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Preference for Having Children, Fertility and Social Security

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Population Aging, Fertility and Social Security

Part of the book series: Population Economics ((POPULATION))

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Abstract

In this chapter, incorporating heterogeneity in preference to having children in a small open economy model, we examine the effects of changes in the size of PAYG social security on fertility choices of individuals and population growth of the economy. In this chapter we focus on the differences in fertility rates under two benefits schemes of proportional-to-contribution or uniform benefits.

This chapter is the revised and expanded version of Hirazawa et al. (2014).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In recent years the situation has slightly changed in OECD countries. For recent trends of family policies, see, for example, Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2013).

  2. 2.

    It is often said that the trend of social security reform in the world is the switch from defined-benefit to defined-contribution systems. In contrast, the reform in Japan can be said to maintain the property of “collective annuities” à la Cremer et al. (2010) through a defined-benefit system.

  3. 3.

    Cremer et al. (2004) also showed that, assuming heterogeneous individuals in the levels of productivity and health status, redistribution through social security may impose an implicit tax on postponed retirement, thus inducing early retirement for some individuals.

  4. 4.

    Their focus is, contrastingly, the second-best policies rather than a positive analysis of social security reforms.

  5. 5.

    Zhang and Zhang (1998) emphasized the parental motive to have children in modeling endogenous fertility. However, unlike ours, they considered two basic utility configurations, i.e., altruistic and non-altruistic.

  6. 6.

    Alternatively, ε may denote the probability of having children. The parameter should be interpreted cautiously since the number of children is not necessarily determined only by parents’ preference in reality. There are many couples who do not have children even though they want them. We exclude this case in this study.

  7. 7.

    Letting \( h(n)= \ln \left(1+n\right) \) be the utility from having children, we have \( h(0)=0 \), \( h\hbox{'}(n)>0 \) and \( h"(n)<0 \). This specification of the utility of having children does not per se exclude the possibility of \( {n}_t<0 \), which is actually impossible. When the utility from having children is too low, the optimal number of children is obtained as a corner solution \( {n}_t=0 \), that is, the constraint (6.3) is effective.

  8. 8.

    Assuming asexual individuals without infant mortality, we suppose that the sustainable growth rate of population is 1. However, since not all the individuals have children, the population growth rate (υ t ) can be lower than 1 temporarily.

  9. 9.

    There are various Bismarckian schemes which link the benefits level to the contribution not necessarily proportionally. We assume an extreme one in this chapter for exposition.

  10. 10.

    That is, \( {\displaystyle {\int}_0^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\left(1-z{n}_t\right)dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}={\displaystyle {\int}_0^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\left(1-z{n}_{t+1}\right)dF\left(\varepsilon \right)} \).

  11. 11.

    With the social security, the lifetime budget constraint of an individual in period t is written as: \( w\left(1-z{n}_t\right)\left(1-\tau \right)={c}_t^1+\left({c}_{t+1}^2-{\beta}_{t+1}\right)/R \). Considering labor-leisure choices of individuals does not essentially affect the results. The effect of an increase in the social security contribution rate on leisure is qualitatively the same as that on fertility.

  12. 12.

    The upper bound of the number of children is given by 1/z, with which the wage income approaches zero. We also assume that even if individuals desire to borrow against their future pension benefits in order to finance current spending, they are constrained to have less than the upper bound of children since there is no mechanism through which they can obligate the future pension benefits.

  13. 13.

    If alternatively the system is operated on a fully-funded basis, the Bismarckian scheme does not affect the economy as long as no individual faces the borrowing constraint. See Samuelson (1975).

  14. 14.

    We can show that \( dn/d\varepsilon \left|{}_{Beveridgean}\right.-dn/d\varepsilon \left|{}_{Bismarckian}\right.>0. \)

  15. 15.

    In contrast, Zhang and Zhang (2007) showed that social security has a larger negative effect on fertility in the earning-dependent benefit scheme than in the earning-independent scheme in an overlapping generations model with operative bequest. The difference between us stems from the fact that the bequest costs tend to reduce the number of children in their model, whereas there are no such costs in our model.

  16. 16.

    We can show that \( {d}^2n/ d\tau d\varepsilon >0 \). The slope of n(ε) will become steeper for each ε if \( n\left(\varepsilon \right)>0 \).

  17. 17.

    Our results crucially depend on the assumption of the payroll tax for social security. However, it is not implausible, and is even common in the literature, to assume non-lump-sum contributions. See, for example, Sinn (2004) and Zhang et al. (2001), although Bental (1989) and van Groezen et al. (2003) assumed lump-sum taxes. Samuelson (1975) showed the effect of PAYG social security on the dynamic resource allocation assuming a lump-sum contribution by identical individuals. In the real world, for instance, Sweden introduced a proportional tax in 1999, while Japan has adopted different schemes with lump-sum and proportional contributions.

  18. 18.

    Galor and Weil (1996) emphasized the effect of an increase in women’s relative wages in lowering fertility, taking into account gender wage gaps. The negative effect of after-tax wage on fertility is also well recognized in Beckerian models such as that in Ehrlich and Lui (1991).

  19. 19.

    See Fig. 6.3.

  20. 20.

    Under plausible values of parameters of τ and z, if population growth rate is low relative to the interest rate, e.g., when the economy is in the dynamic efficient range, we will have \( d{c}^1/d\tau <0 \).

  21. 21.

    Since, if \( z=0.075 \) as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003), we have \( 1/z=13.33 \), the condition holds plausibly.

  22. 22.

    Otherwise, if \( G<0 \), we have \( d\beta /d\tau <0 \), that is, decreases in the contribution rate raise the level of social security benefits, implausible as it seems.

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1

1.1 1.1 Derivation of (6.34)

Inserting (6.33) into (6.32), we have

$$ \begin{array}{l}\frac{d\beta }{d\tau}\left\{1+\beta \left[\frac{z}{{\displaystyle {\int}_0^{\varepsilon_v*}dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}+{\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\left(1-zn\right)dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}}-\frac{1}{\upsilon}\right]\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \beta }dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}\right)\right\}\\ {}\kern1em =\beta \left\{\frac{1}{\tau }-\left[\frac{z}{{\displaystyle {\int}_0^{\varepsilon_v*}dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}+{\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\left(1-zn\right)dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}}-\frac{1}{\upsilon}\right]\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \tau }dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}\right)\right\}\end{array} $$
(6.39)

where, assuming \( 1-2z\upsilon >0 \), we have \( \frac{z}{{\displaystyle {\int}_0^{\varepsilon_v*}dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}+{\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\left(1-zn\right)dF\left(\varepsilon \right)}}-\frac{1}{\upsilon}\equiv V<0 \).Footnote 21

Differentiating ε v  * in (6.30) with respect to τ, we have

$$ {\left[1+\frac{\beta }{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\right]}^2\frac{d{\varepsilon}_v*}{d\tau }+\frac{\left(1+\rho \right)z}{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\frac{d\beta }{d\tau }=-\frac{\left(1+\rho \right)z\beta }{Rw{\left(1-\tau \right)}^2}. $$
(6.40)

From (6.39) and (6.40) we have

$$ \left(\begin{array}{cc}\hfill 1+\beta V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \beta }dF}\right)\hfill & \hfill 0\hfill \\ {}\hfill \frac{\left(1+\rho \right)z}{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\hfill & \hfill {\left[1+\frac{\beta }{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\right]}^2\hfill \end{array}\right)\left(\begin{array}{c}\hfill \frac{d\beta }{d\tau}\hfill \\ {}\hfill \frac{d{\varepsilon}_v*}{d\tau}\hfill \end{array}\right)=\left(\begin{array}{c}\hfill \frac{\beta }{\tau }-\beta V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \tau }dF}\right)\hfill \\ {}\hfill -\frac{\left(1+\rho \right)z\beta }{Rw{\left(1-\tau \right)}^2}\hfill \end{array}\right). $$
(6.41)

From (6.41) we obtain

$$ \frac{d\beta }{d\tau }={G}^{-1}\left[\frac{\beta }{\tau }-\beta V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \tau }dF}\right)\right]{\left[1+\frac{\beta }{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\right]}^2 $$
(6.42)
$$ \frac{d{\varepsilon}_v*}{d\tau }={G}^{-1}\frac{-\left(1+\rho \right)z\beta }{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\left\{\left[1+\beta V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \beta }dF}\right)\right]\frac{1}{1-\tau }+\frac{1}{\tau }-V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \tau }dF}\right)\right\} $$
(6.43)

where \( G=\left[1+\beta V\left({\displaystyle {\int}_{\varepsilon_v*}^{\overline{\varepsilon}}\frac{\partial n}{\partial \beta }dF}\right)\right]{\left[1+\frac{\beta }{Rw\left(1-\tau \right)}\right]}^2 \). We assume here that \( G>0 \).Footnote 22 Therefore, it follows that:

$$ d{\varepsilon}_v*/d\tau <0 $$
(6.34)

and \( d\beta /d\tau >0 \).

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Yakita, A. (2017). Preference for Having Children, Fertility and Social Security. In: Population Aging, Fertility and Social Security. Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47644-5_6

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