Abstract
In this essay we briefly retrace the route taken in Europe to react to the crisis, and some weak points of the adopted approach are examined, namely the fiscal multiplier estimates, the paradoxes of debt algebra, asymmetry in the evaluation of macroeconomic imbalances of Member States and the ambiguous concepts of potential output and structural deficit. We also consider the structural policies, aimed at encouraging recovery in spite of austerity, to show that the effects of the recommended reforms are actually uncertain.
The introduction of fiscal rules, especially in Italy, forms part of an approach aimed at restricting policy choices deemed to be irresponsible. But the power of the rules, which was offset against political power, is not without costs, nor is it neutral. Finally, we explain how the idea of a suspension of democracy has gained ground in Europe and we conclude by highlighting the socio-economic and institutional risks involved.
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Notes
- 1.
Istat (2014), Prezzi al consumo, Statistiche flash, 28th November.
- 2.
Data source is ISTAT: ISTAT, 2014, Occupati e disoccupati, dati provvisori, Statistiche flash, 29th August; ISTAT, 2014, Noi Italia; ISTAT, 2013, La situazione del paese, Rapporto annuale 2014, May; ISTAT, 2014, Produzione industriale, Statistiche flash, 12th September; ISTAT, 2014, La povertà in Italia, anno 2013, Statistiche report, July.
- 3.
ANAAO, Assomed, 2014, Pronto soccorso al collasso in tutto il paese: i medici in prima fila nella denuncia e nella difesa del servizio pubblico, National Secretariat Press Release, 17th January.
- 4.
De Vogli et al. (2012).
- 5.
See on this subject Visco (2013).
- 6.
Even if some countries, including Germany, have made a widen use of these policies. In other countries, like Italy, the automatic stabilisers have mostly worked (revenue reduction following GDP fall and increase of the expenditure for the social shock absorber, as unemployment benefits and, in Italy, the so called Cassa integrazione Guadagni).
- 7.
See for example Standards & Poor’s, 2012, Credit FAQ: Factors behind Our Rating Actions On Eurozone Sovereign Governments, 13th January, available at the address http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245327305715.
- 8.
To realise the firewall the new ESM (European Stability Mechanism) has been juxtaposed with the previous EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility), with a global starting combined lending capacity of 500 billion. Help is conditional to the adjustment programmes.
- 9.
It is well known that the German Constitutional Court has been asked about the problem of the legitimacy of ECB actions, in relation to the OMT, and has in turn brought the action to the European Court of Justice.
- 10.
For countries that have complied with the MTO the limit for expenditure increase is given by the medium term growing rate of potential GDP; instead, for those who have not complied with it, the limit is lower, to such an extent as to allow an annual reduction of the budget structural balance by at least 0.5 % of GDP (the reference expenditure is net of certain items and consider a pluriannual average for investments).
- 11.
See Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze (MEF), Ragioneria generale dello Stato (RGS), L’attuazione del principio costituzionale del pareggio di bilancio, legge 243 del 2012, Note brevi, 2013, February; CE, Economic and Financial affairs, Six Pack? Two Pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new EU fiscal governance, available at the address http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm; CE, 2011, EU Economic Governance “Six Pack” enters into force, Press release database, MEMO/11/898, Brussels 12/12/2011, available at the address http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-898_en.htm.
- 12.
The sanctions, when a State does not conform to a Council recommendation to reduce its excessive deficit, can gradually arrive at 0.5 % of GDP; they are decided through a “reverse qualified majority voting” rule (a recommendation or a proposal of the Commission is considered adopted in the Council unless a qualified majority of Member States votes against it). The same mechanism is adopted on the macroeconomic surveillance side: in case of non-compliance with a recommendation an interesting-bearing deposit is imposed at first, then a fine (0.1 % of GDP).
- 13.
At the beginning the follow indicators have been identified: current account balance (asymmetric thresholds +6 % and −4 % of GDP); net international investment position (−35 % of GDP); 5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in values (−6 %); percentage change in nominal unit labour cost (+9 % for euro zone and +12 % for non-euro zone countries); percentage change of the real effective exchange rates relative to 35 other industrial countries (−/+5 % for euro zone countries and −/+11 % for non-euro zone countries); private sector consolidated debt (160 %); private sector credit flow (15 %); year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator (6 %); General Government sector debt (60 %); unemployment rate (10 %).
- 14.
It is an international treaty, signed by 25 member States of EU (except the United Kingdom and Czech Republic).
- 15.
See the notes in the preamble of the Treaty text and the considerations of the Treaty establishing the ESM.
- 16.
Unusual and uncontrollable events which have a major impact on the financial position of the government or periods of severe economic downturn as set out in the revised stability and growth pact. The temporary deviation does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term.
- 17.
Note that the transposition of the “budget balance rule” in the Italian Constitutional system has resulted in the statement of the “balanced budget principle”. Hence, the Italian constitutional interpretation of the European setting on the one hand allows more margins of manoeuvre, while on the other turns a discussed technical rule into a fundamental concept.
- 18.
See Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, L’attuazione del principio costituzionale del pareggio di bilancio, legge 243 del 2012, “Note brevi”, 2013, February.
- 19.
CE, 2013, Entra in vigore il “two-pack”: completato il ciclo di sorveglianza di bilancio e migliorata ulteriormente la governance economica per la zona euro,—MEMO/13/457, May 2013, available at the address http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-457_it.htm.
- 20.
And hence National attention.
- 21.
See Visco (2014).
- 22.
Cesaratto (2013).
- 23.
The source is IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 for world GDP; for the other data Eurostat, Statistics database, 13 May 2014. This data does not consider the revision of GDP series based on the new Eurostat criterion.
- 24.
- 25.
For the Italian case, see e.g. Gabriele (2013).
- 26.
See FMI, 2012, Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth, “World Economic Outlook”, 2012, October, and Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
- 27.
The multiplier implied in forecasts was then underestimated by about 1.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
Nuti (2013).
- 31.
This relation was traditionally explained by the lower crowding out of private investment—and possibly consumption—which could result from a change in the interest rate; afterwards the possible effect on consumption has been emphasised because of an improvement of confidence and to the expectations of lower taxes (or a lower increase in taxation) and hence a higher income in the future.
- 32.
In contrast with the evidence on expenditure and revenue multiplier’s values.
- 33.
- 34.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
- 35.
- 36.
See D’Elia (2009).
- 37.
A demonstration, based on debt algebra, of the groundlessness of the unchanging fiscal policy rules assumption is in D’Elia (2013).
- 38.
It is well known that some public expenditure items, as public employment remunerations, are fully accounted for in GDP, due to an accounting convention (remunerations actually conventionally represents a component of General Government value added).
- 39.
- 40.
In a recent econometric study (Beqiraj and Tancioni 2014) it emerges that the risk linked to sovereign debt can worsen the effects of a contraction, especially if obtained on the spending side, because a rise in the debt/GDP ratio occurs, which increases the spread, and through the raise of the interest rate the restrictive (Keynesian) effect intensifies. The hypothesis of expansive fiscal contraction would not be empirically relevant.
- 41.
- 42.
Whereas in the EU28 GDP had stabilised (+0.1 %). In Greece (−3.9 %), Cyprus (−5.4 %) and Italy (−1.9 %) the fall in GDP was still relevant.
- 43.
Ifo, Insee, Istat, 2014, Euro-zone economic outlook, 10th January; ISTAT, 2014, Nota mensile sull’andamento dell’economia italiana, August.
- 44.
CE, 2014, Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation, (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup, COM(2014), 150 final, Brussels, 5th March.
- 45.
CE, 2013, Alert Mechanism Report 2014, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Central Bank and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM(2013) 790 final, Bruxelles, 13th November.
- 46.
The two other countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances were Croatia and Slovenia, whereas France, Spain and Ireland required decisive policy action and specific monitoring according to the Commission.
- 47.
In the in-depth examination document for Italy (EC, 2014, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2014, Macroeconomic Imbalances Italy 2014, European Economy, Occasional Papers 182, Brussels, European Union, March) it was judged, albeit through a stylised projection exercise, that a primary surplus of 5 % of GDP would be able to secure the downward trend of debt/GDP ratio for the period 2016–2020. However the same document admitted that it would be difficult to obtain such a surplus with weak economic activity and deflationary pressures.
- 48.
Credit recovery and capital market development encouragement was expected, as well as an increase in the importance of high export potential chains and innovative firms. Other problems characterising Italy were recalled, such as: public sector and judicial system inefficiency, the weakness of corporate governance, the intensity of corruption and fiscal evasion, the lack of human capital, issues to which we will later return.
- 49.
The indicator used for macroeconomic surveillance is a 3 year average of current account balance in percentage of GDP. Data used in the statistical annex to the Alert Mechanism Report 2014 arrived at 2012 (EC, 2013, Statistical Annex of Alert Mechanism Report 2014, Commission Staff Working Document, available at the address http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/documents/alert_mechanism_report_2014_statistical_annex_en.pdf).
- 50.
In the statement to be used by British Ministers prepared with the collaboration of J. M. Keynes to explain the agreements progress on the so called “scarce currency” clause it was written that “The Americans offer voluntarily to abjure their former stranglehold on the world’s economy and never again to allow their hoarding propensities to force deflation on others”—as reported by Harrod (1951). Harrod tells that Keynes was sceptical on the possibility that this clause was introduced. Perhaps he perceived that it would be hardly applied.
- 51.
See Caffè (1978) (fifth revised edition, edited by N. Acocella, 1990) on the developments after Bretton Woods.
- 52.
De Nardis (2014).
- 53.
CER, 2014, Pacta servata sunt, Rapporto CER, Aggiornamenti, 25th March; Fantacone et al. (2014).
- 54.
Palumbo (2013b), who shows that often the potential GDP is merely estimated based on the actual GDP trend.
- 55.
- 56.
CER, 2014, op. cit. The EC actually refers to the NAWRU (Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment).
- 57.
To explain NAIRU changes, at least in the short/medium term, the concept of labour market hysteresis has been introduced—i.e. an influence of actual unemployment on equilibrium unemployment (Palumbo 2013b). Delong and Summers (2012), for example, remind us that hysteresis can be explained by phenomena such as the marginalisation of long-term unemployed, or the failure to set out a career in the case of young people, and moreover, looking beyond the labour market, one can observe the effects of recession on future economic activity as a result of the displacement of public resources from physical and human investments to the more pressing social policies, the abatement of physical and R&D investments, the change in managerial attitude and the reduced dissemination of information.
- 58.
- 59.
- 60.
Even if difficulties and bottlenecks can obviously be encountered.
- 61.
Garegnani and Palumbo (1997).
- 62.
Vianello (2005), p. 36. The text is translated from the original Italian. Vianello continues explaining that the same reasoning also applies to the industrial delocalisation processes, which in a context of growth can “create without destroying” (ibidem, p. 36), because of the simultaneous requalification of the productive apparatus, whilst in stagnation leads to a contraction of national productive base. See also Palumbo (2013a) about the causal effects of growth on productivity, also in the long term.
- 63.
At present in Italy the problem is the extent to which the industrial system has been devastated by the crisis, and thus how able it could be to quickly react to demand increases, rather than let them be absorbed by imports.
- 64.
Palumbo (2013a).
- 65.
- 66.
Actually, the measures proposed for the short term are in part confused with those for the long term, both essentially being supply side policies.
- 67.
See the second chapter (The growth impact of structural reforms) in EC, 2013, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 12, n. 4.
- 68.
That is, the profit expressed as a percentage of the production cost.
- 69.
EC, 2014, Communication For a European industrial renaissance, COM (2014), 14 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 22nd January.
- 70.
It has to be noticed that in Italy competition and financial constraints in part represented an alibi for a carelessness toward policies for productive activities also motivated by the difficulty to carry out consistent and transparent choices (aggravated by the varied commingling of public and private interests) and an incomplete and asymmetric federalism. Brancati (2014) observes that state aid to firms fell in Italy from the early nineties and now much more than in other European countries, becoming extremely limited in absolute terms and by international comparison (e.g. standing much lower than in Germany); public guarantees are more relevant, but not enough to turn the tables. See also Brancati (2012).
- 71.
See for example the already quoted position paper on the in-depth review on Italy developed within the macroeconomic surveillance and the Commission Staff Working Documents for the Assessment of the 2013 and 2014 national reform and stability programme (EC, 2013, Assessment of the 2013 national reform programme and stability programme for Italy accompanying the document Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Italy’s 2013 national reform programme and delivering a Council Opinion on Italy’s stability programme for 2012–2017, SWD(2013) 362 final, Brussels, 29th May; EC, 2014, Assessment of the 2014 national reform programme and stability programme for ITALY Accompanying the document Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Italy’s 2014 national reform programme and delivering a Council Opinion on Italy’s 2014 stability programme, SWD(2014) 413 final, Brussels, 2nd June).
- 72.
See for example the Position Paper on the Position of the Commission Services’ on the development of Partnership Agreement and programmes in ITALY for the period 2014–2020, Rif. Ares (2012) 1326063—09/11/2012.
- 73.
See again the in-depth review on Italy developed within macroeconomic surveillance.
- 74.
In general, even recognising the substantial growth of poverty and social exclusion in Italy, the EC only proposes a recalibration of social expenditure, recovering resources for social care from those of pensions. In fact over time savings obtained from social security cuts have not been allocated to straighten social programs.
- 75.
The in-depth review document on Italy focuses on the lack of reforms in the past (EC, 2014, Macroeconomic Imbalances Italy 2014, cit., p. 10), instead of admitting that the effects of the numerous implemented actions have been of no importance or opposite to those expected (it does not seem necessary to list the numerous reforms of pensions, of labour market, and even of Public Administration, as well as the measures of regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation, overall in the field of public services, realised in the last two decades); the EC communication of March 2014 instead claims that the benefits of the adopted reforms are hindered by public and private inefficiencies, corruption and fiscal evasion (EC, 2014, Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, cit.).
- 76.
Consider for example that the Technical Reports do not even quantify the budgetary effects of the abolition of provinces (decree-law 138/2011), and the saving due to the successive decree-law 201/2011 have been indicated in only 65 million.
- 77.
Besides, Brussels has commented on the low returns to education, and a calls for a higher wage differentiation to stimulate further studies, though it is acknowledged that the characteristics of labour demand, and hence the production structure, are important as well.
- 78.
These models, while assuming a perspective of general equilibrium and rational expectations, are not really able to consider the changes in the overall system of consumer preferences in the face of reforms such as those that allegedly upset their lifestyle. Indeed the results depend in a crucial way on the fact that everybody firmly believes in the model predictions, otherwise the long-term equilibrium—and the outcome of the reforms—could be very different or may even result in several possibilities of equilibrium. Moreover the use of “representative agents” impedes the possibility of taking into sufficient account the diversity of behaviour and distributive phenomenon.
- 79.
Even if the literature on the effects of reforms concedes that there may be some adjustment costs, especially with regard to interventions in the labour market and to periods of depression. See for example Lusynian and Muir (2013).
- 80.
Podrecca (2013). The quoted review shows that microeconomic studies generally find favourable results on locative efficiency (decrease in mark-up and prices, business selection), but uncertain results on technical efficiency (connected to organisational and management aspects) and dynamic efficiency (innovation and introduction of new products and processes), whereas macroeconomic studies reveal the absence of a direct relationship between product market reforms and productivity growth in industrialised countries.
- 81.
Florio (2007).
- 82.
In fact the most solid investigations do not point out significant differences in productivity/efficiency between public and private bodies, whereas there would be significant effects of regressive redistribution, also because privatised enterprises often pass under the control of manager and financial investors who do not have the characteristics of risk-taking and innovation usually ascribed to private investors.
- 83.
Florio (2013).
- 84.
See Zenezini (2013b).
- 85.
- 86.
Pini (2013). Besides the mere association between variables, even an econometric estimate (Damiani et al. 2011) aimed to assess the effects of the deregulation of fixed-term jobs on the so-called “total factor productivity” has showed that these effects would be unfavourable—and this is ascribed to the lack of stimuli to workers’ training and qualification. The effects of the modifications on regular job constraints would not be significant. Instead, some positive effects on productivity seem to emerge from product market deregulation and R&D.
- 87.
- 88.
- 89.
See for example Rodrik (2013).
- 90.
EC, 2012, A blue Print for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European Debate, Communication from the Commission, COM(2012) 777 final/2, Brussels, 30.1.2012.
- 91.
Some steps toward a Banking Union were accomplished between 2013 and 2014, as is well known, although with great caution regarding the execution of the resolution mechanism.
- 92.
The Blue Print (p. 21) claims that the arrangements that would “set out the more detailed measures which the Member State commits to implement” should obtain “the endorsement of its national parliament where appropriate under national procedures”. But this has little meaning, where these arrangements will be required.
- 93.
For more details, see the Camera dei Deputati website, Strumento di convergenza e competitività, Temi dell’attività parlamentare, Documenti, available at the address http://www.camera.it/leg17/561?appro=927&Strumento+di+convergenza+e+di+competitivit%C3%A0.
- 94.
- 95.
Moreover the Blue Print advanced the intention to promote public investments, representing a “relevant factor” to be considered when deciding whether to start an excessive deficit procedure and an element to be specifically evaluated within the assessment regarding adherence to the expenditure rule. Hence the possibility of considering some investment programmes, thanks to the specific clause, as a temporary deviation from the medium term budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards it—even without applying the so-called “golden rule”, according to which investment expenditure would be fully outside the constraints.
- 96.
Besides a full banking, fiscal and economic union, the building of a stabilisation scheme to absorb asymmetric shocks and the possibility to issue stability bonds.
- 97.
- 98.
Mangiameli (2013).
- 99.
Mangiameli (2013).
- 100.
Florio (2007).
- 101.
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Gabriele, S. (2017). Italy and European Economic Policies: When It Is Time to Change the Paradigm. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Consequences of the Crisis on European Integration and on the Member States. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47964-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47964-4_9
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