Abstract
This chapter presents future directions for a schema re-schematized—integrated with the thinker’s cognitive dynamics. Selz’s anticipatory schema features a symbolic and unknown factor, providing for discovery logic and pre-logical search for key variables. The schema opens to a search for knowledge—not dependent on input and outcome locked into information and established sequences. The thinker’s imagination constructs the anticipatory schema. The unknown becomes a factor in a picture of the knowledge and information sought. With the insertion of the thinker as an agent seeking knowledge, the re-schematized schema can be diagrammed in new exciting ways. To make the schematic projections, the thinker uses analogy. Its ‘pre-logical’ relations open the schema to productive thinking. Analogy generates new combinations. Formerly excluded particulars enter the formation of concepts and new categories.
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Notes
- 1.
This does not trace these considerations to the present-day ideas of analogy as ‘mapping.’ In general, such views reduce analogy to induction. While this direction is also derivable from Selz, it is more consonant with the prevailing present-day schema concepts as they are derived from Bartlett, Craik, and Piaget—for the reasons given. The point in this present work is more in line with the extension of Kant’s ideas about the schema in relation to thinking and the thinker. The wide array of schematic diagrams that can be a function of the schema’s forms for accommodating information and information patterns is informed by the inductive approaches. But that’s only part of the story, and it isolates the unsolved portions of Kant’s legacy.
- 2.
Place a cause-and-effect relation in the ‘slots’ for the analogy’s relation of the two sets of features: These sets are Set 1—A : B. Set 2—x : D. (x is the unknown). For the analogy, ‘A : B :: x : D,’ B and D have an order of equivalence. If the analogy’s comparison is assumed to be one of cause and effect; then, where ‘→’ signifies a cause effect relation, A → B :: x → D. That is, A causes B as C causes D. The ‘x’—or the thinker’s guessed factor—is hopefully to be the feature in common. Placed in the analogy as a cause–effect relation, it is assumed to be in a ratio with Set 1 and therein instrumental for Set 2. The slots for the analogy’s sets are on a parallel level, but if x is extracted, the logical structure can then be a conceptual one: The feature (x) in a ‘super-slot’ then superposes the phenomena being related or compared, namely, the ‘feature ⊇ phernomenon1 and phenomenon 2. Notice this is the logic of abduction too, since the particular is assumed a key to the class ordering.
- 3.
These points concerning heterogony are formally in tune with the discovery logic of Peirce’s abductive reasoning. Thus, for Peirce, the diagram has potential for dynamic change. Thought and perception are in a relationship with its representations. Therefore, they can interrelate in different ways in accordance with Peircean representations, like the interpretant. Thought interrelates with representation and it implies change as an outcome. This interrelation and its prospective changes are assumed to be inherent in the function of a diagram like the schema.
The heterogony principle is also consonant with a sweeping theory of art (Gombrich, 2002). In Gombrich’s theory, the organization within a work of art is stable until there is too much stability. Then the art is historically dynamic. It can reverse the relation between its representations, when they are logical, rational, and representational. It can turn that governance on its head, and present primitives—psychologically motivated elements unstabilized. I bring this connection with art to the fore because of the dynamism and inspirations of analogical thinking—its omnipresence and fecundity in thinking about new particulars, their role in understanding the relation of existing relations, and their potential for new knowledge about them and about newly illuminating coordinating relations.
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Fisher, H. (2017). Concluding Issues and Implications. In: Schema Re-schematized. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48276-7_3
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