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Obfuscated Built-In Self-authentication

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Hardware Protection through Obfuscation

Abstract

Hardware trojan insertion and intellectual property (IP) theft are two major concerns when dealing with untrusted foundries. Most obfuscation techniques have a limited capability of addressing both vulnerabilities. Split manufacturing is designed to stop IP piracy and IC cloning, but it cannot deal with untargeted hardware Trojan insertion. Also, there are significant overheads involved with getting the highest level of protection from split manufacturing. Built-in self-authentication (BISA ) is a low-cost technique for preventing and detecting hardware Trojan insertion, but is vulnerable to IP piracy , IC cloning, or redesign attacks, especially on original circuitry. By combining BISA with split manufacturing, it is not only possible to defeat these attacks, but also strengthen protections and lower the cost of split manufacturing as well. The resulting combined technique is called obfuscated BISA (OBISA ). In this chapter, the reader can expect to learn: (1) backgrounds on BISA as well as its existing problems and weakness; (2) two separate approaches for OBISA, based on the trade-offs between security and computational/fabrication costs involved; (3) implementation flow for both approaches; and (4) their design issues, trade-offs, and potential attacks.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ECE Department, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA

    Qihang Shi

  2. Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, California, USA

    Kan Xiao

  3. ECE Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    Domenic Forte & Mark M. Tehranipoor

Authors
  1. Qihang Shi
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  2. Kan Xiao
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  3. Domenic Forte
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  4. Mark M. Tehranipoor
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Qihang Shi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Florida, Gainseville, Florida, USA

    Domenic Forte

  2. University of Florida, Gainseville, Florida, USA

    Swarup Bhunia

  3. University of Florida, Gainseville, Florida, USA

    Mark M. Tehranipoor

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Shi, Q., Xiao, K., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M.M. (2017). Obfuscated Built-In Self-authentication. In: Forte, D., Bhunia, S., Tehranipoor, M. (eds) Hardware Protection through Obfuscation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49019-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49019-9_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-49018-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-49019-9

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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