Abstract
After Ingmar, parties cannot evade the mandatory regime of Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive before a Member State court by virtue of a choice of law clause alone. Therefore, parties can and in fact were expected to further collateralise their choice of law clause with a choice of forum clause in favour of a forum which they expect to uphold their choice of law as an obvious response to Ingmar. This type of ‘tandem’ of a choice of law and an arbitration clause will enable parties to evade the mandatory regime of Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive only to the extent to which arbitrators can mitigate the effects of Ingmar and decide the dispute in line with the parties’ original agreement. Whether, and, if so, how, arbitrators must respect overriding mandatory provisions is an equally classic and contentious question in the study of international commercial arbitration.
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Notes
- 1.
Roth (2002), p. 382.
- 2.
- 3.
Cf. the reference throughout Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB).
- 4.
One of the disputed questions between the parties was whether the English party satisfied the requirements to be a commercial agent under the English transposition of the Commercial Agents Directive. The High Court held that the party could plausibly be seen as a commercial agent, cf. Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB), paras. 58–61. The qualification of commercial agent is particularly daunting in the United Kingdom. Unlike, for example, in Germany, there does not exist a social group identifiable as such, cf. Randolph et al. (2000), p. 671.
- 5.
Like its Quebecoise and Californian counterparts, the law of Ontario does not grant indemnity or compensation after the termination of commercial agency contracts.
- 6.
SI 1993 No. 3053 as amended by SI 1993 No. 3137 and SI 1998/2868.
- 7.
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB), para. 73.
- 8.
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc, 24 June 2010, 2010 ONSC 3364, para. 18.
- 9.
ibid paras. 5, 16, 17.
- 10.
Renner (2011), p. 111.
- 11.
ICC Award 6379/1990, YB Comm. Arb. XVII (1992), 212–220; ICC Award 6752/1991, YB Comm. Arb. XVIII (1993), 54–57 (in both awards the choice of Italian law impeded the application of Belgian provisions on indemnity payments).
- 12.
ICC Award 12045/2003, Clunet 2006, 1434, cf. also ICC Award 9032/1998, 12 ICC Bull. (2001), 123, 125: ‘Cependent, les parties privées restent libre de choisir une directive communautaire en tant que loi, ou en tant que loi “intégrative” de leur relation contractuelle.’
- 13.
Cf. infra 180f for details on the Belgian transposition.
- 14.
ICC Award 8161/1995, ICC Bull. 2002, 86; ICC Award 8177/1995, ICC Bull. 2002, 89; cf. Beulker (2005), p. 78. In a recent analysis Renner has shown that in 31 ICC Awards which discussed the application of mandatory provisions of the lex causae, the mandatory provisions were ultimately applied in 26 cases, Renner (2011), p. 112.
- 15.
Cf. for example ICC Award 8817/1997, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 355, 366, para. 47. As the parties had not chosen an applicable law the arbitral tribunal applied the Commercial Agents Directive itself as it considered its provisions to be common to the countries where the two parties were established, i.e. Denmark and Spain.
- 16.
Cf. ICC Award 4132/1983, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 341–354 (accepting the applicability of Art. 85 EEC Treaty in spite of determining Korean law as the law applicable on the substance of the contract).
- 17.
- 18.
See Park (2005), p. 905: ‘Arbitration proceeds in the shadow of judicial power’; Greenawalt (2007), p. 105: ‘(…) and because arbitration always takes place in the shadow of the judicial review that a party may seek in a national court’. Regarding the Eco Swiss judgment see Blanke (2005), p. 175: ‘(…) the ECJ did not explicitly impose a duty on the arbitrator to raise ex officio the potential infringement of EC competition law, the net effect of the judgment was nonetheless that an arbitrator’s award could turn out to be unenforceable if he failed to give due consideration to the potential competition issues (…) In other words, given the arbitrator’s traditional duty to render an enforceable award, he would run the insurmountable risk of the unenforceability of his award if he ignores relevant competition law issues in the making of the award.’
- 19.
ICC 4131/1982, YB Comm. Arb. IX (1984), 134 pointing out that the tribunal ‘will assure itself that the solution is compatible with international public policy, in particular, in France’ i.e. the expected place of enforcement; cf. also ICC Award 8626/1996, Clunet 1999, 1073; ICC Award 8528/1996, YB Comm. Arb. XXV (2000), 341, para. 35; ICC Award 14046/2010, YB Comm. Arb. XXXV (2010), 241, para. 3.
- 20.
ICC Award 6320/1992, YB Comm. Arb. XX (1995), 62, para. 153.
- 21.
Renner (2011), p. 117.
- 22.
Cf. supra 6ff. The model cannot do without assumptions which in turn can be argued to be influenced by philosophical perspectives. The most critical of those relate to the utilitarian view that arbitrators will always decide in favour of the action which benefits themselves the most. See R. Posner’s laconic answer to the question of what appellate judges in the United States maximise: ‘The same thing as everybody else does.’: R. Posner (1993), p. 1.
- 23.
- 24.
For illustration cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 670, who provides an extensive game form for the comparable situation in the United States. Note that E. Posner does not address setting aside and enforcement proceedings separately.
- 25.
ibid; cf. also E. Posner and Voser (2000).
- 26.
E. Posner (1999), p. 668.
- 27.
As expected by E. Posner, cf. ibid.
- 28.
Cf. supra 122f, 134f.
- 29.
Cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 653.
- 30.
Let P r with remuneration r ϵ {high, low} and f for termination fees. It is assumed that the probability that the conditions under the transposition of Arts 17 and 18 Commercial Agents Directive are fulfilled is 0.5. Then \( {P}_l>{P}_h>{P}_l-f2>{P}_h-f2>0 \). Yet, P l without a duty to pay termination fees is a result that the market does not allow for, cf. supra 107ff.
- 31.
Cf. supra 109f.
- 32.
Let C r with remuneration r ϵ {high, low}. The risk averse commercial agent would prefer receiving termination fees over the opportunity to receive a higher total remuneration through a higher commission. It is assumed that the probability that the conditions for being granted termination fees is 0.5. For risk-averse commercial agents \( {C}_h + f/2>{C}_l + f/2>{C}_h>{C}_l>0 \). For risk-seeking commercial agents \( {C}_h + f/2>{C}_h > {C}_l + f/2>{C}_l>0 \).
- 33.
Cf. supra 107f.
- 34.
The commercial agent’s payoff in case of not agreeing to the arbitration agreement is therefore multiplied by α, with \( 0<\alpha <1 \).
- 35.
Muir Watt and Radicati di Brozolo (2004), p. 93.
- 36.
Let m represent the benefit of the court for having the transposition of Art. 17 Commercial Agents Directive effectively applied and let t represent the cost of judicial review. If the transposition remains unapplied without being detected the payoff is 0. Then: \( m>m-t>0 \).
- 37.
Muir Watt and Radicati di Brozolo (2004), p. 93: ‘Waning of the influence of mandatory rules is certainly one of the selling points of arbitration.’ Radicati di Brozolo has stated in a his witness statement before the Federal Court of Australia that there are two reasons for arbitrators to consider to override a choice of law and apply the mandatory rules of the third country. One reason is their concern for enforceability. He stated as the second reason that ‘(…) as a matter of policy it is recognised that arbitration should not be perceived as a means to avoid or circumvent the application of such mandatory rules.’ cf. Casaceli v Natuzzi SpA [2012] FCA 691 (29 June 2012). This concern for arbitration as an institution can be underweighted in this analysis. The impact of a single, confidential decision on the perception of arbitration at large has to be rated as too small to decisively impact a rational decision maker, cf. Rasmusen (2007), p. 10.
- 38.
As was observed by E. Posner, an arbitrator whose awards are always vacated by courts has little value for the parties, whereas an arbitrator who respects the mandatory rules but is never reversed at least confers the benefit of neutrality and cost savings: E. Posner (1999), p. 654.
- 39.
Let R ac with a \( a\ \in \) {uphold, override} and \( c\ \in \) {res judicata, no res judicata}. Then: \( {R}_{uj} > {R}_{oj}>{R}_{on}>{R}_{un}=0 \).
- 40.
Let δ with \( 0>\delta >1 \) represent the discount which the payoff for not agreeing to the arbitration clause suffers in view of the possibility that the principal will turn to another commercial agent with \( 0>\delta >1. \)
- 41.
Payoffs are \( \left({P}_l-f/2,\ \delta {C}_l+f/2,\ m-t,\ O\right) \). It is assumed that the conditions for being granted termination fees in the transposition of Arts 17 and 18 Commercial Agents Directive are fulfilled with a probability of 0.5.
- 42.
If the commercial agent is interested in dealing with the principal in another context, this assumption would have to be relaxed. He could also decide not to bring his claims but to settle with the principal, especially if pre-award review is costly and if the subsequent moves by the court and arbitrator could be predicted. The results of this settlement, however, would reflect the equilibrium payoffs determined in the model, cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 662.
- 43.
If the conditions in the transposition are fulfilled, the payoffs are \( \left({P}_h-f,\ {C}_h+f,\ m-t,\ 0\right) \). If they are not fulfilled, payoffs are \( \left({P}_h,\ {C}_h,\ m-t,\ 0\right) \).
- 44.
In that case payoffs are \( \left({P}_h-f,\ {C}_h+f,\ m-t,\ {R}_{o,j}\right) \).
- 45.
The result of the analysis of the annulment proceedings would be the same as the result for the enforcement proceedings in Round 5, cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 665.
- 46.
Again, the commercial agent could not initiate review. If the court never reviews awards he should never initiate review. If the court always gives res judicata effect to awards, he should always initiate review unless litigation costs are higher than the potential benefits, cf. ibid 662.
- 47.
If the conditions of the transposition of Art. 17 Commercial Agents Directive are fulfilled, granting res judicata will yield the following payoffs: (P h , C h , 0, R u,j ). If in that situation the court refuses to grant res judicata effect payoffs are \( \left({P}_h-f,\ {C}_h+f,\ m-t,\ {R}_{u,n}\right) \). If the conditions for termination fees are not fulfilled payoffs are (P h , C h , m, R o,j ) for granting res judicata effect and \( \left({P}_h,\ {C}_h,\ m-t,\ {R}_{o,n}\right) \) for refusing to do so.
- 48.
Aumann (1988), p. xi.
- 49.
Cf. Rasmusen (2007), p. 110.
- 50.
If p represents the probability which the court attaches to the arbitrator having overridden a choice of law in accordance with Ingmar, the probability which makes the court indifferent between the two actions is \( {p}^{*}=\left(m-2t\right)/\left(m-t\right) \). This means that the court will grant res judicata effect if \( p>{p}^{*} \). The court will not grant res judicata effect if \( p<{p}^{*} \) and \( m>2t \). If \( m<2t \) the court will grant res judicata effect despite \( p<{p}^{*} \); cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 659.
- 51.
cf. ibid.
- 52.
Cf. supra 144.
- 53.
As \( {R}_{uj} > {R}_{oj} \).
- 54.
As \( {R}_{o,n} > {R}_{u,n} \).
- 55.
There is no pure strategy subgame equilibrium for rounds 4 and 5 if \( p<{p}^{*} \) and \( m\ge 2t \) or if \( p<{p}^{*} \), cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 660.
- 56.
\( p>{p}^{*} \).
- 57.
\( m\ge 2t \) implies that \( m-t\ge \left(m-t\right)/2+\left(m-t\right)/2. \) All other payoffs in rounds 4 and 5 are not available to the court because if \( m\ge 2t \) the arbitrator would uphold the choice of law and the court would not grant res judictata effect in round 5.
- 58.
As \( {P}_l-f/2>{P}_h-f/2 \) , principals will not agree to arbitrate.
- 59.
Cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 660.
- 60.
\( m<2t \) implies that \( m-t<m/2 \), i.e. the payoff for refusing the referral is lower than the expected payoff of the referral, cf. ibid.
- 61.
\( {P}_l-f/2<{P}_h/2+{P}_h/2 \).
- 62.
For risk seeking commercial agents \( {C}_l+f/2<{C}_h/2+{C}_h/2 \).
- 63.
Cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 660.
- 64.
For risk-averse commercial agents \( {C}_l+f/2>{C}_h/2+{C}_h/2 \).
- 65.
Although \( {C}_l+f/2>{C}_h/2+{C}_h/2 \), if δ is small enough \( \delta {C}_l+f/2<{C}_h/2+{C}_h/2 \).
- 66.
High risk aversion implies that \( \left({C}_l+f/2\right)-{C}_h\Big) \) is too high to allow δ to compensate the difference.
- 67.
Cf. Rasmusen (2007), p. 66.
- 68.
Let q represent the probability that the court grants res judicata effect to the award. The model allows the conclusion that the probability that achieves indifference is \( {q}^{*}=\left({R}_{oj}-{R}_{un}\right)/\left({R}_{uj}-{R}_{un}\right) \). Letting \( {R}_{un}=0 \)., \( {q}^{*}={R}_{oj}/{R}_{uj} \), cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 660.
- 69.
The court will then review awards with a probability of p* in round 5 and the arbitrator will override the choice of law with a probability of q* in round 4.
- 70.
The expected payoff of a referral is \( 1/2\Big[\left({p}^{*}m+\left(1-{p}^{*}\right)(0)\right]+1/2(m)=\left(2{m}^2-3mt\right)/2\left(m-t\right) \). The payoff for refusing the referral is \( m-t \). Thus, the court will refer the parties to arbitration if \( m>2t \)., cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 661.
- 71.
For principals \( {P}_l-f/2<1/2\left[{p}^{*}\left({P}_h-f\right)+\left(1-{p}^{*}\right){q}^{*}{P}_h+\left(1-{p}^{*}\right)\left(1-{q}^{*}\right)\left({P}_h-f\right)\right]+1/2\left[{q}^{*}{P}_h+\left(1-{q}^{*}\right){P}_h\right] \) or \( {P}_l-\left({q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\right)f/2<{P}_h. \) This is because \( {P}_l-f/2<{P}_h \) and \( {q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\le 1 \). For risk-seeking commercial agents \( \delta {C}_l+f/2<1/2\left[{p}^{*}\left({C}_h+f\right)+\left(1-{p}^{*}\right){q}^{*}{C}_h+\left(1-{p}^{*}\right)\left(1-{q}^{*}\right)\left({C}_h+f\right)\right]+1/2\left[{q}^{*}{C}_h+\left(1-{q}^{*}\right){C}_h\right] \) or \( \delta {C}_l+\left({q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\right)f/2<{C}_h \). This is because for them \( {C}_l+f/2<{C}_h \) while \( {q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\le 1 \) (and \( 0>\delta >1 \)).
- 72.
For risk averse commercial agents \( {C}_l+f/2>{C}_h \) but \( {C}_l<{C}_h \). Hence, a low value of \( \left({q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\right) \) can satisfy \( \delta {C}_l+\left({q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\right)f/2<{C}_h \).
- 73.
\( \left({q}^{*}-{p}^{*}{q}^{*}\right) \) decreases with an increase of p*. p* increases with a decrease of t and an increase of m.
- 74.
Cf. supra 148, n. 32.
- 75.
Cf. supra 125ff, 128ff.
- 76.
Commercial agents will still have to face δ while principals as buyers in an oligopsony market will be able to easily substitute the commercial agent with another or with a completely different distributional arrangement.
- 77.
Cf. E. Posner (1999), p. 667.
- 78.
- 79.
E. Posner (1999), p. 660.
- 80.
Cf. ibid 667. E. Posner refers to n. 19 of the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mitsubishi, cf. also Guzman (2000).
- 81.
In this context, the lack of uniformity in the approaches among the Member States may not be confused with a mixed strategy. Parties can predict with sufficient certainty which courts will review their arbitration agreement and their arbitral award. The decisive jurisdiction is the one where the commercial agent carried on his activity for the principal. However, individually, the approach adopted by each Member State can potentially be interpreted as facilitating a PARTIAL ARBITRATION equilibrium.
- 82.
Cf. supra 125ff.
- 83.
The rule of law also forms one of the foundations of the EU according to Art. 2 TEU, cf. also Hilf and Schorkopf in: Nettesheim (Ed.) (2012), Art. 2 EUV, paras. 34, 35.
- 84.
Cf. Rasmusen (2007), p. 66.
- 85.
E. Posner assumes that the Supreme Court of the United States inadvertently created the conditions for an application of a mixed strategy in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614, 638 (1985). On the one hand the court held that parties should go forward and arbitrate claims which implicated the antitrust law of the United States as there was ‘no reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that international arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism’, para. 38. At the same time it expressed that it ‘would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy’ if ‘the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations’, n. 19. By speaking out of both sides of its mouth the court created the ambiguity which allows for the application of a mixed strategy, see E. Posner (1999), p. 667.
- 86.
In this respect the often quoted statement by Judge Burrough is apt: ‘Public policy is a very unruly horse and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.’ Richardson v Mellish, [1824-1834] All ER 258 (Common Pleas).
- 87.
Cf. Case 102/81 Nordsee v Reederei Mond [1982] ECR 1095, para. 14; Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, para. 32.
- 88.
See supra 71ff.
- 89.
Cf. supra 133ff.
- 90.
In fact, the assumption of mixed strategies being applied by courts is nothing unusual when modelling judicial behaviour, cf. e.g. Miceli and Coşgel (1994), p. 45.
- 91.
Cf. supra 148, n. 32.
- 92.
‘Where the commercial agency is undertaken by a company or legal person whose most recent annual accounts show that it has a paid-up capital exceeding the equivalent of 100,000 European units of account, or whose annual turnover exceeds 500,000 European units of account, the parties may derogate from the provisions of Articles 15 (4), 19, 21, 26 (2) and 30.’ as provided for in Art. 33 (1) of the Amendment to the proposal for a Council Directive to coordinate the laws of the Member States relating to (self-employed) commercial agents [1979] OJ C56/6.
- 93.
Cf. supra 109.
- 94.
Rosen/Willen, Risk, Return and Self-employment (Discussion Paper 2 July 2002) found that risk aversion is not the predominant consideration driving the decision between becoming self-employed and taking up a wage-earning job. Furthermore, they discovered a negative effect of risk aversion on choosing to become self-employed, yet did not detect enough to conclude anything concerning the causality of this relationship.
- 95.
For example, limited liability in tort is generally acknowledged for excessive risk-taking, Hansmann and Kraakman (1991).
- 96.
Cf. also the arguments put forward in Bellemare and Brown (2010).
- 97.
Pre-award review is typically triggered in such a scenario, i.e. a party ignoring the arbitration agreement and bringing a claim on the merits in the courts, cf. Lew et al. (2003), para. 14–33.
- 98.
- 99.
Those courts will have jurisdiction under the Member State’s procedural law if the arbitration agreement is deemed to have no effect, e.g. under § 21 Zivilprozessordnung (Germany); cf. Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 165.
- 100.
As was the case in the following cases, which are analysed in more detail infra 167ff, 182ff: Cour de cassation, (Belgium), 3 November 2011, Air Transat A.T. Inc. v Air Agencies Belgium S.A, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20111103-3 accessed 26 November 2016; Cour de cassation (Belgium), 16 November 2006, Van Hopplynus Instruments S.A. v Coherent Inc., Rev. dr. com. belge 2007, 889; Oberlandesgericht München (Germany), 17 May 2006, 7 U 1781/06, IPrax 2007, 322–324.
- 101.
Cf. Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB) para. 72: ‘It is the Distributor’s primary case that the Ontario arbitration Award is strictly irrelevant to the compensation claim, and that that must be so in respect of any non-EU arbitration award which does not apply mandatory provisions of EU law.’
- 102.
Cf. ibid para. 7: ‘The Licensor’s interest in the Award is to use it as a means of defeating the claim that the Distributor was bringing in England for compensation under the Regulations.’
- 103.
Born (2014), p. 3172ff.
- 104.
Cf. Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, para. 35.
- 105.
Commission of the European Communities, Report on the application of Article 17 of Council Directive on the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-Employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC), 23 July 1996, COM (1996) 364 final, 2; Küstner and von Manteuffel (1990), p. 297.
- 106.
Unlike Art. 19 Commercial Agents Directive this is not explicitly limited to those types of derogation that are detrimental to the commercial agent.
- 107.
Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, 18 September 1980, 2/3 O 18/80, IPrax 1981, 134–136 (German principal and commercial agent for the market in the United States); cf. also Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany), 26 February 1985, 3 AZR 1/83, NJW 1985, 2910, 2911 (Principal from Kansas, USA and sales agent for the UK market).
- 108.
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 30 January 1961, VII ZR 180/60, NJW 1961, 1061, 1062.
- 109.
- 110.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 165.
- 111.
Oberlandesgericht München, 17 May 2006, 7 U 1781/06, IPrax 2007, 322–324.
- 112.
Landgerichtgericht München, 5 December 2005, 15 HKO 23703/04, available at http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/lg-münchen-i-az-15-hko-23703-04-datum-2005-12-05-id660 accessed 26 November 2016.
- 113.
For implications of the translation of ‘naheliegende Gefahr’ cf. Rühl (2007b), p. 894, n. 6.
- 114.
Oberlandesgericht München, 17 May 2006, 7 U 1781/06, IPrax 2007, 322, 324.
- 115.
Cf. the critique by Quinke (2007), p. 249.
- 116.
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 5 September 2012, VII ZR 25/12, BeckRS 2012, 20587; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163–166.
- 117.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 164: ‘Es besteht daher nicht nur die naheliegende Gefahr, dass die Gerichte in Virginia das zwingede europäische und deutsche Recht nicht zur Anwendung bringen werden (…) dies ist vielmehr als sicher zu erwarten nachdem in Ziff. 10 des Vertrages zwischen den Parteien diese einen Ausgleichsanspruch ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen haben.’
- 118.
Bundesgerichtshof, (Germany), 5 September 2012, VII ZR 25/12, BeckRS 2012, 20587: ‘(…) wenn wie hier feststeht, dass das Gericht des Drittstaates dem Handelsvertreter keinen Ausgleichsanspruch gewähren wird.’.
- 119.
Bundesgerichtshof, ibid para. 6.
- 120.
Quinke (2007), pp. 249, 253; Dathe (2010), p. 2199 (both requiring certainty after an analysis in light of Art. V (2) (b) New York Convention); Rühl (2007b), p. 899 (requiring ‘sufficient certainty’ after an analysis of the conflict of laws rules likely to be applied in arbitration); Kleinheisterkamp (2009), p. 114 (letting reasonable foreseability suffice but allowing for exceptions); cf. for choice of court agreements Weller (2005), p. 184.
- 121.
- 122.
- 123.
- 124.
BT-Drucksache 13/5274, 34; cf. also Hausmann (2011), para. 398.
- 125.
Kröll (2009), para. 16–62.
- 126.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 29 December 2011, 5 U 126/11, IHR 2012, 163, 165.
- 127.
von Schlabrendorff and Sessler in: Böckstiegel et al. (Eds.) (2015), § 1055 para. 30 with reference to Bundesgerichtshof, 7 January 1971, VII ZR 160/69, NJW 1971, 986, 987.
- 128.
Münch in: Krüger and Rauscher (Eds.) (2013), § 1055, para. 31.
- 129.
von Schlabrendorff and Sessler in: Bckstiegel et al. (Eds.) (2015), § 1055 para. 30.
- 130.
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 27 February 1969, KZR 3/68, NJW 1969, 978, 979; Oberlandesgericht Thüringen, 8 August 2007, 4 Sch 03/06, SchiedsVZ 2008, 44, 46.
- 131.
This can be said with certainty for disputes involving a party from Germany and a party from the US. Art. VI (2) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany only allows review with regard to potential public policy violations.
- 132.
Owing to the decisive influence of German law on the indemnity regime of the Commercial Agents Directive, the historical understanding of §§ 89b Handelsgesetzbuch is influential for the interpretation of Art. 17 (2). In this context, the protective function of indemnity has always been emphasised, cf. BT-Drs. I/3856, 33; BT-Drs. 7/3918, 7; Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany), 22 August 1995, 1 BvR 1624/92, NJW 1996, 381.
- 133.
- 134.
- 135.
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 11 February 1977, I ZR 185/75, NJW 1977, 896, 897; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 6 February 1985, I ZR 175/82, NJW 1985, 3076, 3077; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 29 March 1990, I ZR 2/89, NJW 1990, 2899, 2890; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 10 July 1996, VIII ZR 261/95, NJW 1996, 2867, 2868.
- 136.
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 4 June 1992, IX ZR 149/91, NJW, 1992, 3096, 3101; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 22 June 1983, VII ZB 14/82, NJW 1984, 568, 570; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 20 March 1963, VIII ZR 130/61, NJW 1963, 1200, 1200–1201.
- 137.
Cf. supra 161ff.
- 138.
- 139.
Rühl (2007a), p. 748.
- 140.
ibid 752.
- 141.
Saintier (2002), p. 116.
- 142.
Cour de cassation (France), 28 November 2000, Allium v Alfin et Groupe Inter Parfums, Clunet 2001, 511–523.
- 143.
The Cour de cassation had to rule on a choice of law clause in a contract between a French commercial agent and an American company for the distribution of perfumes in Europe and Israel. The choice of law was in favour of the law of New York, which does not provide for indemnity or compensation payments. In the proceedings it was alleged that the commercial agent’s commission was particularly high to account for the implicit waiver of compensation; cf. Cour de cassation (France), 28 November 2000, Allium v Alfin et Groupe Inter Parfums, Clunet 2001, 511–523.
- 144.
Delvolvé et al. (2009), p. 89.
- 145.
- 146.
Especially in the realm of international arbitration, see Erauw (2005), p. 84.
- 147.
Schwarz assumes that the Cour de cassation was not award of Ingmar, see Schwarz (2002), p. 52.
- 148.
Cour de cassation, Droit des Contrats et Quasi-Contrats (2000) Rapport de la Cour de cassation 367, 367.
- 149.
Kling and de Hurtut Giovanni (1997), p. 22.
- 150.
Juris-Classeur Civil Code/Jobard-Bacheller & Train, Art. 3: fasc. 42 (30 April 2010), para. 26.
- 151.
See supra 34.
- 152.
Cour d’appel Versailles (France), 14 October 2004, Casa Milano Internacional v Société Loris Azzaro Parfums, JCP èd. e., 2004, 2002; Cour de cassation (France), 22 October 2008, Monster Cable Products inc. v Audio Marketing Services, Rev. Crit. DIP 1998 (1), 69–70; Reinmüller and Bücken (2013), p. 92.
- 153.
Cour de cassation (France), 22 October 2008, Monster Cable Products inc. v Audio Marketing Services, Rev. Crit. DIP 1998 (1), 69–70; Cour de cassation (France), 8 July 2010 Doga v HTC Sweden, Dalloz 2010, 1797; cf. Reinmüller and Bücken (2013), p. 92.
- 154.
Muir Watt (2010), p. 267.
- 155.
Kling and de Hurtut Giovanni (1997), p. 26.
- 156.
Cf. Cour de cassation (France), 7 June 2006, Maritime Jules Verne v American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Rev. arb., 2006, 945; cf. for further evidence Fouchard, Cour de cassation (France), 5 January 1999, Zanzi v de Coninck, Rev arb. 1999, 262; regarding Art. 1448 NCPC in general cf. supra 33ff.
- 157.
Cour d’appel Paris (France), 16 February 1989, Almira Films v Pierret ès-q, Rev. arb. 1989, 711; Cour de cassation (France), 21 May 1997, Renault v V 2000 (formerly Jaguar France), Rev. arb. 1997, 537, cf. also English translation in Born (2015), pp. 221ff.
- 158.
Cour d’appel Paris (France), 14 October 1993, Société Aplix v Société Velcro, Rev. Arb. 1994, 165.
- 159.
- 160.
Cf. Art. 1504 NCPC.
- 161.
Delvolvé et al. (2009), para. 349.
- 162.
Cf. ibid para. 348. On the res judicata effect of arbitral awards in French arbitration law in general cf. Veillard (2012).
- 163.
As was the case in the two decisions analysed below.
- 164.
- 165.
ICC Award 12045/2003, Clunet 2006, 1434, 1435.
- 166.
Cf. infra 180f.
- 167.
In doing so the Cour de cassation relied inter alia on the European Convention, cf. supra 81.
- 168.
Cour d’appel Paris (France), 24 November 2005, Société BVBA Interstyle Belgium v Société Cat et Co, Rev. arb., 2006, 717, 717. The Cour d’appel used a standard formula to refuse to look into the merits of an award which can also be found in e.g. Cour d’appel Paris (France), 5 April 1990, Courrèges Design v Andre Courrèges, Rev. arb. 1992, 110; Cour d’appel Paris (France), 20 June 1996, P.A.R.I.S. v Razel, Rev. arb. 1996, 657; Cour d’appel Paris (France), 14 June 2001, Compagnie commerciale André v SA Tradigrain France, Rev. arb. 2001, 773.
- 169.
The choice of Swedish law is not evident from the decisions but is inferred from the fact that the commercial agent only objected to the way the Swedish law was applied but not to the mere fact that it was applied at all.
- 170.
Cour d’appel Paris (France), 6 December 2007, de Prémont v Trioplast AB, Rev. arb. 2007, 934–935.
- 171.
Cour de cassation (France), 11 March 2009, de Prémont v Trioplast AB, Rev. arb. 2009, 240–241.
- 172.
Cour d’appel Paris (France), 24 November 2005, Société BVBA Interstyle Belgium v Société Cat et Co, Rev. arb., 2006, 717, 717.
- 173.
Cf. supra 52.
- 174.
Cour d’appel Versailles, 2 October 1989, Société des Grands Moulins de Strasbourg v Société Compagnie Continentale France, Rev. Arb. 1990, 115, 120; Derains (2001), p. 817.
- 175.
Cour d’appel Versailles (France), 2 October 1989, Société des Grands Moulins de Strasbourg v Société Compagnie Continentale France, Rev. Arb. 1990, 115, 120.
- 176.
Cour de cassation (France), 24 March 1998, Sociéte Selenium v Directeur general des Impôrts, Bull. Civ. 1998, IV N° 115.
- 177.
- 178.
Cf. supra 158.
- 179.
“(…) limitations on the scope of the review of international arbitral awards such as those under French law (…) namely the flagrant nature of the infringement of international public policy and the impossibility of reviewing an international arbitral award on the ground of such an infringement where the question of public policy was raised and debated before the arbitral tribunal — are contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law.”, Case C-567/14 Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH & Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH [2016] EU:C:2016:177, Opinion of AG Wathelet, para. 58. This was particularly astonishing since the level of scrutiny did not play an immediate role in the question referred by the Cour d’appel de Paris request. Unfortunately, the Court did not address the French level of scrutiny but merely the referred question which concerned EU Competition Law, cf. Case C-567/14 Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH & Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH [2016] EU:C:2016:526.
- 180.
Loi du 13 avril 1995 relative au contrat d’agence commerciale, Moniteur belge, 2 June 1995, 15621.
- 181.
Loi portant insertion du livre X ‘Contrats d’agence commerciale, contrats de coopération commerciale et concessions de vente’ dans le Code de droit économique, et portant insertion des définitions propres au livre X, dans le livre Ier du Code de droit économique, Moniteur belge, 28 April 2014, 35053.
- 182.
Commission, Report on the Application of Article 17 of Council Directive on the Co-ordination of the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC) COM (1996) 364 final, 5.
- 183.
- 184.
This approach was known in Belgian law under termination fees in the area of continuous and exclusive sales concessions. It was introduced with Article 4 Loi du 27 juillet 1961 (now Art. X.39 Code de droit économique): ‘Le concessionnaire lésé, lors d’une résiliation d’une concession de vente produi-sant ses effets dans tout ou partie du territoire belge, peut en tout cas assigner le concédant, en Belgique, soit devant le juge de son propre domicile, soit devant le juge du domicile ou du siège du concédant. Dans le cas où le litige est porté devant un tribunal belge, celui-ci appliquera exclusivement la loi belge.’ A comparable provision can be found in Art. 285 Commercial Code of Kuwait, cf. El-Ahdab and El-Adhab (2011), p. 316.
- 185.
The provision differs from the approach in Ingmar in that it focuses on the place of business and not on the area where the commercial agent provided his services. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap between the two criteria.
- 186.
As far as the choice of court agreements are concerned, it should be noted that the ECJ held in 2013 that Art. 4 (1) Brussels I Regulation ‘(…) must be interpreted as meaning that, where the defendant is domiciled in a Member State other than that in which the Court seized is situated, it precludes the application of a national rule of jurisdiction such as that provided for in Article 4 of Law of 27 July 1961 on Unilateral Termination of Exclusive Distribution Agreements of Indefinite Duration (…)’, Case 9/12 Corman-Collins, EU:C:2013:860, para. 23. The same must apply for Art. X.25 Code de droit économique. Due to its rather imprecise wording, it is questionable whether Art. X.25 Code de droit économique even grants exclusive jurisdiction to Belgian courts in the first place, cf. Erauw (2005), pp. 82–83.
- 187.
Fock (2002), p. 56.
- 188.
ibid 77.
- 189.
In addition to Art. X.19 and Art. X.25 outlined above, this also applies for the scope of application which Art. X.1 (2) extends to agency contracts for the supply of services.
- 190.
Cour de cassation (Belgium), 3 November 2011, C.10.0613.N, Air Transat v Agencies Air Belgium, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20111103-3 accessed 26 November 2016.
- 191.
Matray and Vidts (2012), p. 245.
- 192.
The Court referred to the provision’s identical predecessor in Art. 27 Loi du 13 avril 1995, which is no longer in force.
- 193.
Conclusions, C.10.0613.N, Air Transat v Agencies Air Belgium, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20111103-3 accessed 26 November 2016.
- 194.
- 195.
Franchisees enjoy a comparable protection under Art. 9 Loi du 19 decembre 2005 relative à l’information précontractuelle dans le cadre d’accords de partenariat commercial.
- 196.
Art. 7 Loi du 27 julliet 1961.
- 197.
- 198.
In the Van Hopplynus case involving the choice of Californian law in combination with an arbitration clause for arbitration in accordance with the AAA rules, the Belgian Cour de cassation expressed in an obiter dictum that parties cannot be referred to arbitration per se if the arbitral tribunal do not have to apply the Loi du 27 julliet 1961 (cf. Cour de cassation (Belgium), 16 November 2006, Van Hopplynus Instruments S.A. v Coherent Inc., Revue Belge de Droit Commercial 2007, 889). In a different case in 1988, the lower courts had refused to refer the parties to arbitration because they had no guarantee whatsoever that the arbitral tribunal would apply the 1961 Act and it was thus putting its respective rights at risk. The Cour de cassation approved this ruling, stating that the fact that the lower court had given some reasoning to the question sufficed in this instance (Cour de cassation (Belgium), 22 December 1988, Gutbrod Werke GmbH v Usinorp de Saint-Hubert et Saint Hubert Gardening, Journal des Tribunaux 1988, 458 (belg.)).Worth mentioning is also the earlier Audi NSU case, where obviously the court described the mission to be not to enforce those arbitration agreements that have the object and effect of leading to the application of a foreign law (cf. Cour de cassation (Belgium), 18 June 1979, Audi NSU v Adelin Petit S.A., Pasicrisie I 1979, 1260). In the Bibby Line case the parties had explicitly agreed to settle their disputes before the courts of Sweden and to have the Swedish courts apply the internationally mandatory provisions of Belgium. In this context, the Cour de cassation felt able to sweep aside the fears of uncertainty as to whether the Swedish courts would apply Belgian law (cf. Cour de cassation (Belgium), 2 February 1979, Bibby Line v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., PASICRISIE I 1979, 634 (belg.)).
- 199.
- 200.
Cour de cassation (Belgium), 5 April 2012, C.11.0430.N., United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, [2012] Pas. No 219, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20120405-2 accessed 26 November 2016; cf. Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare EU:C:2013:301, Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 22, n. 5.
- 201.
Cf. supra 35.
- 202.
Cf. Hollander (2014), p. 339.
- 203.
Keutgen (1984), p. 35.
- 204.
Hollander (2005) p. 45 cites the advocaat generaal from the Audi NSU case (for the decision see Cour de cassation (Belgium), 18 June 1979, Audi NSU v Adelin Petit S.A., Pasicrisie I 1979, 1260) to the effect that ‘Toutefois, et c’est en cela, que les dispositions dites “imperatives” différent des dispositions d’ordre public, de telles clauses ne sont pas illicites en soi, elle ne touchent pas aux intérêts essentiels de l’Etat ou de la collectivité ou ne fixent pas, dans le droit privé, les bases juridiques sur lesquelles repose l’ordre économique ou moral de la société, de sorte que sie le risque de pression qui pourrait être exercé vient à disparaitre, la cause peut être valablement conclue.’; cf. Erauw (2005), p. 66; Kröll (2009), para. 16–36; Matray and Vidts (2012), p. 240.
- 205.
Cour de cassation (Belgium), 18 June 1979, Audi NSU v Adelin Petit S.A., Pasicrisie I 1979, 1260.
- 206.
Regarding the law applied on the question of arbitrability by Belgian laws cf. Kleinheisterkamp (2009), p. 95.
- 207.
Erauw (2006), p. 432.
- 208.
Cf. ibid.
- 209.
As reflected in the decisions leading up to the referral currently pending in front of the ECJ, Belgian courts are willing to consider that the minimum standard of the Directive (as implemented in Bulgaria) does not provide equivalent protection, cf. the decision by the Tribunal de Commerce de Antwerp cited in Cour de cassation (Belgium), 5 April 2012, C.11.0430.N., United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, [2012] Pas. No 219, available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=F-20120405-2 accessed 26 November 2016.
- 210.
SI 1993 No. 3053 as amended by SI 1993 No. 3137 and SI 1998/2868. For Northern Ireland see SI 1993/483 (NI), which is almost identical to the English transposition see Singleton (2010), p. 30.
- 211.
Art. 22 (3) and Recital 6 of the Commercial Agents Directive.
- 212.
The Law Commission, Report on the earliest version of a Proposed E.E.C. Directive on the Law Relating to Commercial Agents, (Law Com No 84) (Cmnd 6984, 1977) para. 53. The respective Proposal for a Council Directive to coordinate the Laws of the Member States relating to (self-employed) Commercial Agents, OJ 1964, 869/64, included a mandatory provision on indemnity in Art. 30, which was later replaced by Arts 17 and 18 Commercial Agents Directive. Art. 30 of the proposed version did not grant the opportunity to provide for compensation instead of indemnity.
- 213.
The Law Commission, Report on the Proposed E.E.C. Directive on the Law Relating to Commercial Agents, Law. Com. No. 84, Cmnd. 6984 (1977), para. 25.
- 214.
Tamarind International Limited and Others v Eastern Natural Gas (Retail) Limited and Eastern Energy Limited [2000] EuLR 708, para. 21; The Law Commission, Report on the Proposed E.E.C. Directive on the Law Relating to Commercial Agents (Law Com No 84) (Cmnd 6984, 1977) para. 12; Bogaert and Lohmann (2000), p. 671.
- 215.
Select Committee on the European Communities, 51st Report, Session 1976–1977.
- 216.
Cf. Watts and Reynolds (2014), para. 11-001, who refer to the Law Commission’s report as hysterical.
- 217.
What ultimately motivated the approval is uncertain. One potential influence could have been that the United Kingdom was holding the presidency of the Council of the European Communities at the time, cf. Hagemeister (2004), p. 10.
- 218.
Commission, Report on the Application of Article of Council Directive on the Co-ordination of the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC), COM (1996) 364 final, 7.
- 219.
- 220.
Williamson and Milligan (1997), p. 9.
- 221.
Hesselink et al. (2006), p. 146.
- 222.
Department of Trade and Industry, Guidance Notes on the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, Annex, No. 4.
- 223.
This places this case outside the strict classification of pre- and post-award review. While awards did already exist, the winning party had no interest in enforcing them. Most decisively for discussing this case in the section on pre-award, however, in its decision the High Court focused on Section 9 (4) Arbitration Act 1996, i.e. the key provision in pre-award review.
- 224.
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc, 24 June 2010, 2010 ONSC 3364, para. 18; cf. supra 142f.
- 225.
Green and Weiss (2011), p. 674.
- 226.
Cf. supra 142f.
- 227.
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB), para. 67.
- 228.
ibid para. 7.
- 229.
ibid para. 89. As the arbitration agreement was deemed null and void only ‘in so far as’ it purports to the arbitration of claims under Regulation 17, the High Court’s decision can be interpreted to carve out only this type of dispute and maintain the arbitration agreement’s validity for all other disputes. Therefore, despite the reference to the arbitration agreement becoming null and void, the decision could also be understood to imply a selective impact on the parties’ possibility to arbitrate their dispute, cf. supra 28.
- 230.
Cf. Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB), para. 88: ‘The decision in Ingmar requires this court to give effect to the mandatory provisions of EU law, notwithstanding any expression to the contrary on the part of the contracting parties. In my judgment this must apply as much to an arbitration clause providing for both a place and a law other than a law that would give effect to the Directive, as it does to the simple choice of law clause that was under consideration in Ingmar.’
- 231.
Fern Computer Consultancy Ltd v Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis Solutions Inc [2014] EWHC 2908 (Ch), [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (regarding Texas). When faced with the English commercial agent’s claim for compensation under the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, the issue before the High Court was whether permission to serve out of the jurisdiction to the Texan principal should be granted. The Court held that the choice of law and the choice of court clauses should not allow the principal to evade the Regulations’ mandatory provisions and the Court signalled that it was in principle willing to serve out of the jurisdiction ([54], [128]). In contrast to Tugendhat J in Accentuate v Asigra, however, Mann J found difficulties in finding a basis to do so in the applicable Practice Direction to CPR 6. Mann J proposed that compensation might be based on a breach of a statutory duty which can conceptually be a tort for the purposes of CPR Part 6 (sub-paragraph 9 of the Practice Direction). Neither party had argued that point, so the Court gave the parties an opportunity to make submissions on this point. No final decision has been made in this matter so far.
- 232.
Accentuate went on to successfully enforce the final award in Ontario, cf. Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc, 24 June 2010, 2010 ONSC 3364, 2011 ONCA 99 (CanLII).
- 233.
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB) para. 68.
- 234.
Ibid the High Court cites Section 103 (3) as follows: ‘Recognition or enforcement of the award may … be refused if …. it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award’ instead of the full text ‘Recognition or enforcement of the award may also be refused if the award is in respect of a matter which is not capable of settlement by arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award’ [emphasis added].
- 235.
- 236.
- 237.
- 238.
- 239.
Cf. also Case C-381/98 Ingmar [2000] ECR I-9305, para. 26.
- 240.
R v V [2008] EWHC (Comm) 1531, [2008] APP LR 07/03 para. 30.
- 241.
Again, at least all other transpositions are equivalent in the sense of Art. 1 (3) (a) Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993.
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Engelmann, J. (2017). Arbitral Tribunals and the Application of Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive After Ingmar . In: International Commercial Arbitration and the Commercial Agency Directive. International Law and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47449-6_4
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