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A Model-Based Approach to Secure Multiparty Distributed Systems

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Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation: Foundational Techniques (ISoLA 2016)

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Abstract

Within distributed systems with completely distributed interactions between parties with mutual distrust, it is hard to control the (illicit) flowing of private information to unintended parties. Unlike existing methods dealing with verification of low-level cryptographic protocols, we propose a novel model-based approach based on model transformations to build a secure-by-construction multiparty distributed system. First, starting from a component-based model of the system, the designer annotates different parts of it in order to define the security policy. Then, the security is checked and when valid, a secure distributed model, consistent with the desired security policy, is automatically generated. To illustrate the approach, we present a framework that implements our method and use it to secure an online social network application.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement ICT-318772 (D-MILS).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    no. TR-2014-6 on http://www-verimag.imag.fr/Rapports-Techniques,28.html.

  2. 2.

    In general, a third conflict resolution layer is used, however, it has a confined impact on information flow and is ommited here for the sake of simplicity of the presentation.

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Correspondence to Marius Bozga .

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Said, N.B., Abdellatif, T., Bensalem, S., Bozga, M. (2016). A Model-Based Approach to Secure Multiparty Distributed Systems. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds) Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation: Foundational Techniques. ISoLA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9952. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47166-2_62

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47166-2_62

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