Objections and Clarifications
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This chapter replies to several objections to TEM. Among them: that physical theories can’t give us the kind of justification that TEM says they can, that TEM is circular, that TEM doesn’t fit with a standard way of arguing in metaphysics, that TEM is far too cautious about our modal justification, that TEM can’t handle conflicts between theories, and that TEM is far too permissive in terms of our modal justification.
KeywordsPhysical Theory Logic Objection Vague Predicate Metaphysical Theory Conflict Objection
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