A Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality

  • Bob Fischer
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 380)


This book articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). At TEM’s core is the idea that if we’re justified in believing the extraordinary modal claims to which philosophers often appeal—such as the claim that I could be disembodied, or that there could be a maximally perfect being—it’s because we’re justified in believing theories according to which those claims are true. This chapter articulates some of the assumptions that shape TEM, sketches the view, and then develops the basic argument for it, which is based on an analogy between a plausible modal epistemology for games and modal epistemology generally.


True Belief Modal Matter Modal Reality Constitutive Principle Modal Knowledge 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bob Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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