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Trinities in Political Economy: More Than Just a Way of Observation

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Advances in Applied Economic Research

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Abstract

In the recent economic discussion we observe more and more the use of so-called triangles or trinities of mutual exclusive options which at list pose trilemmas. The start was made with very famous impossible trinity, which nurtured generation of economists. After that came the so-called blessed and unblessed trinities, the peso and the dollarization trinity. With the appearance of the crises occurred diverse financial trinities, new trilemmas, monetary union trilemmas, and last but not least political economic and international trilemmas. Trinities have been used in the field of the monetary policy and exchange rate arrangements, in the international financial sector, in the Euro zone crisis, in the European banking union discussion, and in the field of the political economy. There are many trinities which entail many important trilemmas which make our life difficult. We believe, it is time to look at those triangles or trinities as a single unity, as a single methodology. We would like to understand their meaning, to investigate them systematically, to see if they are related together, last but not least we would like to discover the real message they are trying to convey. In order to do that, we classified the trilemmas in four groups, the first, second, and third generation trilemmas and as fourth group the political economy trilemmas. Our classification is not based on econometrics or other statistical methods. It is based on intuition and simple experience on how the financial sector was developed in the last decades. We must note that we will not consider all the possible trinities which have appeared occasionally but the most important. Therefore, after the introduction, in the first part of the paper we discuss the “first generation” of the trinities, those from the field of the international monetary and exchange rate theory, where we start with the classical impossible trinity, which seems to be the first one used in this kind of “methodology” and we continue with the “blessed and unblessed,” peso and dollarization trinities. In the second part we discuss the “second generation” of the trinities, those of the field of the international financial market, where we discuss the international financial trinity and holy trinity. In the third part of the paper, we investigate the “third generation” trinities, those that have been used to discuss the situation in the Euro zone after the crisis and we start with triangle with a new impossible trinity, the financial/fiscal trinity and the monetary trinity for EMU. In the fourth part of our paper, we discuss the triangles which are used in the field of the political economy and the international relation where we discuss a number of political trinities. Using this simple “methodology” we do not discover a “hidden” theory. No they don’t carry a “new theory” but they carry some strong message. From the theoretical point of view all the trinities are not very dissimilar to each other and nearly every one carry the same message, i.e., the importance of the monetary and financial sector and the problem the trilemmas express always has to do with the way the monetary and financial sector is combined with the others sectors in the economy. From the praxis point of view we discovered that the trinities should not be interpreted strictly because politicians and the authorities use the degree of freedom they have to choose the degree of capital transactions openness, the degree of exchange rate flexibility and that of the monetary independence?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the following these three terms would be used interchangeably with same meaning if nothing else is mentioned.

  2. 2.

    Trilemmas are not to mix with the trixotomes, which are triples as well, but they do not need to pose mutually exclusive alternatives.

  3. 3.

    In the following reference, when we use the simple words of triangle or trinity without stating something else, we mean a triangle or a trinity, which pose trilemmas.

  4. 4.

    It is interesting to know who used first the construction of the impossible trinity. We conclude from the paper by Thomas Palley with a title “Rethinking the economics of capital mobility and capital controls” that the person, who used first the construction of the impossible trinity was Paul Krugman (Palley 2009, p. 16). Obstfeld and Taylor in their book “Global Capital Markets: Intergration, Crisis, and Growth” say that they use the construction of the impossible trinity after an idea of Padoa-Schioppa, who used a square to discuss the situation of the European Community (Obstfeld and Taylor 2005 p. 29).

  5. 5.

    The impossible trinity, as it is well known, is very often used to explain the different monetary systems in the history of the world, asserting that the gold standard is a combination of fixed exchange rate and free capital movement without the using of an independent monetary policy, while the Bretton Woods system is a combination of a fixed exchange rate with an independent monetary policy and capital controls, where the today “non system” is a combination of free capital movement, independent monetary policy and flexible instead fixed exchange rates (see Fig. A.1).

  6. 6.

    The New Open Macroeconomic Models, which consider price rigidities and monopolistic competition, show policy dynamics quite different from those built in the Mundell-Fleming tradition (Subbarao 2012).

  7. 7.

    The empirical evidence is not very supportive to the case of the capital mobility because there was not found clear evidence to the thesis that the capital mobility increases growth. Most of the empirical works do not find a direct effect of the free capital mobility on growth, but an indirect effect is actualized, as far as capital mobility has collateral effects fostering technology transfer, trade, and Foreign Direct Investment (Palley 2009, p. 20, Kose et al. 2006).

  8. 8.

    Original sin is a term which was used by Eichengreen et al. (2005a, b) in order to describe a situation where a country cannot issue debt in the international financial market denominated in their own currency and therefore uses debt denominated in an international recognized currency with the result to end up in a currency mix situation. Under the original sin suffer usually the emerging markets, the developing, and the poor countries. According to the authors this unfavorable situation can be only overcame through the international help and the development of the special bond market.

  9. 9.

    M Goldstein and P. Turner (Goldstein 2002, Goldstein and Turner 2004) differentiate between the original sin and currency mix. In their opinion the currency mix situation is a situation where countries use different currencies because of original sin and others reasons but a situation which the countries by themselves can solve and do not need the help of the international community.

  10. 10.

    The Bank for International Settlement estimated that in the year 1998 on average 1, 2 billion dollar per day were exchanged in the international capital market (Casper 2002, p.).

  11. 11.

    Laeven and Valencia (2008) accounted 124 banking, 208 currency, and 63 sovereign debt crisis for the period 1970–2007.

  12. 12.

    This thesis is “challenged” again by Georgiadis and Mehl (2015), who assert that a part of the financial accelerator channel, which expresses the influence of global cycle, one has to consider the exchange rate channel, the valuation’s effects of the exchange rates change on the net long position of the countries. Measuring the effectiveness of the monetary policy in a number of developed countries, they found that the exchange rate channel had significant effects on the input of these countries and therefore they concluded that even though flexible exchange rate doesn’t isolate the country from abroad, they still play a role as far as they effect the monetary policy through the exchange rate channel.

  13. 13.

    See the First Generation Trinities part of this essay.

  14. 14.

    The article states following: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project” (Pisani Ferry, 2012, p. 4).

  15. 15.

    This clause is called as well the no bailout clause (Pisani Ferry, 2012, p. 12).

  16. 16.

    The article states “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favor of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments” (Pisani Ferry 2012, p. 5).

  17. 17.

    With the expression “bank sovereign interdependence” the author means that time existent situation in the banking sector, where the single state was responsible for the regulation, supervision and survival, or recapitalization in case of bankruptcies, thus the banks were relatively active overall in Europe, and they had relative big amounts of governments bonds (Pisani Ferry 2012, p. 6).

  18. 18.

    As it is already known, Europe is in a phase of strong procedural changes. There is a variety of proposals. A large number have been included in the proposals of the five presidents of EU. Taking into account the proposals of the presidents, one can express the view that the EMU is directed towards the solution of the banking union as far as the clauses of no co-responsibility and no financing remain in power.

  19. 19.

    Optimal Currency Theory is developed by Mundell, McKinnon, Kenen, and others and examines whether a geographical area is an optimal area for a single currency. In other words, it is a theory, which investigates how far countries could or should participate to monetary union, how far countries could or should choose a fixed exchange rate system. Unlike the others traditional theories, which focus on the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism, OCA concentrates on alternatives to exchange rate mechanism, like the geographical mobility of workers, size of the area, concentration, diversification, etc (Mongelli 2002, 2008).

  20. 20.

    The endogeneity of OCA states that even a geographical area has not the right criteria to be an optimal currency at the start, but by adopting a common currency, it might become an optimal currency area in the future (Mongelli 2002, 2008).

  21. 21.

    Many analysts do not believe that solving the monetary union trilemma will be enough. For example, Bibow (2013a, b, 2014, 2015a, b) asserts that EMU must proceeds much farther than solving simply the monetary union trilemma and implement a real fiscal union by establishing a union treasury, which will back the lender of last resort function of the European Central Bank and give the Euro the legitimate power to become a currency of “European Nation,” the power of sovereign state. As he put it “the current regime (in the EMU added) leaves all players vulnerable. Lacking a central bank partner, the national treasuries are subject to default and, hence, runs. Lacking a Euro Treasury partner and Euro Treasury debt, the ECB is subject to legal challenges of its quasi-fiscal policies as applied to national debts.”

  22. 22.

    This must, of course, not be truth, but we cannot deal with such issues in the present work. Issues of democratic legitimacy, for example, of the European Semester or the European Stability Mechanism are beyond our subject, and for this reason they are no further examined.

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Siskou, T. (2017). Trinities in Political Economy: More Than Just a Way of Observation. In: Tsounis, N., Vlachvei, A. (eds) Advances in Applied Economic Research. Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48454-9_30

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