TEM and Modal Skepticism

  • Bob Fischer
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)


In this chapter, I argue that TEM is offers a better basis for modal skepticism than the one van Inwagen develops. My aim here is twofold. On the one hand, I want to show that TEM can lead to a form of modal skepticism, and if it does, then it leads to a better form than what’s previously been available. Second, I want to clarify what it would take to get a non-skeptical version of TEM—i.e., one on which we’re justified in believing some extraordinary modal claims. In other words, the goal here is to give a better sense of what TEM requires of those who think, for example, that they justifiably believe that there could be a maximally perfect being. Doing so will help us appreciate the nature of TEM’s cautiousness, as well as what’s valuable about it.


Perceptual Knowledge Contingent Truth Metaphysical Theory Metaphysical Possibility Modal Knowledge 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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