TEM’s Details

  • Bob Fischer
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)


According to TEM, a person is justified in believing an interesting modal claim, p, if and only if (a) she is justified in believing a theory according to which p is true, (b) she believes p on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief that p. Accordingly, we need a story about how we come to justifiably believe theories, a story about theories on which they have modal content, and a story about what it is to believe a claim on the basis of a theory. This chapter provides the second and third story, and explains why I can leave the problem of theory confirmation for others.


Mental Model Modal Content Semantic View Theoretical Hypothesis Metaphysical Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Baker, L. R. (2007). The metaphysics of everyday life: An essay in practical realism. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  3. Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  4. DePaul, M. R., & Ramsey, W. (1998). Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  5. Gentner, D., & Stevens, A. L. (1983). Mental models, cognitive science. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
  6. Giere, R. N. (1979). Understanding scientific theories. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.Google Scholar
  7. Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories: Learning, development, and conceptual change. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2004). The history of mental models. In K. Manktelow & M. C. Chung (Eds.), Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives (pp. 179–212). New York: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
  9. Kim, J. (1994). Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. Philosophical Issues, 5, 51–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Lewis, C. I. (1970). The pragmatic element in knowledge. In J. D. Goheen & J. L. Mothershead (Eds.), Collected papers of Clarence Irving Lewis (pp. 240–257). Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  13. Lloyd, E. A. (1994). The structure and confirmation of evolutionary theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Nichols, S. (2006). Imaginative blocks and impossibility: An essay in modal psychology. In S. Nichols (Ed.), The architecture of the imagination (pp. 237–256). New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Putnam, H. (1979). Mathematics, matter, and method: Philosophical papers. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Salmon, W. C. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
  17. Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Suppe, F. (1977). The structure of scientific theories. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
  19. Suppe, F. (1989). The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
  20. Suppes, P. (1993). Models and methods in the philosophy of science: Selected essays. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Thompson, P. (1989). The structure of biological theories. New York: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  22. Vaidya, A. (2015). The epistemology of modality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
  23. Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and symmetry. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Vogel, J. (1990). Cartesian skepticism and inference to the best explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(11), 658–666.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

Personalised recommendations