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Part of the book series: Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations ((PPCE,volume 3))

Abstract

Law and morality are two normative systems that control and regulate behaviors in a human community so as to allow harmonious and effective intersubjectivity between individuals who recognize one another as bearers of rights. Both notions have their common foundation in the concept of individual autonomy and equal respect for everyone. They have a complementary relationship. Law compensates for the functional weaknesses of morality and morality tempers the mechanical implementation of positive law through the notions of solidarity and responsibility. Different legal thinkers have interpreted the relationship between law and morality in different ways. On the one hand, there are those who argue that law and morality are independent – though not unrelated. For this first group, a law cannot be disregarded merely because it is morally indefensible. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that law and morality are interdependent. For this second group, any law that claims to regulate behavioral expectations must be in harmony with moral norms. Approached from this perspective, the law must be enacted in such a way that it secures the welfare of the individual and the good of the community. Thus, the aim of all laws should be both the attainment of the end of the state and the common good of the community, both immediate and ultimate. For Habermas, law and morality deal with the same problem: legitimately ordering interpersonal relationships through justified norms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    BFN, 83.

  2. 2.

    John Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ consulted on Thursday, January 8, 2015.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    Andrea Westlund, “Rethinking Relational Autonomy,” in Hypatia, vol. 24, Issue 4 (Fall 2009): 35.

  5. 5.

    Westlund, “Rethinking Relational Autonomy,” 40.

  6. 6.

    Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.”

  7. 7.

    Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 28.

  8. 8.

    Habermas, “Introduction to the Seminar on Jürgen Habermas’s Discourse Theory,” Ratio Juris, vol. 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 330.

  9. 9.

    Charles E. Curran, The Development of Moral Theology (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 74.

  10. 10.

    Michael Bertram Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, cited by Alex E. Wallin, “John Finnis’s Natural Law Theory and a Critique of the Incommensurable Nature of Basic Goods,” in Campbell Law Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 60.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Legal dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Natural+Law (Accessed, January 16, 2015).

  13. 13.

    Daniel Chernilo, The Natural Law Foundations of Modern Social Theory: A Quest for Universalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 74.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., 77.

  15. 15.

    Costa Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 15.

  16. 16.

    Robert P. George, “Natural Law,” in Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol. 31, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 172.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 280.

  19. 19.

    Finnis, “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning,” in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992): 135–6.

  20. 20.

    Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions”, in Robert P. George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, 4.

  21. 21.

    Michael D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, cited by Alex E. Wallin, “John Finnis’s Natural Law Theory and a Critique of the Incommensurable Nature of Basic Goods,” in Campbell Law Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 62.

  22. 22.

    William O. Einwechter, Nature Law: A summary and Critique, http://darashpress.com/articles/natural-law-summary-and-critique (Accessed on December 22, 2014).

  23. 23.

    Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 35–36.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., 36.

  25. 25.

    Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, cited by Stephen J. Loughlin, Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae: A Reader’s guide (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 209.

  26. 26.

    Jacques Maritain, Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice, ed., William Sweet (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 43.

  27. 27.

    Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 28.

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.

  30. 30.

    Robert Alexy, “On the Concept and Nature of Law.” In Ratio Jurist, vol. 21, no. 3, (September 2008): 285.

  31. 31.

    Alexy, “Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2012): 3.

  32. 32.

    Matthew H. Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.

  33. 33.

    Michael Giudice, “The Regular Practice of Morality in Law,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 2008): 95.

  34. 34.

    Andrei Marmor, “The Separation Thesis and the Limits of Interpretation,” in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. XII, no. 1 (January 1999): 135.

  35. 35.

    Alexy, “The Dual Nature of Law,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 23, no. 2, (June 2010): 175.

  36. 36.

    Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 38.

  37. 37.

    Alexy, “The Dual Nature of Law,” 176.

  38. 38.

    Alexy, “The Dual Nature of Law,” 177.

  39. 39.

    Ronald Dworkin, Taking Right Seriously, cited by Raymond A. Bellioti, Justifying Law: The Debate over Foundations, Goals, and Methods (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 75.

  40. 40.

    Daniel Chernilo, “Jurgen Habermas: Modern Social Theory as Postmetaphysical Natural Law,” http://www.academia.edu/2638851/Jurgen_Habermas_social_theory_as_postmetaphysical_natural_law (Accessed on February 2, 2015).

  41. 41.

    Daniel Chernilo, The Natural Law Foundations of Modern Social Theory, 15.

  42. 42.

    BFN, 7–9.

  43. 43.

    Daniel Chernilo, The Natural Law Foundations of Modern Social Theory, 16.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    BFN, 107.

  46. 46.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 220.

  47. 47.

    Peter Bal, “Discourse Ethics and Human Rights in Criminal Procedure,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 20, no. 4 (1994): 73.

  48. 48.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 219.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., 223.

  50. 50.

    Bal, “Discourse Ethics and Human Rights in Criminal Procedure,” 73.

  51. 51.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 226.

  52. 52.

    I.O, 245.

  53. 53.

    Andrew Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 250.

  54. 54.

    I.O, 255.

  55. 55.

    BNR, 93.

  56. 56.

    P.C, 116.

  57. 57.

    BFN, 135.

  58. 58.

    I.O, 214–5.

  59. 59.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 252.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., 264.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., 261.

  62. 62.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 266.

  63. 63.

    I.O., xxxv.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., xxxv–xxxvi.

  66. 66.

    J.A, 151.

  67. 67.

    MCCA, 200.

  68. 68.

    John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei Socialis, #38.

  69. 69.

    MCCA, 200.

  70. 70.

    MCCA, 201.

  71. 71.

    I.O., 3.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., 4.

  73. 73.

    I.O., 4.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

  75. 75.

    MCCA, 63.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., 195.

  77. 77.

    J.A., 1.

  78. 78.

    Thomas McCarthy, Introduction to MCCA, vii.

  79. 79.

    Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” in Ethics, vol. 105, no. 1 (October 1994): 45.

  80. 80.

    MCCA, 203–4.

  81. 81.

    I.O., 34.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., 35.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., 39.

  84. 84.

    Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 123.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    JA, 51.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., 50.

  88. 88.

    Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 125.

  89. 89.

    JA, 49–50.

  90. 90.

    JA, 44.

  91. 91.

    JA, 45.

  92. 92.

    I.O, 30.

  93. 93.

    William Rehg, “Discourse Ethics,” in Barbara Fultner (ed.), Jürgen Habermas: Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011), 123.

  94. 94.

    I.O, Introduction, xii.

  95. 95.

    BNR, 91.

  96. 96.

    Ibid.

  97. 97.

    Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” 84.

  98. 98.

    BFN, 112.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., 452.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    BNR, 90.

  102. 102.

    BFN, 452.

  103. 103.

    BFN., 452.

  104. 104.

    BFN, 450.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., 451.

  106. 106.

    BNR, 81.

  107. 107.

    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, I–II, Q. 94, a. 2.

  108. 108.

    BFN, 450.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., 106.

  110. 110.

    Jürgen Habermas, “Law and Morality,”

  111. 111.

    Tony Honoré, “The Necessary Connection Between Law and Morality,” in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 22, no. 3 (2002): 494.

  112. 112.

    Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet, 117.

  113. 113.

    Exclusive positivism states that moral considerations must be excluded from the concept of law. As Didier Mineur notes, Raz contends that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations about what the law ought to be in the relevant circumstances (Didier Mineur, “The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 25, no. 2, June 2012, p. 140). In line with Mineur, Michael Giudice notes that on Raz’s account it is never a condition of validity or existence of law that moral standards or considerations are satisfied. The existence and content of law always depend on what the official of the legal system actually practice as law (Micheal Giudice, “The Regular Practice of Morality in Law,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 21, no. 1, March 2008, p. 95).

  114. 114.

    Michael Giudice, “The Regular Practice of Morality in Law,” 99.

  115. 115.

    Honoré, “The Necessary Connection Between Law and Morality,” 494.

  116. 116.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 259.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., 267.

  118. 118.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 267.

  119. 119.

    BNR, 91.

  120. 120.

    I.O, 256.

  121. 121.

    Habermas, “Introduction to the Seminar on Jürgen Habermas’s Discourse Theory,” Ratio Juris, vol. 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 330.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    Habermas, “Introduction to the Seminar on Jurgen Habermas’s Discourse Theory,” 331.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    BFN, 105.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., 106.

  127. 127.

    Ibid.

  128. 128.

    BFN., 106.

  129. 129.

    Ibid., 452–3.

  130. 130.

    Habermas, “Law and Morality,” 245–6.

  131. 131.

    BFN, 452.

  132. 132.

    I.O, 216.

  133. 133.

    Didier Mineur, “The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 2012): 142.

  134. 134.

    Alexy, “The Dual Nature of Law,” 168.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., 171.

  136. 136.

    BFN, 453.

  137. 137.

    Ibid.

  138. 138.

    Jerome E. Bickenbach, “Law and Morality,” in Law and Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 3, Symposium on Legitimacy of Law (December 1989): 291–2.

  139. 139.

    I.O, 257.

  140. 140.

    Bickenbach, “Law and Morality,” 295.

  141. 141.

    Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 223.

  142. 142.

    BFN, 107.

  143. 143.

    William Rehg, “Discourse Ethics,” 120.

  144. 144.

    Ibid.

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Rehg, “Discourse Ethics,” 120.

  147. 147.

    Ibid.

  148. 148.

    Ibid.

  149. 149.

    I.O, 42.

  150. 150.

    Rehg, “Discourse Ethics,” 121.

  151. 151.

    I.O, Editors’ introduction, xii.

  152. 152.

    I.O., xxxv.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., note 51, p. 274.

  154. 154.

    Arthur Scheller, Jr., “Law and Morality,” in Marquette Law Review, vol. 36, issue 3, (Winter 1952–1953): 320.

  155. 155.

    BFN, 461.

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Moka-Mubelo, W. (2017). Law and Morality. In: Reconciling Law and Morality in Human Rights Discourse. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49496-8_3

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