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Theory Selection

  • Bob Fischer
Chapter
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Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)

Abstract

This chapter begins Part II. In it, I develop a general framework for selecting between competing modal epistemologies, focusing on three desiderata that are especially relevant to our choice: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle modal disagreement. Unsurprisingly, I argue that TEM fares well in the relevant respects. However, I’ll also distinguish the senses in which TEM is and isn’t conservative, eventually describing TEM’s disagreement with some modal intuitions as its cautiousness. This requires further discussion in subsequent chapters.

Keywords

Modal Disagreement Simple Hypothesis Metaphysical Theory Metaphysical Possibility Modal Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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