, [2013] 3 MLJ 534, para 18 [references omitted].

  314. 314.

    Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad Azri bin Wan Deris, [2014] 9 MLJ 605.

  315. 315.

    The Guardian (2014).

  316. 316.

    Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Pendakwa Raya, [2015] 2 MLJ 293.

  317. 317.

    Ibid, para 229.

  318. 318.

    United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1994).

  319. 319.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (1997), paras 122–134.

  320. 320.

    United Nations (1946).

  321. 321.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (1997), paras 122–134 and United Nations Economic and Social Council (1998b), paras 106–116.

  322. 322.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (Report) (1998a), para 116.

  323. 323.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (1999), paras 115–123.

  324. 324.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (Request) (1998b).

  325. 325.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (2000), para 198.

  326. 326.

    Ibid, para 199.

  327. 327.

    United Nations General Assembly (1999), p. 7.

  328. 328.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (2001), para 145.

  329. 329.

    Insas Bhd v Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, [2000] 4 MLJ 727.

  330. 330.

    Ibid, para 21.

  331. 331.

    Ibid, para 22.

  332. 332.

    Ibid.

  333. 333.

    United Nations Economic and Social Council (2002), para 122.

  334. 334.

    Harding and Whiting (2012), p. 285.

  335. 335.

    Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, 695.

  336. 336.

    Members of the Commission of Enquiry on the Video Clip Recording of Images of a Person Purported to be an Advocate and Solicitor Speaking on Telephone on Matters of Appointment of Judges v Tun Dato’ Seri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato’ Sheikh Abdul Halim, [2011] 6 MLJ 490.

  337. 337.

    Ibid, paras 28, 37.

  338. 338.

    Ibid, para 43.

  339. 339.

    Harding and Whiting (2012), p. 285.

  340. 340.

    Ibid, pp. 285–286.

  341. 341.

    Ibid, p. 286.

  342. 342.

    Ibid, p. 288.

  343. 343.

    Ibid, p. 297.

  344. 344.

    The concept of deference and its application to the Malaysian judiciary is discussed further below.

  345. 345.

    Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd, [2013] 3 MLJ 534, para 18.

  346. 346.

    Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd v James Foong Cheng Yuen, [2006] 1 MLJ 464.

  347. 347.

    Ibid, para 73.

  348. 348.

    Razak (2011).

  349. 349.

    But see the discussion of a legally binding general guarantee to judicial independence in the Malaysian Constitution, discussed above.

  350. 350.

    See Larkins (1996), p. 619 who suggests that the limits of judicial independence can be observed by looking at the political question doctrine that is “applied in reference to very sensitive issues.”

  351. 351.

    Faruqi (2005).

  352. 352.

    See Dyzenhaus (1997). These meanings also track different definitions of deference appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary where on the one hand deference refers to “[s]ubmission to the acknowledged superior claims, skill, judgement, or other qualities, of another” and “the manifestation of a disposition to yield to the claims or wishes of another”; while, on the other hand, deference refers to “respectful acknowledgement of the authority of, out of practical respect or regard to”: Oxford English Dictionary “deference”.

  353. 353.

    See, e.g., Allan (2006).

  354. 354.

    Referred to as the ‘Oakes test’ from R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, which is applied to determine whether a prima facie infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11, can be justified pursuant to Section 1 of the Charter which authorises infringements if they can are seen as reasonable limits “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. The test provides a degree of latitude for legislative judgement on balancing among competing rights provided that there is a pressing and substantial objective, a rational connection between the limitation of the right and the means used to achieve the objective, an impairment of the protected right as little as is reasonably possible, and an overall proportionality of the measures used in relation to the infringement.

  355. 355.

    Liston (2013), p. 65.

  356. 356.

    Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190.

  357. 357.

    Ibid, para 48.

  358. 358.

    Ibid, para 47.

  359. 359.

    R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene, [2000] 2 AC 326.

  360. 360.

    Ibid, p. 381.

  361. 361.

    R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, [2014] UKSC 38.

  362. 362.

    Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v Kekatong Sdn Bhd, [2004] 2 MLJ 257.

  363. 363.

    Ibid.

  364. 364.

    Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Calsonic Compressor (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., [2009] MYMHC 42, para 25.

  365. 365.

    Arts. 10(2)(a)-10(2)(c).

  366. 366.

    Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia, [2010] 2 MLJ 333.

  367. 367.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82.

  368. 368.

    Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan, [2008] 1 MLJ 1.

  369. 369.

    Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1989] 3 MLJ 121.

  370. 370.

    Jamaluddin bin Othman, [1989] 1 MLJ 418.

  371. 371.

    Malaysia Today (2009).

  372. 372.

    Anti-Corruption Act 1997, 575.

  373. 373.

    Koshy (2013).

  374. 374.

    During the first 5 years of Malaysia’s history, only four cases directly concerned the rights of the individual under the Constitution: Hickling (1962), pp. 198–200 and Hamzah (2009), p. 19. Because of judicial deference in constitutional cases, it is not surprising that the government showed it was “not afraid to govern”: Hickling (1962), p. 204.

  375. 375.

    Constitution (Temporary Amendment) Ordinance, Ord. 42/1958.

  376. 376.

    Hamzah (2009), p. 19.

  377. 377.

    Ibid, pp. 20–21.

  378. 378.

    Ahmad (1999), p. 6.

  379. 379.

    Hickling (1975), p. 33.

  380. 380.

    Hamzah (2009), p. 118.

  381. 381.

    Hickling (1975), p. 30 and Ahmad (1999), pp. 8–15.

  382. 382.

    Wade (1961).

  383. 383.

    Ibid, p. 10. Notably, this text was written before the House of Lords decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 AC 147, which limited the effect of a private clause that purported to exclude judicial review.

  384. 384.

    In 1961 most of Malaysia’s lawyers were educated in the United Kingdom: Sheridan (1961), p. 170; see also Ibrahim (1976).

  385. 385.

    Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi and others (Malaysia), [1967] UKPC 21.

  386. 386.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82.

  387. 387.

    Third Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949).

  388. 388.

    Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi and others (Malaysia), [1967] UKPC 21.

  389. 389.

    Osman bin Haji Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor (Malaysia), [1968] UKPC 14.

  390. 390.

    Ibid; Third Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949).

  391. 391.

    SK Ningkan v Government of Malaysia (Malaysia), [1968] UKPC 21.

  392. 392.

    Ibid.

  393. 393.

    Ibid, para 4.

  394. 394.

    Ibid, para 5.

  395. 395.

    Government of Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, [1963] MLJ 355.

  396. 396.

    Many Malayan superior court judges at the time were British. For example, Chief Justice James Thomson was a Scottish barrister and a member of the English Bar. As demonstrated in this case, British judges were generally unwilling to challenge the new government presumably on the basis that it should be enabled to make important decisions unhampered by significant judicial restraints. In addition, British judges were familiar with the English legal system and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The Privy Council also held final appellate jurisdiction over the Malayan courts and often upheld the validity of government action: see e.g., Ibrahim (1969–1972), pp. 170–171.

  397. 397.

    Government of Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, [1963] MLJ 355, pp. 357–358. Harding (1996), p. 41 questions the legal reasoning in this judgment.

  398. 398.

    Harding (2012), p. 43.

  399. 399.

    To deal with continuing threats of terrorism, the government introduced the Internal Security Act 1960, 82 to increase executive control over the detention of suspects.

  400. 400.

    Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris, [1976] 2 MLJ 116.

  401. 401.

    Ibid, p. 124.

  402. 402.

    Ibrahim (1976).

  403. 403.

    Ibid, pp. 251–252.

  404. 404.

    Harding (1996).

  405. 405.

    Ibid, Table of Cases.

  406. 406.

    Harding and Whiting (2012), p. 263.

  407. 407.

    Ibid, p. 262.

  408. 408.

    Harding (1996), p. 143. Criminal appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1978.

  409. 409.

    Quoted in Hamzah (2009), p. 44.

  410. 410.

    Public Prosecutor v Dato Yap Peng, [1987] 2 MLJ 311.

  411. 411.

    Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1989] 3 MLJ 121.

  412. 412.

    Jamaluddin bin Othman, [1989] 1 MLJ 418.

  413. 413.

    See the discussion above.

  414. 414.

    See the discussion above.

  415. 415.

    Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan, [2008] 1 MLJ 1.

  416. 416.

    Harding (2012), p. 216. It should be noted that the new judicial model provides more legal work for lawyers and therefore the Malaysian Bar also advances the economic interests of lawyers by promoting a larger judicial role.

  417. 417.

    Members of the Commission of Enquiry on the Video Clip Recording of Images of a Person Purported to be an Advocate and Solicitor Speaking on Telephone on Matters of Appointment of Judges v Tun Dato’ Seri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato’ Sheikh Abdul Halim, [2011] 6 MLJ 490.

  418. 418.

    See the discussion above.

  419. 419.

    Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia, [2010] 2 MLJ 333.

  420. 420.

    Noorfadilla bt Ahmad Saikin v Chayed bin Basirun, [2012] 1 MLJ 832.

  421. 421.

    Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v Sagong Tasi, [2005] 6 MLJ 289.

  422. 422.

    The previous longest period without constitutional amendment was between 1996 and 2000.

  423. 423.

    Internal Security Act 1960, 82; Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747.

  424. 424.

    Palani (2011).

  425. 425.

    UN News Centre (2012).

  426. 426.

    International Commission of Jurists (2013) and International Commission of Jurists (2012).

  427. 427.

    See the discussion of Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor, [2004] 2 MLJ 517 above and also the dissenting judgment of Justice Hamid Sultan of the Putrajaya Court of Appeal in Nik Noorhafizi bin Nik Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor, [2013] 6 MLJ 660, para 77 who extensively discusses the role of the Malaysian judiciary and writes that “the Federal Constitution by virtue of the constitutional oath of the judge to preserve, protect and defend the constitution, has in immutable terms vested the court, independent jurisdiction and power to preserve, protect and defend the constitution without any shackles of limitation related to judicial power or judicial review concept or jurisprudence or lack of procedural mechanism to canvass the constitutional complaint.”

  428. 428.

    Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj v Peguam Negara Malaysia, [2013] 2 MLJ 321.

  429. 429.

    Ibid, para 18.

  430. 430.

    Ibid, para 21.

  431. 431.

    Ibid, para 20.

  432. 432.

    Ibid, para 21.

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Neudorf, L. (2017). Judicial Independence in Malaysia. In: The Dynamics of Judicial Independence. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49884-3_2

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