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Objections and Clarifications

  • Bob Fischer
Chapter
  • 174 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)

Abstract

This chapter replies to several objections to TEM. Among them: that physical theories can’t give us the kind of justification that TEM says they can, that TEM is circular, that TEM doesn’t fit with a standard way of arguing in metaphysics, that TEM is far too cautious about our modal justification, that TEM can’t handle conflicts between theories, and that TEM is far too permissive in terms of our modal justification.

Keywords

Physical Theory Logic Objection Vague Predicate Metaphysical Theory Conflict Objection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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