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Decolonising South African Contract Law: An Argument for Synthesis

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The Constitutional Dimension of Contract Law

Abstract

South Africa is an example of a ‘mixed’ legal system. The fascinating synthesis of Roman-Dutch and English Contract laws is a key feature of this system and has often been remarked upon by scholars. The new frontier of debate in this country, however, is as to the role of the Constitution in shaping the Common law of contract and effecting transformation of our commercial landscape. The question in this regard of how to apply the Bill of Rights to the common law seems to have been settled at indirect horizontality. A related and pressing concern is how to incorporate indigenous African Customary law perspectives into the law of contract. All of these revisionist aims must, however, leave South Africa as a viable country in which to invest and do business. This paper was inspired by the 2015 ‘decolonisation’ movement and will explore ways in which to effect (in a commercially viable manner) the goal of decolonisation of Contract law, which is arguably mandated by the Constitution. In the light of this, one must ask, what is the future of South Africa’s traditional Roman-Dutch common law of contract?

This work is based on the research supported by the National Research Foundation. Any opinion, finding and conclusion, or recommendation expressed in this material is that of the author and the NRF does not accept any liability in this regard.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This movement, which started at the University of Cape Town as a call for the removal of a prominent statue of British colonialist Cecil John Rhodes in March, spread very quickly to other South African universities, with the general call being for transformation of institutions perceived as being Eurocentric. In October and November 2015 there were nationwide student protests against increases of student fees, which arose at the University of the Witwatersrand and spread to all major universities around the country within a week. Protests continued intermittently through 2016 at most South African universities, particularly once it became clear that fees for tertiary education would remain a reality going forward and would be subject to inflationary increases in 2017.

  2. 2.

    For an influential theoretical account of decolonisation, see Fanon (1967). See also: Fanon (2008). In the South African context, see Biko (2004) for another statement of the black consciousness ideal.

  3. 3.

    Himonga and Bosch (2000), p. 306.

  4. 4.

    See by way of example: Massie et al. (2014), pp. xxii–xxvi; Piketty (2014), pp. 326–328.

  5. 5.

    This chapter will use Nigeria as an example here, since it is Anglophone and hence accessible to the author. Nigeria is particularly relevant since it is, at the time of writing, Africa’s largest economy. See: Staff Writer, The Economist (2014).

    Reference will also be made to other SADC countries which base their Private law largely on South African law, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana. For the influence of South African law in these countries, see: Zimmermann and Visser (1996), pp. 3–4.

  6. 6.

    On horizontal application see text and accompanying notes 72–76 in Sect. 3 below.

  7. 7.

    See by way of example: Mureinik (1994), Langa (2006) and Ackermann (2000).

  8. 8.

    See by way of example: Klare (1998) and Davis and Klare (2010). For a work tracing the influence of Aristotle on contract law, see: Gordley (1991) (see pp. 12–13 for a discussion of distributive justice in this context).

  9. 9.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), p. 567. The settlement was financed and administered by the Dutch East India Company (‘VOC’). Initially the intention was to found a refreshment station for passing ships, but after a short period, the first ‘freeburghers’ began to farm independently, which began the process of permanent European settlement. See generally in addition: Fagan (1996), pp. 35–37.

  10. 10.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 567–575; Fagan (1996), pp. 35–41.

  11. 11.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 567, 575–578; Fagan (1996), pp. 46–51.

  12. 12.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 567, 575–578; Fagan (1996), pp. 46–49; Hutchison (1991), p. 28.

  13. 13.

    Hutchison (1991), p. 28.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., pp. 28–29.

  16. 16.

    See generally: De Vos and Freedman (2014), pp. 15–23.

  17. 17.

    Act 200 of 1993 (hereinafter the ‘interim Constitution’).

  18. 18.

    De Vos and Freedman (2014), pp. 20–25.

  19. 19.

    Sections 2; 165–173 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the ‘final Constitution’). Note: the hierarchy of the South African court structure was changed by the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 (in force since August 2013), in terms of which the Constitutional Court is now the apex court in all matters.

  20. 20.

    For an example of recent black consciousness scholarship making this type of argument, see: Sibanda and Mosaka (2015). See also in a different context: Barnard-Naudé (2016).

  21. 21.

    On the fact that the South African common law in general is a local synthesis, see Hahlo and Kahn (1968), Chapter 17; Fagan (1996) and Price (1947). For a negative view of this synthesis, see Chanock (2001), pp. 155–169.

  22. 22.

    See Mwalimu (2009), pp. 399–401. Asein (2005), p. 101 hints at a certain hostility to the colonial origins of the received English Common law. The alternative appears to be only Customary law, however, which in the current Nigerian law is subject to ‘any law for the time being in force’ (Ibid., p. 129, citing Section. 20(1) of the Cross River State High Court Law).

  23. 23.

    See in particular: Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court); Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (1) SA 256 (Constitutional Court); Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd, [2015] (3) SA 479 (Constitutional Court). These cases are discussed below in Sect. 3.

  24. 24.

    In this chapter, ‘common law’ (lower case) will be used to refer to the body of South African law built up through judicial development of the historic sources. ‘Common Law’ (upper case) will be used to refer to the English Common Law and the legal family originally based thereon.

  25. 25.

    Zimmermann and Visser (1996), pp. 12–15. The Constitutional Court’s position on this question is discussed below in Sect. 3.

  26. 26.

    Section 211(3) final Constitution. See further: Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 82–87; Bennett (2004), pp. 42–43. It should be noted that the exact meaning of the phrase ‘when applicable’ in Section. 211(3) remains (to date) a little uncertain.

  27. 27.

    See Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 82–87.

  28. 28.

    Compare Zimmermann and Visser (1996), pp. 12–15; compare the argument of Sachs (1989).

  29. 29.

    See on Labour law (inter alia): Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. On Consumer law, see (inter alia): Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, National Credit Act 34 of 2005, Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999.

  30. 30.

    The Constitutional Court’s position of ‘fairness’ in contracting will be explored in Sect. 3 below.

  31. 31.

    Fagan (1996), p. 41.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.; Hahlo and Kahn (1968), p. 579.

  33. 33.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 578–596; Fagan (1996), pp. 41–45. It should be noted that the bald statement made here sums up what has in the past been a hotly contested terrain. There were both narrow views of Roman-Dutch law, namely that only the writers of the province of Holland during the above period were binding, with other Dutch writers of the period, or even other European writers of ius commune generally, being of mere persuasive authority. Hahlo and Kahn at pp. 580–581 set out this viewpoint. Fagan at pp. 43–44 argues for a broader view based on the fact that national boundaries were not clearly observed by writers in the period in question, plus the fact that South Africa courts have traditionally selected the version of the law which best suits the particular policy argument being furthered in a given case.

  34. 34.

    Compare Hahlo and Kahn (1968), p. 586fn5, which reflects the historic fact that most South African law schools (at the time of writing) taught these concepts as Roman-Dutch Law I, II, III, et cetera, rather than under their more conventional subject titles, as used around the world. This was the position at the University of Cape Town until 1995. Thereafter the title ‘Private Law’ was used for these courses, until 2001 when a new curriculum introduced titles such as Law of Property, Law of Contract, Law of Succession etc.

  35. 35.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 575–578.

  36. 36.

    Fagan (1996), p. 57; Chanock (2001), pp. 156–159.

  37. 37.

    General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 (Cape Colony); General Law Amendment Ordinance 5 of 1902 (Orange Free State); Fagan (1996), p. 56.

  38. 38.

    See generally: Zimmermann (1996).

  39. 39.

    Fagan (1996), p. 60; Chanock (2001), pp. 160–167; Corder (2010), pp. 572–575.

  40. 40.

    For praise of South Africa’s Roman-Dutch common law see: Hahlo and Kahn (1968), p. 596 (‘one of the world’s great legal systems’). For a negative view that one of the major underlying motivators for development of a South African version of Roman-Dutch law was resistance to British imperialism and a desire to subjugate the local black population by means of (inter alia) the law of contract, see Chanock (2001), pp. 155–176.

  41. 41.

    Chanock (2001), pp. 172–176.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., pp. 155–184.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., pp. 169–184.

  44. 44.

    The two key texts (in the opinion of this author) on the history of the doctrine of good faith in South Africa are Zimmermann (1996) and Hutchison (1999).

  45. 45.

    Zimmermann (1996), pp. 218–220; Hutchison (1999), pp. 215–217.

  46. 46.

    Zimmermann (1996), pp. 218–220; Hutchison (1999), p. 216.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Habersack and Zimmermann (1999), p. 219; Hutchison (1999), p. 216.

  49. 49.

    Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund, [1976] (3) SA 16 (Appellate Division), p. 28; Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis, [1980] (1) SA 645 (Appellate Division), pp. 651–652; Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas, [1988] (3) SA 580 (Appellate Division), pp. 601–602; Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO, [1997] (4) SA 302 (Supreme Court of Appeal), pp. 318–331 (per Olivier JA); Brisley v Drotsky, [2002] (4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal), para 22.

  50. 50.

    Zimmermann (1996), p. 236.

  51. 51.

    Ibid. The ‘passport’ metaphor is taken from Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk, [1964] (2) SA 47 (Transvaal Provincial Division), p. 49.

  52. 52.

    Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas, [1988] (3) SA 580 (Appellate Division), p. 607. Zimmermann (1996), pp. 234–235 notes that the only case in which the exceptio doli generalis was successfully invoked as a defence in its own right, was in the high court decision in Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein, [1981] (2) SA 207 (Witwatersrand Local Division).

  53. 53.

    Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas, [1988] (3) SA 580 (Appellate Division), p. 607. Zimmermann (1996), pp. 609–610.

  54. 54.

    Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes, [1989] (1) SA 1 (Appellate Division), p. 7H–9G.

  55. 55.

    Jansen JA in a dissenting judgment in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas, [1988] (3) SA 580 (Appellate Division), pp. 617F–G had already linked the underlying basis of the exceptio doli generalis, namely the ‘sense of justice of the community’ to the ‘defences based on public policy’. See further: Lubbe (1991).

  56. 56.

    Brisley v Drotsky, [2002] (4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal), paras 11–22. Confirmed in: Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom. [2002] (6) SA 21 (Supreme Court of Appeal), paras 31–32; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd, [2005] (3) SA 323 (Supreme Court of Appeal), paras 26–31. For more recent statements by the SCA to this effect see the cases cited in note 111 below.

  57. 57.

    Brisley v Drotsky, [2002] (4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal), para 22. Note that this statement is taken from Hutchison (2001), pp. 743–744. Compare the creative use by the SCA of good faith at the interpretation stage in South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd, [2005] (3) SA 323 (Supreme Court of Appeal), paras 32–36.

  58. 58.

    See the cases cited in notes 23 above and 85 below. See Price and Hutchison (2015).

  59. 59.

    For an introduction to the English position on good faith see: Whittaker and Zimmermann (2000), pp. 39–48, but note the recent English case law developments discussed below in the text accompanying notes 211–212.

  60. 60.

    On English Consumer law, see (inter alia): Consumer Credit Act, 1974; Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977; Sale of Goods Act, 1979. Compare SA statutes cited above note 29.

  61. 61.

    See: Brisley v Drotsky, [2002] (4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal) (on non-variation clauses) & Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, [2002] (6) SA 21 (Supreme Court of Appeal) (on exemption clauses). Hutchison (2001), Lubbe (2004) and Bhana and Pieterse (2006). Note that the position on exemption clauses with regard to consumer contracts has been alleviated by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (see Chapter 2, part G). The case law on mistake in contract has sometimes seen a relaxation of the caveat subscriptorrule, however, based on the doctrine of reasonable reliance. See in particular: Sonap Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis [1992] (3) SA 234 (Appellate Division).

  62. 62.

    Chanock (2001), pp. 169–184.

  63. 63.

    For defences of the necessity of contractual certainty, see in particular the following articles by Supreme Court of Appeal Justices, writing in their personal capacity: Brand (2009), Lewis (2013) and Wallis (2016).

  64. 64.

    The key Constitutional Court cases on contract law will be discussed below and are listed in note 23 above and note 85 below.

  65. 65.

    This purpose is expressed in the Preamble to the final Constitution. Compare also Chapter 2’s Bill of Rights, which includes not only civil and political rights, but also socio-economic rights. For discussion in law journals, see: [Former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court] Langa (2006); [Former Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court] Moseneke (2009).

  66. 66.

    Sections 7(1), 36(1), 39(1) final Constitution.

  67. 67.

    Ibid, Section 9(2). See further: Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 & Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.

  68. 68.

    For a brief general discussion of freedom versus dignity, which explains potential conflict and the resolution thereof, see: Meyerson (1997), pp. 10–15. For a view that freedom and dignity are inter-linked and not in antithesis, see: Du Bois (2008).

  69. 69.

    Compare: Lubbe (2004), pp. 420–423.

  70. 70.

    Du Bois (2008), Ackermann (2000), Cowen (2001) and Feldman (1999). In a specifically contractual context, see: Lubbe (2004), pp. 420–423.

  71. 71.

    This will be explored in Sect. 5 below.

  72. 72.

    Interim Constitution: Du Plessis v De Klerk, [1996] (3) SA 850 (Constitutional Court), paras 42–49 (indirect application to the common law under the relevant sections of the interim Bill of Rights). Final Constitution: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security, [2001] (4) SA 938 (Constitutional Court), paras 33–40, 50–60; S v Thebus, [2003] (6) SA 505 (Constitutional Court), paras 23–32; K v Minister of Safety and Security, [2005] (6) SA 419 (Constitutional Court), paras 15–19; Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), paras 23–30. All of these cases favoured indirect application under Section 39(2). See however: Khumalo v Holomisa, [2002] (5) SA 401 (Constitutional Court), paras 29–33 (direct application of the Bill of Rights under Section 8 of the final Constitution to a defamation claim). Currie and De Waal (2013), pp. 46–47 argue that Khumalo is the only decision in which the Constitutional Court applied the Bill of Rights directly to the common law. In the subsequent Barkhuizen decision, the Constitutional Court was invited to use direct application, but chose instead indirect application. These authors thus reach the logical conclusion that this is the preferred method of the Constitutional Court. There is much debate on this point in the law journals, see by way of example: Woolman (2007), Fagan (2010), Bhana (2013) and Du Bois (2015).

  73. 73.

    Sections 7 and 35(3) of the interim Constitution; Sections 8 and 39(2) of the final Constitution. For discussion, see the sources listed in the previous note.

  74. 74.

    Du Plessis v De Klerk, [1996] (3) SA 850 (Constitutional Court), para 60.

  75. 75.

    Section 8 of the final Constitution differed from Section 7 of its predecessor in that the ‘judiciary’ is expressly bound by the Bill of Rights in Section 8(1) and Sections 8(2)–(3) go on to spell out that natural and juristic persons are also bound and that the common law must be developed to give effect to fact. See: Woolman (2005) and Van der Walt (2001).

  76. 76.

    Section 39(2). See Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), paras 23–30.

  77. 77.

    Section 34 final Constitution.

  78. 78.

    Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), para 56.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., para 28.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., para 51.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., paras 79–83.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., para 80.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., para 82.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., paras 82–83.

  85. 85.

    Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (1) SA 256 (Constitutional Court); Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (3) SA 531 (Constitutional Court); Botha v Rich NO, [2014] (4) SA 124 (Constitutional Court); Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard, [2014] (4) SA 474 (Constitutional Court); Malan v City of Cape Town, [2014] (6) SA 315 (Constitutional Court); Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd, [2015] (3) SA 479 (Constitutional Court); Makate v Vodacom Ltd [2016] (4) SA 121 (Constitutional Court); Nkata v Firstrand Bank Ltd[2016] (4) SA 257 (Constitutional Court).

  86. 86.

    Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (1) SA 256 (Constitutional Court), para 72.

  87. 87.

    Ibid.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., paras 74–80.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., para 23.

  90. 90.

    See the dictum in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (1) SA 256 (Constitutional Court) cited above in the text accompanying note 86; and those in Botha v Rich NO, [2014] (4) SA 124 (Constitutional Court) cited below in the text accompanying notes 92–93.

  91. 91.

    Botha v Rich NO, [2014] (4) SA 124 (Constitutional Court), paras 23, 49–51.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., para 45 (references omitted—Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis, [1980] (1) SA 645 (Appellate Division) is cited above at note 49).

  93. 93.

    Ibid., para 46.

  94. 94.

    Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd, [2015] (3) SA 479 (Constitutional Court), paras 66, 73–75 (per Madlanga J).

  95. 95.

    Ibid., paras 89–94 (per Madlanga J); 106,119 (per Moseneke J); Cameron J dissenting. Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation), [1998] (1) SA 811 (Supreme Court of Appeal) stated the prior position and was overruled by the majority of the Constitutional Court in Paulsen.

  96. 96.

    See for example: Nedbank Ltd and Others v National Credit Regulator and Another, [2011] (3) SA 581 (Supreme Court of Appeal), para 37.

  97. 97.

    Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd, [2015] (3) SA 479 (Constitutional Court), paras 120–150 (per Cameron J).

  98. 98.

    Ibid., paras 66–94 (per Madlanga J); 103,106, 119 (per Moseneke J).

  99. 99.

    Ibid., para 73.

  100. 100.

    For an account of the facts, see Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd, [2015] (3) SA 479 (Constitutional Court), paras 1–11.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., paras 32–41.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., paras 1, 102.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., paras 42–58. The two writers involved were Huber and Van der Keesel—these two sources were in conflict on the question in issue, while the SCA in Oneanate had chosen the Huber view that interest runs afresh from the institution of legal proceedings, the Constitutional Court preferred the view of Van der Keesel that it did not. Based on the view that there was a conflict in the Roman-Dutch law sources, it is hard to see how a choice between these was not based on policy grounds. While Madlanga J maintained that he was not developing the common law (paras 55–58), Moseneke J in the majority judgment disagreed with this argument (paras 112–113), although he concurred in the ultimate order made by Madlanga J.

  104. 104.

    Ibid., paras 55–58 (per Madlanga J).

  105. 105.

    Hahlo and Khan (1968), p. 580; Chanock (2001), p. 166. Both of these views relate to the development of the South African common law prior to democracy, but it is submitted that the arguments are relevant to the present point.

  106. 106.

    See text above and Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), paras 23–30.

  107. 107.

    Compare the discussions of the role of good faith in Barkhuizen, Everfresh and Botha covered above, along with the dicta on the role of ‘ubuntu’ in Everfresh in particular (see note 86 and accompanying text).

  108. 108.

    Compare the arguments of Brand (2009), Lewis (2013) and Wallis (2016).

  109. 109.

    For an argument that Public law (in the form of human rights dispensations) should not render the Private law of contract redundant, with reference to various European legal systems, see: Cherednychenko (2007), pp. 541–549.

  110. 110.

    A close reading of judgments such as Barkhuizen, Everfresh and Botha indicates the Constitutional Court still views good faith/ubuntu as values underlying the common law and given expression to through rules, such as that on public policy.

  111. 111.

    Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, [2010] (4) SA 468 (Supreme Court of Appeal), paras 52–53; African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC and Others, [2011] (3) SA 511 (Supreme Court of Appeal), para 28; Potgieter v Potgieter NO and Others, [2012] (1) SA 637 (Supreme Court of Appeal), para 32.

  112. 112.

    Chanock (2001), pp. 291–293.

  113. 113.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), p. 579 (on ‘bantu law’); pp. 329–596 (on Roman-Dutch law).

  114. 114.

    Section 11(1) Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; Section 54A(1) Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (1986–1988 by amendment of this Act); Section 1 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Today African Customary law applies ‘where applicable’ under Section 211(3) of the final Constitution, but is subject to the Constitution itself in terms of the supremacy clause (Section 2).

  115. 115.

    Chanock (2001), pp. 243–357.

  116. 116.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 24–25; Bennett (2004), pp. 5–7.

  117. 117.

    Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others, [2004] (5) SA 460 (Constitutional Court), paras 51–57; Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; SA Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another, [2005] (1) SA 580 (Constitutional Court), paras 40–46, 156–157; Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa, [2009] (2) SA 66 (Constitutional Court), paras 42–49; MM v MN and Another, [2013] (4) SA 415 (Constitutional Court), paras 23–25; Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), p. 31.

  118. 118.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 32–33; Bennett (2004), pp. 48–49.

  119. 119.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 60–61; Bennett (2004), pp. 5–7, 44–48; Chanock (2001), pp. 291–293.

  120. 120.

    See Sections 2, 30, 31, 39(2)–(3) and 211 final Constitution.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., Section 211(3). See Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 81–87.

  122. 122.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 72–76, 81–87.

  123. 123.

    Sections 30–31 final Constitution. Bennett (2004), pp. 78–90.

  124. 124.

    See by way of example the cases cited in note 117 above. For a particularly good example of the development of the ‘living’ Customary law see MM v MN and Another, [2013] (4) SA 415 (Constitutional Court), where the court developed the Customary law rules surrounding marriage in the light of the Constitution, to give an earlier wife a say as to whether her husband married a second wife. In other cases, like Bhe, the Constitutional Court developed the living Customary law by amending the Intestate Succession Act, rather than developing Customary law itself. See Sibanda and Mosaka (2015), pp. 274–280 for a critical account of this process.

  125. 125.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 32–33. Compare Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; SA Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another, [2005] (1) SA 580 (Constitutional Court), para 215.

  126. 126.

    The clearest statement is by Yacoob J in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] (1) SA 256 (Constitutional Court), para 23, but see also Moseneke J in the same case at paras 71–72. See further: Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), para 51 on ubuntu informing public policy.

  127. 127.

    Note that Himonga and Nhlapo (2014) contains a chapter 10 on Customary Contract law, as does Joubert (2009), paras 230–243. An examination of these chapters reflects that the type of transaction discussed mostly relates to ties of kinship, particularly marriage, and there is little clear statement of general principles of contract law. Thus while the Constitution requires that recognition be given to these transactions and that they be developed where necessary, there is little scope for the displacement of the common law of contract in a commercial setting. Rather this paper will argue for a cross-pollination of the customary value of ubuntu into the common law of contract.

  128. 128.

    See sources in note 127 above. See further: Elias (1956), pp. 144–155. These accounts have been described as ‘official’ Customary law, however: Mqeke (2003), p. 118 (cited in Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), p. 195).

  129. 129.

    The few examples given below should illustrate this point, see further the chapters in note 127 above.

  130. 130.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), p. 187.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., pp. 188–191. For the present statutory definition of ‘lobolo’ (or the equivalent in other official African languages) see Section 1, Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.

  132. 132.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), p. 189. For an anthropological account of the social value of lobolo, see: Yarbrough (2014).

  133. 133.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 190–193; Bekker (2009), para 238.

  134. 134.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 190–193; Bekker (2009), para 238.

  135. 135.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 208–209; Bekker (2009), para 243.

  136. 136.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 194–195; Bekker (2009), para 241.

  137. 137.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), pp. 194–195; Bekker (2009), para 241.

  138. 138.

    Bekker (2009), para 241.

  139. 139.

    For useful South African studies of this concept, see: Verhoef (2001), Schultze (1997a, b) and Mashigo and Schoeman (2012). For an international overview, which includes South Africa, see: Ardener (1964).

  140. 140.

    Verhoef (2001), pp. 263–272; Schultze (1997a), pp. 20–24.

  141. 141.

    Ibid.

  142. 142.

    Verhoef (2001), p. 264; Mashigo and Schoeman (2012), p. 56, Ardener (1964), p. 216.

  143. 143.

    Verhoef (2001), pp. 272–273 (referring to the concept of ‘ubuntu’); Schultze (1997a), p. 23; Mashigo and Schoeman (2012), p. 56.

  144. 144.

    Compare Elias (1956), pp. 144–156.

  145. 145.

    For a summary of the leading case law on ‘ubuntu’, as well as a collection of essays on the topic, see: Cornell and Muvangua (2012). Another South African publication dedicated exclusively to ubuntu is: Diedrich (2011).

  146. 146.

    Ibid. The use of ubuntu as a value under the final Constitution has been argued to be based on the following provision at Section 39(3): ‘The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or conferred by common law, Customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.’ See: Himonga (2013).

  147. 147.

    For example, see: Mokgoro (2012), p. 317.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., pp. 317–318; Himonga (2013), pp. 173–180; Keep and Midgley (2007), pp. 31–33.

  149. 149.

    S v Makwanyane, [1995] (3) SA 391 (Constitutional Court). For a philosophical discussion of the role of ubuntu in this decision, see: Metz (2010).

  150. 150.

    Dikoko v Mokhatla, [2006] (6) SA 235 (Constitutional Court), paras 62–70 (per Mokoro J), 112–121 (per Sachs J).

  151. 151.

    Compare Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), para 51 (in setting out the content of public policy under the final Constitution).

  152. 152.

    Bennett (2011), p. 18. Bennett notes that ubuntu is a broader concept than good faith or public policy, however.

  153. 153.

    Mokgoro (2012), p. 317.

  154. 154.

    Ibid., pp. 317–318.

  155. 155.

    Ibid., p. 318.

  156. 156.

    See by way of example: Mokgoro (2012), pp. 317–318; Himonga (2013), pp. 173–177; Keep and Midgley (2007), pp. 31–33; Metz (2010), pp. 83–85.

  157. 157.

    Himonga (2013), pp. 174–177.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., p. 176.

  159. 159.

    Ibid., p. 177.

  160. 160.

    Gyekye (1997), p. 64.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., p. 65.

  162. 162.

    Himonga (2013) (with reference to the right to healthcare, contained in Section 27 of the final Constitution).

  163. 163.

    Keep and Midgley (2007), p. 35.

  164. 164.

    For a reported decision involving a stokvel, see: Mndi v Malgas, [2006] (2) SA 182 (Eastern Cape High Court). It should be noted that much of the literature on stokvels draws attention to the fact that these obligations are typically enforced outside of the courts, resorting rather to social pressure. See text accompanying notes 142–143 above.

  165. 165.

    Compare the argument of Keep and Midgley (2007), p. 48.

  166. 166.

    Compare Mokgoro (2012), pp. 317–318, discussed above. For a negative view on the potential of ubuntu to operate in a commercial contractual setting, see: Wallis (2016).

  167. 167.

    Asein (2005), p. 3.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., pp. 100–102. Malemi (1999), p. 46.

  169. 169.

    Asein (2005), pp. 101–102; Malemi (1999), pp. 46–47.

  170. 170.

    Mwalimu (2009), pp. 400–401.

  171. 171.

    Asein (2005), pp. 107–112.

  172. 172.

    Sagay (1985).

  173. 173.

    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The Bill of Rights can be found in chapter four of this enactment.

  174. 174.

    See in particular the property clause (Section 44), which refers to contracts only to exempt them from a prohibition on the compulsory taking of property; and the application clause (Section 46), which states that any person who alleges a contravention of the Bill of Rights may approach a High Court for redress.

  175. 175.

    Asein (2005), pp. 129–138.

  176. 176.

    Mwalimu (2009), pp. 400–401.

  177. 177.

    Ibid., p. 401.

  178. 178.

    Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, [2002] 34 WRN 11 (Supreme Court of Nigeria), cited in Asein (2005), p. 99.

  179. 179.

    Compare Mwalimu (2009), pp. 399–400 and the dictum of Lord Denning to this effect in Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General, [1955] 1 All ER 646 (House of Lords), pp. 652–653.

  180. 180.

    The lack of a strong constitutional dimension to Nigerian contract law is in line with the present English position, however, see below notes 213–214 and accompanying text.

  181. 181.

    Robinson et al. (2000), pp. 263–264.

  182. 182.

    Ibid., pp. 264–265.

  183. 183.

    Compare the argument of Sachs (1989), pp. 5–6.

  184. 184.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014) refer to law on marriage and persons; succession; contract; delict; criminal law; traditional leadership and dispute resolution procedure. Compare Bennett (2004) who has substantive chapters on traditional leadership, family, marriage, children, succession and land tenure.

  185. 185.

    Zimmermann and Visser (1996), pp. 3–4.

  186. 186.

    Compare the discussion in section three above.

  187. 187.

    Section 23 final Constitution calls for legislation to give effect to fair labour practices.

  188. 188.

    See Sect. 3 above.

  189. 189.

    This is required by Section 174(2) of the final Constitution.

  190. 190.

    This is in line with the argument of Sachs (1989). See also: Van Niekerk (1998).

  191. 191.

    Zimmermann (1990), pp. vii–xi.

  192. 192.

    Hugo Grotius Epistolae ad Gallos CLVI (1633), cited in Zimmermann (1990), p. v.

  193. 193.

    Hahlo and Kahn (1968), pp. 514–517; Price (1947), p. 494.

  194. 194.

    For example: Blower v Van Noorden, [1909] TS 890 (Transvaal Supreme Court), p. 905: ‘There come times in the growth of every living system of law when old practice and ancient formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and to keep pace with the requirements of changing conditions.’ See also: Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government, [1934] AD 560 (Privy Council), p. 563.

  195. 195.

    Compare the argument of Wallis (2016).

  196. 196.

    Compare: Mak (2008); Cherednychenko (2007); Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law (2004).

  197. 197.

    Mak (2008), pp. 9–12; Lewan (1968); Oeter (1994); Habersack and Zimmermann (1999).

  198. 198.

    Apart from the sources cited in note 197 above, see for a South African discussion: Du Plessis v De Klerk, [1996] (3) SA 850 (Constitutional Court), paras 39–41.

  199. 199.

    Mak (2008), pp. 70–83; Cherednychenko (2007), p. 115.

  200. 200.

    Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] (5) SA 323 (Constitutional Court), para 51 read with para 80. Compare the discussion in Kruger (2011).

  201. 201.

    Whittaker and Zimmermann (2000), pp. 18–32.

  202. 202.

    Ibid., pp. 52–55; Mak (2008), pp. 35–37.

  203. 203.

    In addition to the references supplied in notes 204–212 below, see: Paterson (2009).

  204. 204.

    See in particular the brief summary of the US position in Summers (2000). For the Australian position, see: Peden (2009) and cases cited below in note 206. See further the cases cited in notes 205 and 211–212 below for the position in Canada and the UK.

  205. 205.

    Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 (Supreme Court of Canada), paras 33, 63, 73–74. The court was careful to state at para 86 that: ‘The duty of honest performance … should not be confused with a duty of disclosure or of fiduciary loyalty. A party to a contract has no general duty to subordinate his or her interest to that of the other party.’

  206. 206.

    See: Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd, [2004] NSWCA 15 (New South Wales Court of Appeal), paras 189, 125. See further: Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella, [1998] 44 NSWLR 349 (New South Wales Court of Appeal); Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd, [2001] 69 NSWLR 558 (New South Wales Court of Appeal) in support of this view. The question whether a duty of good faith should be recognised in the performance of all contracts had previously been left open by the High Court of Australia in Royal Botanic Gardens v South Sydney City Council, [2002] 186 ALR 289.

  207. 207.

    US Uniform Commercial Code (Revised version: 2008) §1–201(20), read with §1-304; Restatement (Second) Contracts §205; Summers (2000) and Perillo (2009), pp. 412–417.

  208. 208.

    For a general discussion of the law on good faith in commercial contracts (especially franchising) see: Hadfield (1989–1990). By way of case law example, see: Bak-A-Lum Corporation of America v Alcoa Building Projects Inc, [1976] 351 A 2d 349 (Supreme Court of New Jersey); Taylor Equipment Inc v John Deere Company, [1996] 98 F 3d 1028 (US Court of Appeals, 8th circuit); United Airlines Inc v Good Taste Inc, [1999] 982 P 2d 1259 (Supreme Court of Alaska).

  209. 209.

    Hadfield (1989–1990), pp. 980–984.

  210. 210.

    United Airlines Inc v Good Taste Inc, [1999] 982 P 2d 1259 (Supreme Court of Alaska), per Matthews CJ dissenting.

  211. 211.

    Socimer International Bank Limited (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd, [2008] EWCA Civ 116 (England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)), para 66 (good faith as a fetter on an exercise of a contractual power); Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd, [2013] EWHC 111 (England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division)), para 131 (English law prepared to recognise good faith as a term implied on the facts, although not a term implied by law).

  212. 212.

    Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd, [1988] 2 WLR 615 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)), p. 621; Walford v Miles, [1992] 2 AC 128 (House of Lords), p. 138. In a follow up to Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd, [2013] EWHC 111 (England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division)), the Court of Appeal chose not to read in an implied duty of good faith, since this would be in conflict with the express terms of the contract, see: Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest), [2013] EWCA Civ 200, paras 105–112. For a brief overview of the English position, see: Steyn (1997) and Whittaker and Zimmermann (2000).

  213. 213.

    Human Rights Act, 1998. See generally: du Bois’s chapter in this volume; Hoffman (2011). For a comparison of the UK and South African human rights regimes and their impact on private in each of these countries, see: A Price (2012).

  214. 214.

    MacQueen (2004), pp. 380–383; Rose (2011), p. 301. The obligations of a landlord under the Rent Act 1977 were developed on constitutional grounds in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30. There, the rights of the same sex partner of a deceased tenant to a statutory tenancy were recognized by the House of Lords, where the Rent Act referred only to the rights of a ‘wife or husband’. In Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, [2003] UKHL 40 the House of Lords declined to strike down a provision of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974 in a challenge based on the Human Rights Act, 1998. See further on these cases: du Bois’s chapter in this volume; Van Zyl Smit (2011), p. 66.

  215. 215.

    The term ‘fiduciary loyalty’ is borrowed from Bhasin v Hrynew, [2014] SCC 71 (Supreme Court of Canada), para 86.

  216. 216.

    Compare in this regard the concept of ‘reasonable expectations of honest men’ set out in Steyn (1997).

  217. 217.

    See statutes cited in note 29 above.

  218. 218.

    Himonga and Nhlapo (2014), chapter 1; Bennett (2004), pp. 34–42.

  219. 219.

    African Customary law was introduced as an optional course by the University of Cape Town Law Faculty for the first time in 1977 (it had previously been covered at UCT as part of a course on African government and law in the Faculty of Humanities), but only became a compulsory for the LLB in 2001 after a curriculum review.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his thanks to Chuma Himonga, Alistair Price, Caroline Ncube, Tom Bennett, and Dale Hutchison for their comments on a draft of this chapter. The views expressed herein remain my own and should not (necessarily) be ascribed to those who provided comments.

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    Andrew Hutchison

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    Luca Siliquini-Cinelli

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    Andrew Hutchison

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Hutchison, A. (2017). Decolonising South African Contract Law: An Argument for Synthesis. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L., Hutchison, A. (eds) The Constitutional Dimension of Contract Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49843-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49843-0_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-49842-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-49843-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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