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International Conference on Research in Security Standardisation

SSR 2016: Security Standardisation Research pp 244–260Cite as

State Management for Hash-Based Signatures

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10074))

Abstract

The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital signature schemes. Hash-based signatures are well-understood and promising candidates, and the object of current standardization efforts. In the scope of this standardization process, the most commonly raised concern is statefulness, due to the use of one-time signature schemes. While the theory of hash-based signatures is mature, a discussion of the system security issues arising from the concrete management of their state has been lacking. In this paper, we analyze state management in N-time hash-based signature schemes, considering both security and performance, and categorize the security issues that can occur due to state synchronization failures. We describe a state reservation and nonvolatile storage, and show that it can be naturally realized in a hierarchical signature scheme. To protect against unintentional copying of the private key state, we consider a hybrid stateless/stateful scheme, which provides a graceful security degradation in the face of unintentional copying, at the cost of increased signature size. Compared to a completely stateless scheme, the hybrid approach realizes the essential benefits, with smaller signatures and faster signing.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This allows for forward-secure constructions if used with the right schemes, e.g. special instantiations of XMSS using a forward-secure PRNG as shown by [2]. That way an attacker may get access to the secret key on a system but is not able to forge signatures using previous keys. A hash-based secret key is then to be seen just as secure as any other signing key that an attacker gets access to.

  2. 2.

    The authentication path is the sequence of tree nodes that a verifier needs to reconstruct the path to reach the root of the tree from a leaf.

  3. 3.

    Recall that the Winternitz parameter is used as a trade-off setting for the underlying one-time signature scheme.

  4. 4.

    Note that either of these two levels could themselves be hierarchical signature schemes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cisco Systems, San Jose, USA

    David McGrew, Panos Kampanakis & Scott Fluhrer

  2. genua GmbH, Munich, Germany

    Stefan-Lukas Gazdag

  3. TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Denis Butin & Johannes Buchmann

Authors
  1. David McGrew
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  2. Panos Kampanakis
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  3. Scott Fluhrer
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  4. Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
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  5. Denis Butin
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  6. Johannes Buchmann
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to David McGrew .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Security Division, NIST, Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA

    Lidong Chen

  2. Cisco Systems Inc., San Jose, USA

    David McGrew

  3. University of London, Egham, United Kingdom

    Chris Mitchell

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McGrew, D., Kampanakis, P., Fluhrer, S., Gazdag, SL., Butin, D., Buchmann, J. (2016). State Management for Hash-Based Signatures. In: Chen, L., McGrew, D., Mitchell, C. (eds) Security Standardisation Research. SSR 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10074. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_11

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-49100-4

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