Abstract
The initiatives taken by the Union after the Lisbon Treaty to deal with the economic crisis of recent years, have questioned some of the principles of European economic governance, or at least they have modified the terms of implementation, thus demonstrating their inadequacy in these economic circumstances and how illusory it was to consider some of them as irrevocable fundamental points. However, there are still some aspects that make the changes made so far insufficient: in particular, the central importance attached to budget restraints, the focus on the need to prevent the production of negative externalities by the States, and the sterilization of politics that is enmeshed in a web of rules designed to neutralize conflicts that exist only because Europe is underpinned by an intergovernmental logic.
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- 1.
Chiti (2012) speaks of the transition from a “community of benefits” to a “community of risk” (p. 788).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Ruffert (2011).
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- 6.
- 7.
It was however envisaged that, if the lending State incurred higher fund raising expenses, the difference would be covered by a reduction in the interest that the borrowing States were owed.
- 8.
Napolitano (2012), p. 462.
- 9.
Regulation no 407/2010 of the Council of 11 May 2010.
- 10.
Messina (2013), p. 6.
- 11.
- 12.
On the ESM, Napolitano (2012), pp. 463 et seq.; Chiti (2013a, b), pp. 10 et seq.; Micossi and Peirce (2013), pp. 55 et seq. On the possibility of establishing the ESM within the European legal order, with recourse to reinforced cooperation, and on a different explanation as to why the international solution was preferred, see Messina (2013), pp. 7 et seq.
- 13.
On the negative consequences of this voting system, see Peroni (2011), p. 993.
- 14.
- 15.
Manzella (2008), pp. 278 et seq.
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BCE, Bollettino mensile, September 2012. On this type of intervention, see Napolitano and Perassi (2013), pp. 48 et seq.
- 17.
But prior to this there had already been the decision of the ECB of 14 May 2010 that established a programme for the securities markets (Securities Markets Programmes): see Napolitano and Perassi (2013), p. 44.
- 18.
The repurchase agreements can be made on eligible financial assets, namely those assets listed in an ad hoc list that includes also sovereign debts; also final purchases can be made of these assets through bilateral procedures not at regular intervals.
- 19.
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Obstacles because of three sets of factors. First of all the high yield of the sovereign debts of some States overshadows other financial assets in the marketplace that have to compete against such yields and that, because they are compelled to ensure similar yields, increase the funding costs of the banks. Secondly, the loss of value of the sovereign debt reduces the guarantees available to the banks to obtain liquidity, given the fact that on the interbanking market the relevant transactions are made by using public debt securities as collateral. Thirdly, the very loss of value of sovereign debt obviously determines a worsening of the financial conditions of the players, including the banks, that have those securities in their portfolios.
- 21.
- 22.
According to the Court of Justice Pringle cit, the ESM is an instrument of economic policy.
- 23.
They suggest the ECB exercise self-restriction in its freedom of action, Napolitano and Perassi (2013), p. 51.
- 24.
Europe’s intervention would have merely “rescued the rescuer” (Napolitano (2012), p. 461.
- 25.
Furthermore, under the Lisbon Treaty Art. 121 (4) is amended following the fact that the Commission may address warnings to the Member State that as a result of its behaviour runs the risk of undermining the good functioning of the UEM; in addition the representative of the State in question cannot vote in the Council.
- 26.
- 27.
Del Gatto (2012), p. 43 footnote 22 emphasizes how the lack of uniformity among the economies of the States of the Eurozone commands the adoption of monetary policy measures that are procyclical for some and countercyclical for others.
- 28.
Regulations 1466/1997 and 1467/1997.
- 29.
Alla (2011).
- 30.
Regulations 1055/2055 and 1056/2005.
- 31.
On the marginal importance previously acknowledged to the coordination of economic policy, so much so that the guidelines were issued by the Council only every three years Boggero (2012).
- 32.
On the calendar of obligations required by the European semester, Boggero (2012).
- 33.
See the Recommendation addressed to Italy on the 2014 national reform programme [Recommendation of 8 July 2014 (2014/C 247/11)].
- 34.
- 35.
On the control of macroeconomic imbalances, Alla (2011).
- 36.
By the Commission.
- 37.
On all of these indicators, Servizio studi e Servizio bilancio della Camera dei deputati (2014).
- 38.
European Commission, Alert Mechanism Report of November 2014, Brussels 13 November 2013, COM (2013) 790 final.
- 39.
European Commission, Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic, Brussels 5 March 2014, COM (2014) 150 final.
- 40.
It is worth noting that the Commission made the proposal to establish forms of financial assistance for States presenting macroeconomic imbalances by creating a fund, to which the States would contribute in proportion to their gross national income, and through agreements under which the beneficiary States would commit to making the necessary reforms to overcome the imbalances. Tufano and Pugliese (2014), pp. 328 et seq.
- 41.
Alla (2011) highlights the link between these new elements and the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy [EU Commission, Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, Brussels Com (2010)]. Europe 2020 sets out a vision to achieve high levels of employment (75 %), R&D spending at 3 % of GDP, low carbon economy cutting greenhouse gases by 20 % and decrease school dropouts to below.
- 42.
- 43.
See the opinion of the Commission of 15 November 2013 [SWD (2013) 606 final] on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy.
- 44.
Pinelli (2014) on the relationships between the Commission and the National Parliaments.
- 45.
- 46.
Because this is not allowed, not even by the arbitration clause envisaged by the Treaty, under which legal proceedings may be started before the Court of Justice but only when the European budget restraints are not transposed into the legal system of a Member State (for an review of this jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, see Porchia (2013).
- 47.
And indeed, in starting the procedure for excessive imbalances, the Commission must not restrict itself to checking the debt/GDP ratio, but it must also consider various factors such as the level of public investments, the performance of private finance, the growth policies adopted by the State involved, its pension reforms, the financial assistance provided to other Member States and the contributions given to international solidarity initiatives.
- 48.
Pinelli (2012) speaks of a “philosophy of rules” and of the “primacy of rules”.
- 49.
- 50.
- 51.
For similar observations Bilancia (2014a, b), p. 12, proposes that the governance of the economy be a concurrent power of the EU, at least for the Eurozone; a similar view is held by Rossi (2013), p. 750; while Peroni (2011), p. 973 maintains the need for a revision of the TEU and of the TFEU for the creation of a political-economic power in charge of the economic choices of the Union.
- 52.
On this point see, Salvemini (2013), pp. 99 et seq.
- 53.
Even when the ordinary procedures were activated, they were systematically duplicated by parallel negotiations at the intergovernmental level (Chiti 2012, p. 785).
- 54.
Tufano (2012), p. 155 states that the Commission has “technical powers” rather than “real decision-making powers”.
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Brancasi, A. (2017). The Functioning of the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty and the Fiscal Compact. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Consequences of the Crisis on European Integration and on the Member States. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47964-4_1
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