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TEM and the Theoretical Virtues

  • Bob Fischer
Chapter
  • 170 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)

Abstract

This concluding chapter summarizes the case for TEM and revisits a point with which I began: namely, that TEM needn’t compete with every other modal epistemology; it can be a supplement, not a rival. To make this point clearer, I briefly discuss one essence-based modal epistemology, showing how TEM can deliver a key principle for that epistemology that might otherwise be difficult to defend.

Keywords

General Kind Theoretical Virtue Modal Knowledge Modal Claim Total Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Hale, B. (2013). Necessary beings: An essay on ontology, modality, and the relations between them. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Leon, F. (2016). From modal skepticism to modal empiricism. In B. Fischer & F. Leon (Eds.), Modal epistemology after rationalism. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  3. Lowe, E. J. (2012). What is the source of our knowledge of modal truths. Mind, 121, 919–950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Peacocke, C. (1999). Being known. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Roca-Royes, S. (2016). Similarity and possibility: An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities. In B. Fischer & F. Leon (Eds.), Modal epistemology after rationalism. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  6. Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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