Abstract
This concluding chapter summarizes the case for TEM and revisits a point with which I began: namely, that TEM needn’t compete with every other modal epistemology; it can be a supplement, not a rival. To make this point clearer, I briefly discuss one essence-based modal epistemology, showing how TEM can deliver a key principle for that epistemology that might otherwise be difficult to defend.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, Hale’s argument for the kind membership principle (given just below) is based on the idea that, to survive changes, a being has to remain the same F, where F is a “pure” sortal—e.g., “horse” instead of “brown horse.” But since that sortal is one that applies whenever the object exists, and the object would cease to exist were that sortal not to apply, it seems plausible that sortal is essential to the object. And since this argument is perfectly general, it seems to support the kind membership principle. However, that argument only gets Hale maximally general sortal, such as “object”—it doesn’t get him more specific sortals, like “horse.” You can’t defend the more specific kind membership principle, “A horse is essentially an object of the horse kind,” without knowing that specific horses can’t become other things. That’s what Hale wants, but it isn’t clear how he can get it.
References
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Fischer, B. (2017). TEM and the Theoretical Virtues. In: Modal Justification via Theories. Synthese Library, vol 380. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1_7
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