Abstract
The issue of the constitutional sovereignty of Member States emerged right from the earliest stages of the construction of the European Community and still remains the “Gordian Knot” of the European integration process, especially at the present time characterized by the effects of the economic crisis that has put to the test the very existence of the European Union.
The Treaty establishing the MES and the Treaty establishing the so-called Fiscal Compact have introduced measures and procedures that are external to the European rules that were modified for their implementation. The European regulations on macroeconomic monitoring and the restraints of the Fiscal Compact produce effects for the Member States that are very severe without, on the other hand, achieving their goal of enabling a true economic recovery in Europe.
The MES Treaty and the Fiscal Compact cause a transfer of sovereignty that, in the absence of clear rules on the identification of who is called upon to be invested with the power that is yielded, runs the risk of being lost.
Indeed, European macroeconomic monitoring is managed substantially by the Commission and by the bureaucracy of Brussels, with severe repercussions on the sentiment of the citizens that in many cases conditions also the choices of the governments of Member States vis-à-vis the European Institutions.
In this framework we need to recall the reasons for the foundation of Europe and act within the legal and institutional framework of the Treaties.
The way ahead could be the route traced by the Commission in the Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launhing a European Debate; the time horizon envisaged by the Commission for bringing about the institutional changes envisaged by the plan, instead is so long that it is not useful for appropriately managing the economic, political and institutional crisis of Europe.
Going back to political integration could be the only real solution to the crisis and it cannot be postponed anymore; for this purpose, the Member states should jointly use their constitutional sovereignty to bring about a different structure of the European Institutions. Indeed, unless we work towards the construction of an accomplished Federal European democracy, the alternative could soon be the breakdown of the single currency and of the European Union itself.
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Notes
- 1.
Kelsen (1989).
- 2.
Ventura (2014).
- 3.
Bodin (1988–1997).
- 4.
Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1983).
- 5.
Grozio (2010).
- 6.
Althusius (2009).
- 7.
Hobbes (1948), p. 273, who in his conclusions states “Rulers cannot contribute more to the happiness of their citizens than by giving them the possibility of quietly enjoying the well-being they have acquired through their industriousness, safe from war and civil strife”.
- 8.
Hobbes (1948), p. 270. In defining the recta ratio, Hobbes himself speaks about “natural, moral and divine law”, he does not consider it in an objective and Aristotelic manner, but rather subjectively as the expression of sovereign will.
- 9.
- 10.
Schmitt (1981), pp. 486–494. Note that the connotation with which Schmitt uses the term “federation” goes beyond the logical scheme of the distinction between Confederation of States and Federal State (v. p. 477) and the teaching on this point appears to be particularly significant, in that it allows to perfectly position the European experience in its entirety.
- 11.
Patroni Griffi (2015).
- 12.
- 13.
Kant (2008).
- 14.
See Monaco (1970), pp. 30–33.
- 15.
On this point see Mangiameli (2013c), p. 8.
- 16.
Vayssière (2009), pp. 31 ss.
- 17.
Preda (1989), pp. 575 ss.
- 18.
- 19.
Bertozzi (2003), pp. 70 ss.
- 20.
- 21.
As is well known, the Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting in Messina decided to entrust the task of drafting the new treaties to a committee of experts appointed by the governments and by the European Institutions of namely “the creation of a common organization for the peaceful development of atomic energy and the institution of a common market to be set up step by step through a progressive reduction of the quantitative limitations and unification of customs regimes». The political coordination of the Committee was entrusted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak. The preparatory work of the Committee ended with the approval of a report that was submitted to the Council of Ministers of 6 that met in Venice at the end of May 1956. This was the basis for the Treaties of Rome.”
- 22.
On this issue see also Bruno (2012).
- 23.
Smit and Herzog (2006), § 2.03.
- 24.
Kulow (1997).
- 25.
On the repercussions of the crisis on Member States see, among others, the volume edited by Vipiana (2014).
- 26.
On the positions of scholars on the embryonic phase of the European Community see Caggiano (2013), pp. 441 ss.
- 27.
- 28.
von Bogdandy (1999).
- 29.
On the role of the Court of Justice in the initial consolidation of the European order see Mangiameli (2008a), pp. 213 ss.
- 30.
Cf.: Court of Justice, judgment of 12 November 1969, Case 29/69, Stuader, in Racc. Uff. 1969, 419; judgment 17 December 1970, case 11/70, Internazionale Handelsgesellschaft, in Racc. Uff. 1970, 1125; judgment 14 May 1974, case 4/73, Nold, in Racc. Uff. 1974, 491; judgment 13 December 1979, case 44/79, Hauer, in Racc. Uff. 1979, 3727; judgment 13 July 1989, case C-5/88, Wachauf, in Racc. Uff. 1989, 2609.
- 31.
Mangiameli (2008b), p. 325 ss.
- 32.
- 33.
“Plus qu’une convention classique du droit des gens, ce Traité-cadre de politiques vivantes, base d’institutions aux pouvoirs étendus, générateur de droit et d’obligations pour chaque citoyen comme pour les Autorités les plus hautes des Etats, n’évoque-t-il pas la constitution d’un Etat moderne et nous permette en citoyen d’une république fédérale de ne pas hésiter sur la nature de cette Constitution?” (see Malandrino 2005).
- 34.
Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE) (1983).
- 35.
SEA, Preamble, second paragraph.
- 36.
Mangiameli (2005).
- 37.
Mangiameli (2008c).
- 38.
De Schutter (2004), pp. 81–117.
- 39.
Mangiameli (2012), pp. 21 ff.
- 40.
Mangiameli (2008d).
- 41.
Mangiameli (2008e), pp. 343 ss.
- 42.
See again Mangiameli (2008c).
- 43.
On this point see Amato (2014), pp. 11 ss.
- 44.
The White Paper on European Governance carries the date of 5 August 2001 and its deductions were the basis for the declaration of 15 December 2001 on the future of the European Union. The Convention took office on 15 March 2002.
- 45.
D’Atena (2009), pp. 191 ss.
- 46.
Starace (2006), pp. 9 ss.
- 47.
See Blanke and Mangiameli (2006).
- 48.
On this see Blanke and Mangiameli (2011).
- 49.
Romano (1928), p. 30.
- 50.
“A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union Launching a European Debate”.
- 51.
On this refer to Grasso (2015).
- 52.
Art. 136.3 TFEU “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”.
- 53.
On this refer to Mangiameli (2013b).
- 54.
See Art. 3 of the Fiscal Compact Treaty: “The Contracting Parties shall apply the rules set out in this paragraph in addition and without prejudice to their obligations under European Union law”.
- 55.
Rivosecchi (2011).
- 56.
For further information refer to Mangiameli (2013a).
- 57.
- 58.
See Ipsen (1972), p. 101 e p. 211, who points out that “die Mitgliedstaaten haben damit als Subjekte des Völkerrechts und als Vertragsstaaten im Sinne des Völkerrechts gehandelt und sind folglich grundsätzlich den allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechts unterstellt”.
- 59.
Art. 48, (4), TEU, “A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to the Treaties”.
- 60.
Art. 50 TEU foresees that (par. 2) “A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention” and that “In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union” (on the right of withdrawal s. Wyrozumska (2013), and Puglia (2014) and (par. 3) “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, 2 years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2”.
- 61.
See also, Mangiameli (2016), pp. 11 ff.
- 62.
Edward (2002), pp. 215 ss.
- 63.
Schmitt (1981), p. 502.
- 64.
In this regard see Art. 259 TFEU “A Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union”.
- 65.
European Commission, Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Starting the European debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2, 30.11.2012.
- 66.
European Commission, Blueprint for an economic and monetary union, cit., 2, in the text “fiscal” means “related to the budget”.
- 67.
In practice, however, there is a considerable increase in the use of the ordinary procedure.
- 68.
In this regard see Bergonzini (2013), pp. 201 ss.
- 69.
Habermas (2013).
- 70.
Fischer (2014).
- 71.
Giscard d’Estaing (2014).
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Mangiameli, S. (2017). The Constitutional Sovereignty of Member States and European Constraints: The Difficult Path to Political Integration. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Consequences of the Crisis on European Integration and on the Member States. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47964-4_10
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