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Preferable System of Review Regarding Adherence to Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive

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International Commercial Arbitration and the Commercial Agency Directive

Part of the book series: International Law and Economics ((ILEC))

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Abstract

The preceding two chapters have outlined the possibilities and restrictions of arbitrating cross-border disputes between principals and commercial agents. The game theoretical model has shown that the system of review is a potent direct constraint on the decision-making process of arbitrators. Therefore, the goal of mitigating Ingmar’s effect through arbitration within the insurmountable constraints set by EU law appears accomplishable through an adequately designed system of review. The model has also shown that it is possible to constrain arbitrators to adhere to a certain standard of protection for commercial agents in spite of a choice of law pointing them towards a law which does not provide for termination fees. Yet, the heterogeneous methods of both pre- and post-award review throughout the four surveyed Member States leaves doubt as to whether any of them has found the right recipe to address arbitrators in this way. Therefore, a system of review which can be considered preferable will be developed in the following. It is possible to design a system of review which balances the constraints set by EU law, the results of the normative analysis of the Directive’s regime for termination fees, the inferences drawn from the game theoretical analysis regarding arbitrators’ behaviour and the conditions of review in the four surveyed Member States.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Case C-381/98 Ingmar [2000] ECR I-9305, paras. 14, 26.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Schwarz (2002), p. 70. In this respect, Ingmar had widely been interpreted to imply that only the minimum standard provided for in the Directive was elevated to the status of overriding mandatory provisions but not individual ‘goldplating’ transpositions, Kindler in; Joost & Strohn (Eds.) (2014), § 92c Anh., para. 15; Häuslschmidt (2010), para. 2224.

  3. 3.

    Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:663; for the reference cf. Cour de cassation (Belgium), 5 April 2012, C.11.0430.N., United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, [2012] Pas. No 219, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20120405-2 accessed 26 November 2016.

  4. 4.

    Cour de cassation (Belgium), 5 April 2012, C.11.0430.N., United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, [2012] Pas. No 219, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20120405-2 accessed 26 November 2016.

  5. 5.

    Belgian law determines the validity of the arbitration agreement according to the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, cf. supra 35. The Belgian courts apparently concluded that the choice of Bulgarian law as the law applicable to the contract and the choice of a seat of arbitration in Bulgaria implied that the arbitration agreement would principally have to be held against the Bulgarian standard for the validity of arbitration agreements. The result of this conflict of laws analysis could, however, be altered if the relevant parts of the Belgian transposition of the Commercial Agents Directive could be held to constitute overriding mandatory provisions.

  6. 6.

    According to Art. 1 (2) Commercial Agents Directive, the Directive itself does not cover this type of agency contract but refers only to commercial agents engaged in the sale or purchase of goods. Nonetheless, a number of Member States have ‘goldplated’ their transposition by also including this type of contract. One of those Member States is Belgium (others include Italy, Austria, Portugal, Spain, France; cf. Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson (2006), p. 168. In contrast, the Bulgarian transposition applies only to sales, cf. Art. 32 (1) Tъpгoвcки зaкoн (Bulgarian Commercial Law); cf. Case C-184/12 Unamar EU:C:2013:301, Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 47. Other transpositions that are limited to sales agency include the ones in Denmark, Finland, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Northern Ireland and Sweden, cf. Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson (2006), p. 168. German law does not consider its regime for indemnity to be mandatory as far as shipping agents are concerned, cf. § 92c Handelsgesetzbuch (Germany).

  7. 7.

    Even if the Bulgarian transposition were to cover this type of contract, it still could be argued that the level of protection remains below the level provided by the Belgian Code de droit économique in view of the specific claims raised by the Belgian commercial agent. Among other claims he requested additional compensation for damages suffered in connection with the consequential dismissal of the chief of staff. The broad provision of Art. X.19 Code de droit économique provides the basis for this type of additional indemnity before Belgian courts. Both the Directive and Bulgarian law strictly cap indemnity to the average value of one year’s remuneration calculated on the last five years of the contract’s duration, cf. Art. 17 (2) (b) Commercial A Directive, Art. 40 (2) Tъpгoвcки зaкoн (Bulgarian Commercial Law).

  8. 8.

    The Convention was applicable because the contract between the parties was concluded before 16 December 2009, cf. Art. 28 Rome I Regulation. This is one of the few constellations in which the Rome regime becomes directly relevant in relation to an arbitration agreement despite the exclusion of arbitration agreements in Art. 1 (2) (d) Rome Convention and Art. 1 (2) (e) Rome I Regulation, see supra 83ff.

  9. 9.

    Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:663, para. 26.

  10. 10.

    In contrast to Advocate General Wahl’s opinion, which made the case for applying the Belgian goldplating provisions as overriding mandatory provisions, cf. Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:301, Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 39.

  11. 11.

    Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:663, para. 52.

  12. 12.

    ibid.

  13. 13.

    ibid paras. 49–50.

  14. 14.

    It stands to reason that the Court would have reached a different result if the dispute had arisen in a case involving the application of the Rome I Regulation. The Rome I Regulation includes a decisive differentiation which is not included in the Rome Convention, i.e. the differentiation between ‘provisions which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ in Art. 3 (3) and ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ in Art. 9. While the goldplating Belgian provision certainly qualifies as a provision which cannot be derogated from by agreement, its status as an overriding mandatory provision can certainly be called into question. Therefore, it could have been argued that the Belgian commercial agent would only be protected against the choice of law if all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice were located in a country other than Bulgaria in the sense of Art. 3 (3) Rome I Regulation, e.g. in Belgium.

  15. 15.

    Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:663, para. 46; cf. Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and others [1999] ECR I-8453, para. 31; Fetsch (2002), p. 125ff.

  16. 16.

    Cour de cassation (Belgium), 12 September 2014, C.11.0430.N, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20140912-1 accessed 26 November 2016.

  17. 17.

    Cf. Dursin, De invloed van het Europees recht op Belgische distributieovereenkomsten, in: Bocken (ed), De invloed van het Europees recht op het Belgisch recht (2003) 164. In so far as the qualification of the Belgian transposition’s status under Art. 9 (3) Rome I Regulation is concerned, the regime for termination fees would presumably already not qualify for not being directed at the performance of the contract but only at its termination, cf. Hollander (2014), p. 332.

  18. 18.

    Neither did the Cour de cassation address it in its decision to quash the decision by the Cour d’appel de Antwerp.

  19. 19.

    Art. 1 (2) (d) Rome Convention provides that the rules of the Convention ‘shall not apply to (…) arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court (…)’. Cf. Art. 1 (2) (e) Rome I Regulation.

  20. 20.

    Advocate General Wahl briefly touched upon this topic but merely pointed out that ‘[i]t is therefore clear from the [Cour de cassation’s] reasoning that there is a close link between the determination of the law applicable to the contract and the possibility the court has of rejecting the [arbitration] clause and, accordingly, declaring that it has jurisdiction’, see. Case C-184/12, Unamar EU:C:2013:663, Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 23.

  21. 21.

    Accordingly, there has been conjecture that after Unamar v NMB German courts would invalidate arbitration agreements in order to safeguard adherence to German goldplating provisions, Quinke (2015), para. 29.

  22. 22.

    See supra 125ff., 128 ff.

  23. 23.

    Cf. supra 126.

  24. 24.

    Cf. supra 84.

  25. 25.

    Magnus (2010), p. 34; Ferrari in: Ferrari, Kieninger, Mankowski et al. (2012), Art. 4 Rom-I VO, para. 63; Pfeiffer (2008), p. 625; cf. Krebber (1998), p. 156 regarding the application of Directives’ minimum level of protection under the Rome Convention.

  26. 26.

    Schwarz (2002), p. 71.

  27. 27.

    ibid.

  28. 28.

    ibid 70.

  29. 29.

    ibid 71.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Beulker (2005), pp. 332, 336, who points out that Directives themselves cannot represent overriding mandatory provisions, but only their transpositions.

  31. 31.

    ICC Award 12045/2003, Clunet 2006, 1434; ICC Award 8817/1997, YB Comm. Arb XXV (2000), 355, 366.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Schwarz (2002), p. 72; Michaels and Kamann (1997), p. 604; Michaels and Kamann (2001), p. 308; Staudinger (2001), p. 1976.

  33. 33.

    Cf. supra 98.

  34. 34.

    However, it can be argued that indemnity does not always provide less protection than compensation. Then the requirement of legal certainty suggests that the lex fori’s choice between indemnity and compensation is to be considered the applicable measure, cf. Michaels and Kamann (2001), p. 308.

  35. 35.

    Cf. supra 21ff.

  36. 36.

    Weller (2005), p. 166 (regarding choice-of-court agreements).

  37. 37.

    Cf. supra 23.

  38. 38.

    This holds true as long the pure strategy of always recognising arbitral awards is not applied, cf. supra 155f.

  39. 39.

    Kröll (2009), para. 16-28; cf. Brekoulakis (2009), para. 2–66.

  40. 40.

    Cf. Oberlandesgericht München (Germany), 10 September 2013, 34 SchH 10/13, SchiedsVZ 2013, 287, 290; Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), SchiedsVZ 2005, 54: ‘Nur wenn die nichtigen Teile das Gesamtgepräge der vereinbarten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit betreffen (…)’.

  41. 41.

    Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 165–166; confirmed by Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 5 September 2012, VII ZR 25/12, BeckRS 2012, 20587, para. 7.

  42. 42.

    Kröll (2009), para. 16-28; Basedow (2014), p. 344: ‘Das Kontrollinstrument sollte nicht die Wirksamkeit der Klauseln, sondern die Ausübung der damit begründeten Rechte betreffen.’

  43. 43.

    Cf. supra 25ff.

  44. 44.

    Shelkoplyas (2003), p. 151.

  45. 45.

    Cf. supra 128ff.

  46. 46.

    See Brekoulakis (2009), paras. 2-42 to 2-57.

  47. 47.

    Such objections have been raised against the arbitrability of competition law matters, cf. R. Posner in University Life Insurance Co. v Unimarc Ltd., 699F 2d 846, 850–851 (CA 1983): ‘[Federal anti-trust issues] are considered to be at once too difficult to be decided competently by arbitrators—who are not judges, and often not even lawyers—and too important to be decided otherwise than by competent tribunals.’

  48. 48.

    See supra 155f.

  49. 49.

    The Supreme Court of the United States held in relation to a case involving claims under securities law that the ‘Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possible inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums’, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v Byrd, 470 US 213, 217 (1985).

  50. 50.

    Galetta (2010), p. 18.

  51. 51.

    Cf. supra 25ff.

  52. 52.

    In particular the decision by the Oberlandesgericht München reflects this approach, cf. Oberlandesgericht München, 17 May 2006, 7 U 1781/06, IPrax 2007, 322.

  53. 53.

    Cf. W eller (2005), p. 166.

  54. 54.

    Cf. ibid 168.

  55. 55.

    Cf. supra 25ff.

  56. 56.

    Cf. supra 133ff. It can also be reiterated that the Commission had explicitly denied the need to secure the mandatory nature of the regime for termination fees through any jurisdictional measures prior to Ingmar, cf. Commission, Report on the Application of Article 17 of Council Directive on the Co-ordination of the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC), COM (1996) 364 final, 10.

  57. 57.

    Cf. supra 149.

  58. 58.

    Cf. Weller (2005), p. 246.

  59. 59.

    In 2014, Cuniberti analysed 8,991 requests for arbitration filed with the International Court of Arbitration at the ICC and found that parties made a choice of law in favour of state law in 80 to 85 % of the cases: Cuniberti (2014), p. 398.

  60. 60.

    Kraus (2013), p. 39; Harris (2012), p. US11; Katz (1997), p. 6.

  61. 61.

    Cf. supra 123, n. 127.

  62. 62.

    E.g. Section 1738.13 Civil Code (California); Section 686.201 (2) Florida Statutes 2010; Section 191-b Labor Law (New York); Section 35.82 Business and Commerce Code (Texas); Section 59.1-456 Code of Virginia 2006.

  63. 63.

    Section 686.201 (3) (b) Florida Statutes 2010.

  64. 64.

    The Act’s motives reflect this intention: ‘The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico cannot remain indifferent to the growing number of cases in which domestic and foreign enterprises, without just cause, eliminate their dealers, concessionaires or agents, as soon as theses have created a favourable market and without taking into account their legitimate interests. The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico (…) deems it necessary to regulate, insofar as pertinent to the field of said relationship, so as to avoid the abuse caused by certain practices.’; cf. Born (2015), p. 181, n. 6. For a full English translation cf. Garner (2001), p. 664ff.

  65. 65.

    Telenetworks Inc v Motorola Universal Data Systems Inc 906F Supp 75 (DPR 1995).

  66. 66.

    Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, 723F 2d, 155, 158 (1st Cir 1983).

  67. 67.

    Feinauer and Weingarten (2013), p. 33.

  68. 68.

    Álvarez (2013), p. 70.

  69. 69.

    Maaz (2013), p. 75; Hajjar (2011), p. 206. Contract law No. 2200/19991.03.15 grants a right to damages incurred through termination but does not specify what is understood as such a loss. This does not suffice as equivalent protection.

  70. 70.

    von Ortenberg (2013), p. 131.

  71. 71.

    Schlüter (2013a), p. 143.

  72. 72.

    de Pay (2013), p. 255.

  73. 73.

    Tarandschik and Serdjuk (2013), p. 304.

  74. 74.

    Häring (2013), p. 325.

  75. 75.

    Weingarten (2013), p. 328.

  76. 76.

    Brückner (2013), p. 348.

  77. 77.

    Klose (2013), p. 360.

  78. 78.

    Koller (2000), p. 111; Collart (2011), p. 938ff; Meyer and Reinfried Egli (1997), p. 8.

  79. 79.

    Demir Gökyala (2011), p. 994.

  80. 80.

    Neocleous and Christoforou (2012) CYP/5, CYP/23-CYP27; Landas and Sīmane (2013), p. 404.

  81. 81.

    Levenfeld and Novogroder-Shoshan (2012), ISR/36-ISR/37; cf. 2012 − חוק חוזה סוכנות (סוכן מסחרי וספק), התשע’ב (The Agency Contract Law (Commercial Agent and Principal), 2012) available in Hebrew at http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2338/2338.pdf accessed 26 November 2016; unofficial English translation available at http://www.export.gov/israel/doingbusinessinisrael/eg_il_058074.asp accessed 26 November 2016. Prior to the enactment of the 2012 Law, Israel had not had a comparable regime, cf. Levenfeld and Novogroder-Shoshan (2012), ISR/16-ISR/17.

  82. 82.

    Nudenberg (2011); Jebsen (2013), p. 26.

  83. 83.

    Art. 27 Lei 4886/65 (amended by Lei 8420/92), cf. Geide and de Pay (2013), p. 57.

  84. 84.

    Arts 1324 and 1325 Codigo de Comercio, Decreto 410/1971 (Colombia), cf. Mafla (2012) COL/14-COL15; Ule (2013), p. 203.

  85. 85.

    Art. 830 Zakon o obveznim odnosima (Croatia), cf. Will (2013), p. 213.

  86. 86.

    Bortolotti (2001), p. 48, n. 1.

  87. 87.

    Art. 92-2 Korean Commercial Code; cf. Garbrecht and Fischer (2013), p. 207.

  88. 88.

    Art. 177 (2) Commercial Law No. 36/2005/QH11, English translation available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/vie117980.pdf accessed 26 November 2016; cf. Schlüter (2013b), p. 398.

  89. 89.

    Kuwait Commercial Code; English translation of parts relating to commercial agency available in Krüger (1997), p. 60ff.

  90. 90.

    Cf. ibid 68.

  91. 91.

    El-Ahdab and El-Adhab (2011), p. 316.

  92. 92.

    Federal Law No. 18 of 1981 concerning the Organization of Commercial Agencies (UAE) as amended 2010; English translation available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ae/ae007en.pdf accessed 26 November 2016.

  93. 93.

    أبوظبي) المحكمة الاتحادية العليا (UAE), 6 May 2009, Appeal No. 713-Civil of the 27th Judicial Year, reported at http://aidarous.com/uploads/publications/Legal_Pinch_October_2013.pdf accessed 26 November 2016.

  94. 94.

    Arts 8 (d), 9 (b) Legislative Decree No 10/1992 (Bahrain) amended by Legislative Decree 8/1998 and Legislative Decree 49/1992.

  95. 95.

    Arts 4, 5 Decree-Law No. 34 of August 5, 1967 (Lebanon); cf. Reindel and Seiffert (2013a), p. 231. Those provisions were held to render arbitration agreements concluded before the dispute arose unenforceable, cf. Cour de cassation (Lebanon), 4th chamber, Decision 34/2001, 19 July 2001, The Lebanese Review of Arab and International Arbitration (22), 62–63, Cour de cassation (Lebanon), 5th chamber, Decision No. 4/2005, The Lebanese Review of Arab and International Arbitration (33), 65; El-Ahdab and El-Adhab (2011), p. 360.

  96. 96.

    Art. 402 Commercial Code, Law No. 15/95 (Morocco); cf. Yakhloufi (2013), p. 249.

  97. 97.

    Arts 8, 9 Commercial Agency Law No. 8/2002 (Qatar), English translation available at http://www.tawfikcpa.com/Assets/documents/law%208.pdf accessed 26 November 2016; cf. Reindel and Seiffert (2013a), p. 197.

  98. 98.

    Reindel and Seiffert (2013c), p. 309.

  99. 99.

    Krüger and Oechsner (1996), p. 28.

  100. 100.

    Cf. supra 78ff.

  101. 101.

    Shelkoplyas (2003), p. 266; Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 108.

  102. 102.

    ICC Award 8817/1997, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 355, 366, paras. 47–48.

  103. 103.

    Cf. IV.E. – 2:305, IV.E. – 3:312 DCFR; Arts 1:305,. 2:312 PEL CAFDC.

  104. 104.

    Cuniberti found that parties made their contract subject to lex mercatoria in less than 2 % of cases, see Cuniberti (2014), p. 403.

  105. 105.

    Born (2014), p. 2760 with reference to Smit (1991), p. 1312.

  106. 106.

    Ten countries need to ratify the Convention in order to come into force. So far only four have done so (France, Italy, Netherlands, Mexico, South Africa).

  107. 107.

    Art. 21 of the ICC Model Contract provides parties with two options: Alternative A which does not allow for termination fees and Alternative B which effectively incorporates the indemnity regime of Art. 17 (2) Commercial Agents Directive into the contract, cf. International Chamber of Commerce (2015), p. 7.

  108. 108.

    ICC Award 3131/1979, YB Comm. Arb. IX (1984), 109.

  109. 109.

    ibid: ‘[The principal] must therefore be held responsible for the breach of the agency. The Tribunal is also of opinion that this termination has caused damages to [the commercial agent] as a result of its inactivity during one year, its loss of customers and the blow to its commercial reputation. Because of the extreme difficulty which would arise when itemising and calculating a separate figure for each of these heads of damages, which moreover partially overlap, the Tribunal has evaluated in equity by way of a global lump sum, the amount of the damages due to Pabalk by reason of the breach of the agency agreement at the sum of 800,000 French francs.’; see Bortolotti (2001), p. 51.

  110. 110.

    Cf. ICC Award 8117/1995, 12 ICC. Bull. 69 (2001), in which the commercial agency contact included a choice of law clause in favour of the ‘Laws of the International Chamber of Commerce Paris’. While the arbitral tribunal could have understood this as choice in favour of the lex mercatoria, it considered the contract to be silent on the applicable law and determined the applicable law itself, cf. ibid 52.

  111. 111.

    Cf. ICC Award 8817/1997, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 355, 366, paras. 47-48: While the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG were deemed to apply to the contract in general, the arbitral tribunal also applied the Directive’s provisions on termination fees relying on the fact that they were common to the country of the principal (Denmark) and the country of the commercial agent (Spain).

  112. 112.

    Cf. supra 128ff.

  113. 113.

    Cf. supra 108.

  114. 114.

    Cf. supra 44.

  115. 115.

    Zhou (2014), p. 361; generally Basedow (1996), p. 354.

  116. 116.

    Singleton proposes a stipulation according to which ‘the commercial agent will be paid compensation as if the 1993 Regulations applied’ in order to protect commercial agents operating in a country where no such compensation is provided for, Singleton (2010), p. 152.

  117. 117.

    Bremermann (2013), p. 186; Brückner (2013), p. 348.

  118. 118.

    Cf. Zohar v Travenol Labs, CA 442/85, [1990] IsrSC 44(3) PD 661.

  119. 119.

    Let X be expected or actual duration of the commercial agency in years, Y expected or actual volume of yearly transactions entitling the commercial agent to commission, C s standard commission and C a commission agreed upon by the parties. YC s accounts for termination fees based on Art. 17 (2) (b) Commercial Agents Directive. Then C a can be considered to provide equivalent protection if \( XY{C}_s+Y{C}_s=XY{C}_a \) or \( X = \left({C}_a\right.-\left.{C}_s\right)/{C}_s \). This means that a commercial agent who receives 50 % instead of the standard rate of commission of roughly 25 % can be considered to be put on a par with the Directive’s minimum level of protection as soon as the commercial agency agreement could be expected to last or actually lasted for at least one year. For a case with comparable facts in which an English court refused to refer the parties to the prorogated forum after a commercial agency which lasted for over 3 years, cf. supra 135.

  120. 120.

    The connection between restraint of trade clauses and termination fees is reflected in Belgian and German law on commercial agency. Where a contract including a restraint of trade clause bars a commercial agent from benefitting from the customer base after termination, both laws assume that termination fees should be paid, cf. Art X.18 (2), Code de droit économique (Belgium); § 90a (1) Handelsgesetzbuch (Germany). It is also interesting to note that all of the drafts of the Directive included provisions according to which a suitable indemnity had to be paid for the duration of a restraint of trade, cf. Randolph and Davey (2010), p. 128.

  121. 121.

    Kelton v Stravinski, 138 Cal App 4th 941, 946–947 (Cal.App Ct 5th Dist 2006); Hill Medical Corp. v Wycoff, 86 Cal.App 4th 895, 900 (Cal App Ct 2d Dist. 2001); cf. generally Kränzlin (1983), p. 170.

  122. 122.

    Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 108, n. 50.

  123. 123.

    Cf. Quinke (2007), p. 249.

  124. 124.

    Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1.

  125. 125.

    Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 108; Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 832 in reference to a waiver of restraint of trade clauses.

  126. 126.

    ibid.

  127. 127.

    The risk of uncertainty should ultimately remain with the principal, cf. infra 232ff. Also Kleinheisterkamp prefaces his objection to the equivalence test by observing that such a test should at least not be preferable if the party seeking enforcement of the arbitration agreement did not even raise equivalence in pre-award review, Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 108.

  128. 128.

    The review of arbitral practice has revealed examples in which arbitral tribunals have expressly adapted their decision making in light of concerns over enforceability, cf. supra 144. Furthermore, the model has explained the inner workings of the process which makes arbitrators behave this way—in spite of the unquestionable significance of party autonomy in arbitration.

  129. 129.

    See supra 40.

  130. 130.

    Mankowski (2006), p. 152.

  131. 131.

    It can be assumed that enforcement against the principal will not be effective in 90 % of those cases, Basedow (2014), p. 351.

  132. 132.

    Cf. Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 834.

  133. 133.

    ibid. The respective enforcement would not even require any exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation (recast).

  134. 134.

    A condition for this court’s post-award review to become imminent is obviously that the principal possesses assets in the said country. A possible target for enforcement could also be a persisting stream of the principal’s goods into the EU, cf. ibid.

  135. 135.

    For example, Art. 9 United Arabs Emirates Federal Law No. 18 of 1981 concerning the Organization of Commercial Agencies (as amended 2010) requires to commercial agents to be compensated if a commercial agency agreement is terminated or not renewed in the absence of any ‘justifiable’ reason. Compensation is to be paid in respect of the investment made by the commercial agent in the commercial agency and the loss of future profits. In particular, arbitration clauses have been held unenforceable by the Federal Supreme Court of the United Arab Emirates if they relate to a contract governed by UAE Federal Law No. 18 of 1981, cf. أبوظبي)الاتحادية العلياالمحكمة) (UAE), 6 May 2009, Appeal No. 713-Civil of the 27th Judicial Year, reported at http://aidarous.com/uploads/publications/Legal_Pinch_October_2013.pdf accessed 26 November 2016. In Lebanon, disputes which relate to Lebanese Decree-Law No. 34 on Commercial Representation Agreements (issued on 5 August 1967) are considered inarbitrable per se, cf. Comair-Obeid (2012), p. 2.

  136. 136.

    Basedow (2014), p. 351.

  137. 137.

    ibid.

  138. 138.

    Cf. Rau (2009), pp. 144 with reference to Northrop Corp. v Triad Int’l Marketing S.A., 811F 2d 1265 (9th Cir 1987).

  139. 139.

    A lack of seizable assets will always make it difficult to ultimately bring about a situation which does not violate public policy. Also if the commercial agent is granted termination fees by a Member State court, the commercial agent will have difficulties enforcing the respective judgment. He will face the common problems connected with enforcing a foreign judgment as well as the added difficulty that the Member State court assumed jurisdiction in spite of an arbitration agreement which can be considered to be valid prima facie. Nevertheless, if there are no seizable assets, it is still preferable to expose the commercial agent to those challenges than to refer him to arbitration. Otherwise the courts would run the risk of creating a situation in which an arbitral tribunal decides the dispute without being incentivised to override a choice of law by post-award review favouring the purposes of the Commercial Agents Directive. If the commercial agent also did not receive any alternative compensation, an undetectable violation of public policy becomes palpable. A court which knowingly exposes a commercial agent to that risk violates the principle of effectiveness.

  140. 140.

    Supra 30.

  141. 141.

    Cf. supra 34, 167f.

  142. 142.

    Niedermaier (2014), p. 20.

  143. 143.

    Cf. Case C-8/08, Telekom Nederlands BV [2009] ECR I-4529, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 80, n. 60: ‘The burden of proof determines, first, which party must put forward the facts and, where necessary, adduce the related evidence (subjektive or formelle Beweislast, also known as the evidential burden); second, the allocation of that burden determines which party bears the risk of facts remaining unresolved or allegations unproven (objektive or materielle Beweislast).’

  144. 144.

    Wilske and Fox in: Wolff (Ed.) (2012), Art. II, para. 287; Schramm, Geisinger and Pinsolle in: Kronke et al. (Eds.) (2010) Art. II, 102.

  145. 145.

    Cf. Art. II (3) New York Convention ‘The court of a Contracting State (…) shall (…) refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’; § 1032 (1) Zivilprozessordnung (Germany) ‘(…) so hat das Gericht die Klage als unzulässig abzuweisen, (…) es sei denn das Gericht stellt fest, dass die Schiedsvereinbarung nichtig, unwirksam oder undurchführbar ist’; Art. 1448 NCPC (France) ‘(…) une jurisdiction de’l Etat (…) se déclare incompétente sauf si le tribunal n’est pas encore saisi et si la convention d’arbitrage est manifestement nulle ou manifestement inapplicable’; Art. 1682 (1) Code Judiciare (Belgium) ‘Le juge (…) se déclare sans jurisdiction à la demande d’une partie, à moins qu’en ce qui concerne ce différend la convention ne soit pas valable ou n’ait pris fin’; Section 9(4) Arbitration Act 1996 (England) ‘On an application under this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed’.

  146. 146.

    Inco Europe Ltd. v First Choice Distribution, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 765, 777 (EWCA 1998); Bishop et al. (2008), p. 323; Schramm, Geisinger and Pinsolle in: Kronke et al. (2010) Art. II, 102; Huber and Bach in: Böckstiegel et al. (Eds.) (2015), § 1032, para. 17; cf. Lobo v Celebrity Cruises, 426F Supp 2nd 1296 (SD Fla 2006), YB Comm. Arb. XXXIII (2008), 820, 831.

  147. 147.

    In simple cases it might be possible to accomplish this for the first indicator if the court applies a black-letter approach to the comparison, looking exclusively for mandatory indemnity or compensation payments under the chosen law. It becomes distinctly more difficult regarding the second indicator, i.e. the economic comparison between different schemes of alternative compensation, which can be time consuming and require the input of experts. It becomes close to impossible for the third indicator. After the termination of the commercial agency a commercial agent will realistically be unaware of the whereabouts of the principal’s assets.

  148. 148.

    Cf. supra 75.

  149. 149.

    Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and van Veen v SPF [1995] ECR I-4705, para. 22.

  150. 150.

    ibid para. 21.

  151. 151.

    Case C-137/08 Ference Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847, para. 56.

  152. 152.

    Niedermaier (2013), p. 243.

  153. 153.

    Case C-137/08, Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847, Opinion of AG Trestenjak, para. 114.

  154. 154.

    Case C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank EU:C:2013:88, paras. 29, 33 with reference to Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones [2009] ECR I-9579, para. 53.

  155. 155.

    Cf. Niedermaier (2013), p. 67ff, 363.

  156. 156.

    Cf. supra 117ff.

  157. 157.

    Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), NJW-RR 93, 746, 747; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 16 October 1984, NJW 1985, 264, 265; Walker v Carpenter, 57 SE 461, 461 (NC 1907): ‘The first rule laid down in the books on evidence is to the effect that the issue must be proved by the party who states an affirmative, not by the party who states a negative.’

  158. 158.

    Cf. Niedermaier (2013), p. 357; Rose (2014), p. 217.

  159. 159.

    Cf. supra 103ff.

  160. 160.

    Cf. Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial and ethnic origin.

  161. 161.

    Cf. Art. 8 (1) Directive 2000/43/EC; Art. 9 (1) Directive 2004/113/EC; Art. 4 Directive 97/80/EC; Art. 19 Directive 2006/54/EC; cf. Case C-127/92 Enderby [1993] ECR I-5566, paras. 16, 17.

  162. 162.

    Niedermaier (2013), p. 357.

  163. 163.

    Cf. Weller (2005), p. 354.

  164. 164.

    Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 830.

  165. 165.

    Thus, they would also permit to refuse to refer parties to arbitration under Art. VI (3) European Convention.

  166. 166.

    E.g. Campbell (2012); Rödl and Partner (2013); Albaric and Dickstein (2011); Jausàs (1997); Saintier (2002). For details on proving the content of foreign law in Member State courts cf. Trautmann (2011); Geeroms (2004); Fentiman (1998).

  167. 167.

    Singleton (2010).

  168. 168.

    See supra 218f.

  169. 169.

    Kleinheisterkamp proposes that principals should concede the application of the lex fori’s overriding mandatory provisions: Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 116. In line with the analysis of the preferable standard of protection above, every dépeçage expressing the Directive’s minimum standard of protection should suffice.

  170. 170.

    ibid 114; see Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 837.

  171. 171.

    The distribution of the burden of proof in pre-award review was also Kleinheisterkamp’s point of departure. Commenting on the decision by the Oberlandesgericht München from 2006 he argued that a refusal to refer parties to arbitration ‘reflects nothing else but the weakness of the arguments presented by the [principal] who could have made the effort to show that the effectiveness of German mandatory rules [transposing the Commercial Agents Directive] would not be imperilled by the combined choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clause.’ Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 106 in reference to Oberlandesgericht München, 17 May 2006, 7 U 1781/06, IPrax 2007, 322.

  172. 172.

    Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 117.

  173. 173.

    Rau (2007), p. 51; Cheng (2009), p. 121; Thorn and Grenz (2011), p. 197.

  174. 174.

    Thorn and Grenz (2011), pp. 197−198.; Kleinheisterkamp already acknowledged this point in Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 839.

  175. 175.

    Beulker (2005), p. 230.

  176. 176.

    At an earlier stage the enforceability of the arbitration agreement was also questioned under the aforementioned Puerto Rican Ley de Contratos de Distribucion protecting commercial agents inter alia against arbitration agreements working in tandem with a choice of law. This argument was, however, dropped before the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614 (1985), n. 8.

  177. 177.

    Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614, 637 (1985), n. 19; cf. Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 115.

  178. 178.

    Thorn and Grenz (2011), p. 198.

  179. 179.

    In terms of the model, it triggers the worst possible outcome for the principal. He paid high commission and takes on the risk of having to pay termination fees (i.e. \( {P}_h-f/2 \)), cf. supra 148, n. 30.

  180. 180.

    Thorn and Grenz (2011), p. 198.

  181. 181.

    In California, for example, foreign judgments do not carry full faith and credit. Instead courts retain the freedom not to recognise a foreign judgment if the courts hold that ‘the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court’, cf. Code of Civil Procedure (California) 1716 (a) (5) (based on Section 4 (b) (5) Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act). The lack of deference towards foreign mandatory law outlined above allows the assumption that a foreign judgment would not be recognised and enforced readily if it ignored an arbitration agreement in the name of provisions which did not have a counterpart in substantive Californian law. The same effect can be assumed to be present in other places of enforcement outside the EU.

  182. 182.

    Thorn and Grenz (2011), p. 205ff.

  183. 183.

    Cf. Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 164.

  184. 184.

    Arbitration had a comparable mechanism to safeguard compliance with arbitral awards by requiring a deposit by the party at the onset of the proceedings in pre-Islamic arbitration in the Middle-East, cf. El-Ahdab and El-Adhab (2011), p. 5; Schacht (1961), p. 8; Walkin (2008), p. 16.

  185. 185.

    Kleinheisterkamp (2009b), p. 105; Kleinheisterkamp (2009a), p. 828.

  186. 186.

    Basedow (2004), p. 304; Michaels and Kamann (2001), p. 310; Hopt (2009), § 92c, para. 12.

  187. 187.

    Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), 26 January 2005, 3 Ob 221/04b, YB Comm. Arb. XXX (2005), 421; Nigerian National Petroleum Corp v IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 89 (EWCA); Kr­ll in: B­ckstiegel et al. (Eds.) (2015), § 1061, para. 46.

  188. 188.

    Cf. supra 170 (Germany), 176 (France), 191f (England).

  189. 189.

    Cf. supra 186.

  190. 190.

    See supra 75 regarding the obstacles for transferring this standard to post-award review.

  191. 191.

    Cf. supra 216.

  192. 192.

    Cf. Poudret and Besson (2007), paras. 938, 941 for the phrase ‘contextual approach’ with reference to the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785 (EWCA).

  193. 193.

    Mayer and Sheppard (2003), p. 262.

  194. 194.

    Including the following 9 arbitrators which Chambers & Partners ranked among the 35 ‘Most In Demand Arbitrators – Global-wide’ in 2015: Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Charles N. Brower, Bernardo Cremades, Yves Derains, Bernard Hanotiau, Pierre Mayer, V. V. Veeder, David Williams, see Ghosh et al. (2015), p. 22ff.

  195. 195.

    Cf. supra 76ff.

  196. 196.

    Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones [2009] ECR I-9579, para. 53; C-76/10, Pohotovost’ [2011] ECR I-11561, paras. 51, 53; cf. also Case C-243/08 Pannon v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713, paras. 32, 37.

  197. 197.

    Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v Benetton [1999] ECR I-3055, Opinion of AG Saggio, para. 42.

  198. 198.

    E.g. ICC Award 7134/1995, YB Comm. Arb. XXIII (1998), 49, 60 (rejecting the qualification of a distributor as commercial agent under the Greek transposition of the Directive); ICC Award 16655/2011, 4 Int’l J. Arab Arb. 125, 177–181 (2012) (rejecting the qualification of a distributor as commercial agent under the French transposition of the Directive); Michaels and Kamann (2001), p. 310.

  199. 199.

    The published awards which address this question conclude that Art. 18 Commercial Agents Directive was not fulfilled, Bortolotti (2001), p. 59, n. 41; cf. e.g. ICC Award 8463/1996, 12 ICC Bull. 100, 105, 106 (2001).

  200. 200.

    It is possible in all those cases that the arbitral tribunal made a wrong assessment of the facts—yet this does not warrant the reversal of its decision in post-award review. The nature of post-award review would otherwise be approximated to that of an appeals process.

  201. 201.

    Paulsson (2013), p. 214; cf. van den Berg (1981), p. 269; Berger (1992), p. 16.

  202. 202.

    Hilbig (2006), p. 71.

  203. 203.

    Cf. supra 142ff.

  204. 204.

    A lack of sufficient reasoning in and of itself justifies annulment under the arbitration law of Born (2014), pp. 3274–3275.

  205. 205.

    Cf. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), paras. 22-071ff in relation to EU competition law.

  206. 206.

    Cf. ibid para. 22-071.

  207. 207.

    As was apparently possible in the case Fern Computer Consultancy Ltd v Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis Solutions Inc Fern Computer Consultancy Ltd v Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis Solutions Inc [2014] EWHC 2908 (Ch), cf. supra 135.

  208. 208.

    Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken (Germany), 30 May 2011, 4 Sch 03/10, SchiedsVZ 2012, 47, 49; Gater Assets Ltd v Nak Naftogaz Ukrainiy [2007] EWCA Civ 988; Otto and Elwan in: Kronke et al. (eds) (2010), Art. V (2), 348 with reference to Bezirksgericht Zürich (Switzerland), 17 July 2003, YB Comm. Arb. XXIX (2004), 819, 828; Adolphsen in: Krüger and Rauscher (Eds.) (2013), Art. II UNÜ, para. 66; cf. Kröll and Kraft in: Böckstiegel et al. (Eds.) (2015), § 1059 ZPO, para. 50.

  209. 209.

    Cf. supra 232f.

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    Jan Engelmann

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Engelmann, J. (2017). Preferable System of Review Regarding Adherence to Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive. In: International Commercial Arbitration and the Commercial Agency Directive. International Law and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47449-6_5

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