International Report

Akman, Pınar

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46891-4_1

Pınar Akman⁵

Part of the book series: LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition ((LIDC))

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Abstract

This International Report aims to summarise and synthesise the responses received from the national LIDC groups in 21 jurisdictions. The national reports were prepared in response to a questionnaire prepared by the author of this International Report. The questionnaire sought to illicit views on abuse of a dominant position and globalisation in relation to two broad questions: first, whether there is consistency between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the notion of abuse and, second, whether there are too many restrictions on legal rights and business opportunities resulting from the prohibition of abuse of dominance. Given that not every jurisdiction that takes part in the LIDC and that has responded to the questionnaire adopts the terminology of abuse of a dominant position, the aim of the exercise is better expressed as the comparison of the different provisions and the different approaches to the issue of the anticompetitive exercise of unilateral market power. For ease of narrative, the concept of ‘abuse of a dominant position’ will be used to refer to such provisions even if they are not expressed in terms of abuse of a dominant position but in terms of monopolisation and similar concepts.

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Notes

1.
The following national groups submitted reports on the topic: Austria (G. Fussenegger, F. Schuhmacher and R. Tahedl); Belgium (P.M. Sabbadini); Brazil (M. Pallerosi); Bulgaria (A. Petrov); France (M. Boudou, C. Hubert, M. Isola, T. Marcerou, G. Poulakos, M. Vaz d'Ameida); Germany (M. Hartmann-Rüppel); Hong Kong (K. Fournier); Hungary (A. Papp); Italy (A. Camusso and C. De Cesero); Japan (T. Itoh); Lithuania (Y. Goldammer); Moldova (A. Svetlicinii); Netherlands (S. Beeston and M. Geilmann); Norway (J.C. Kongsli); Poland (A. Stawicki, B. Turno and T. Feliszewski); Spain (M. Cañadas Bouwen and J. Suderow); Sweden (T.O. Bergqvist); Switzerland (D. Cherpillod); Ukraine (N. Ivanytska); United Kingdom (J.D.M. Robinson); United States (D.I. Baker, K. Mereand-Sinha and M. Ferrari).
2.
For the criticisms, see eg E.M. Fox, ‘Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness’ (1986) 61 Notre Dame Law Review 981, 1004; P. Jebsen and R. Stevens, ‘Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union’ (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 443; B. Sher, ‘The Last of Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82’ (2004) 25 (5) ECLR 243; J. Kallaugher and B. Sher, ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82’ (2004) 25 (5) ECLR 263; D. Waelbroeck, ‘Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?’ (2005) 1 (1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 149; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 4^th ed, 2011) 281; R. O’Donoghue and J Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Publishing, 2^nd ed, 2013) 67 et seq.
3.
Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) cited in Baker et al., US, p. 7.
4.
See ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’, OJ 2009 C45, p. 7.
5.
See eg H. Schweitzer, ‘Recent developments in EU competition law (2006-2008): Single-firm dominance and the interpretation of Article 82’ (2009) (2) European Review of Contract Law 175, 184.
6.
See eg J. Killick and A. Komninos ‘Schizophrenia in the Commission’s Article 82 Guidance Paper: Formalism Alongside Increased Recourse to Economic Analysis’ (2009) (February-I) Global Competition Policy; Y. Katsoulacos, ‘Some Critical Comments on the Commission’s Guidance Paper on Art. 82 EC’ (2009) (February-I) Global Competition Policy.
7.
Baker et al. US, p. 1.
8.
Baker et al., US, p. 2. Indeed, it is pointed out that it might be lack of competition intervention that might restrict the business opportunities of undertakings other than the dominant undertaking; see Baker et al., US, p. 3.
9.
Baker et al., US, p. 2.
10.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 2; Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 2; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 4; Papp, Hungary, p. 4; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 1; Stawickiet al., Poland, p. 1; Boudou et al., France, p. 3; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 3; Robinson, UK, p. 6; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 3.
11.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 4.
12.
Itoh, Japan, p. 1.
13.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 4.
14.
These jurisdictions include Italy; Ukraine; Poland; Bulgaria; Japan; United Kingdom; Austria; Germany; Hungary; Switzerland; Lithuania; Spain; Brazil; Netherlands; Norway; Ukraine; Sweden; Moldova; Hong Kong (due to enter into force in December 2015).
15.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, pp. 1-2.
16.
See Act against Restraints of Competition Section 18 (4) cited in Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 2.
17.
Fussenegger et al., Austria, pp. 9-10.
18.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 2; Goldammer, Lithuania, pp. 2-3; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 3; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 2; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 2; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 4; Svetlicinii, Moldova, pp. 4-5.
19.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 1.
20.
Itoh, Japan, p. 1.
21.
See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v EC Commission, ECR 1979 461, para. 38.
22.
See eg United States v Aluminium Co of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir 1945).
23.
See Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, ECR 1991 I-3359, para. 60.
24.
This wording is more akin to the Australian provision; Fournier, Hong Kong, pp. 16-17.
25.
See eg Commission Guidance, para.13.
26.
For the definition of market power, see eg Commission Guidance, para. 11.
27.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 4; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 2; Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 5; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 4; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 4; Papp, Hungary, p. 5; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 2; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 2; Itoh, Japan, pp. 1 -2; Kongsli, Norway, p. 1; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 5; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 1; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 7; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 1; Boudou et al., France, p. 3; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 3; Switzerland, Cherpillod, p. 4; Robinson, UK, p. 7; Germany, p. 4; Hong Kong, pp. 2, 8, 15: the provisions state either ‘including, but not limited to’ or ‘in particular’. The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act prohibits two types of conduct: i. private monopolisation; ii. unfair trade practices; Itoh, Japan, p. 1.
28.
Baker et al, p. 6.
29.
Itoh, Japan, p. 1.
30.
Provisions which add to the Article 102 TFEU list are found in Bulgaria; Spain; Austria; Poland; France; Hungary; Germany.
31.
These are Moldova; Ukraine; Switzerland; Norway.
32.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 4.
33.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 2.
34.
Robinson, UK, p. 9; Boudou et al., France, p. 10.
35.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 5; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 3; Itoh, Japan, p. 1; Boudou et al., France, pp. 3 et seq.
36.
Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 1; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 3; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 6; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 2; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 3; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 5; Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 6; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 2; Papp, Hungary, pp. 4-7; Kongsli, Norway, pp. 2-3; Baker et al, US, p. 11.
37.
15 USC § 45.
38.
Baker et al, US, pp. 12-13.
39.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 5.
40.
Itoh, Japan, p. 2.
41.
Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1, Article 3(2) stipulates that Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.
42.
Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 3.
43.
Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 3.
44.
Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 7.
45.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 5.
46.
Fournier, Hong Kong, pp. 2, 8, 15.
47.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 5.
48.
See Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 7; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 5; Robinson, UK, p. 12; Kongsli, Norway, p. 4.
49.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 3.
50.
Fussenegger et al, Austria, p. 6.
51.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 7.
52.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 7.
53.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 5; Kongsli, Norway, pp. 3-4.
54.
Papp, Hungary, p. 8; Robinson, UK, p. 12; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 3.
55.
Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 6.
56.
Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 3; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 4; Kongsli, Norway, p. 5.
57.
See Hoffmann- La Roche, para. 91.
58.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 9.
59.
United States of Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 570-1 (1966) cited in Baker et al, US, p. 7.
60.
Baker et al, US, p. 5.
61.
For the distinction, see P. Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (Hart Publishing 2012), p. 6.
62.
See Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 6; Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 6; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 6; Papp, Hungary, p. 10; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 3; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 6; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 4; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 7; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 2; Boudou et al., France, p. 7; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 4; Robinson, UK, p. 15; Kongsli, Norway, p. 5; and Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 7; Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 7. In the Netherlands, there is no express distinction in the provision, but the distinction exists in the explanatory memorandum to the Competition Act; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 3.
63.
Baker et al, US, p. 9.
64.
Baker et al, US, p. 9. To prove attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must demonstrate: i. that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with ii. a specific intent to monopolize and iii. a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power; Spectrum Sports, Inc v McQuillan, 506 US 447, 456 (1993) cited in Baker et al, US, p. 5. Conspiracy to monopolize requires proof of concerted action as in a cartel violation, and intent to achieve a monopoly; see American Tobacco Co v United States, 328 US 781 (1946) cited in Baker et al, US, p. 5.
65.
Fournier, Hong Kong, p. 14.
66.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 5.
67.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 5.
68.
Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 5. The new Act, however, does contain a prohibition of ‘arbitrarily increasing profits’; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. Brazil 6.
69.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 5.
70.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 5.
71.
Papp, Hungary, p. 2.
72.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 2
73.
Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 1.
74.
See Ivanytska, Ukraine, pp. 3, 5-6.
75.
‘Exclusion’ is understood to cover activity that has an artificial character which exceeds the normal competition measures in the sense that it could create, maintain and strengthen its own market power, and such activity has an effect to make it extremely difficult for a competitor to enter into (or continue competition in) the relevant market; whilst ‘control’ is understood to refer to restricting the counterparty in some way and to deprive it of the freedom to make its own decision; Itoh, Japan, p. 3.
76.
Itoh, Japan, p. 3.
77.
Papp, Hungary, pp. 9-10.
78.
Papp, Hungary, p. 9.
79.
See eg Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 6; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 3; Papp, Hungary p. 12; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 7.
80.
Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 4; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 5.
81.
Kongsli, Norway, p. 5.
82.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 4; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 7.
83.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 8.
84.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 6; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 2; Kongsli, Norway, p. 6; Stawicki et al., Poland p. 4.
85.
See Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 8; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 6; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 5; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 4. The practice appears to be different in Poland, Spain and Austria where the courts use the categorisation in their judgments; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 4; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 5; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 7.
86.
See eg Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 4-5; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 7; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 3; Boudou et al., France, p. 8; Fussenegger et al., Austria, pp. 7-8.
87.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 6.
88.
See Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 14; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 10; Itoh, Japan, p. 5; Bergqvist, Sweden, pp. 2-3; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 8; Kongsli, Norway, p. 8; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 4; Boudou et al., France, p. 17; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 5; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 11; Robinson, UK, pp. 29-30.
89.
See Papp, Hungary, p. 11.
90.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 9; Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 10; Sabbadini, Belgium, pp. 7–8; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 6; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 4; Itoh, Japan, p. 4; Kongsli, Norway, p. 6; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 3; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 5; Robinson, UK, p. 15; Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 7; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 5-6; Papp, Hungary, pp. 13-14; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 8; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 6; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 5.
91.
See text around n. 80 and eg Boudou et al., France, pp. 8-9.
92.
As stated in the reports: Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 7, Papp, Hungary, p. 14 and Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 9.
93.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 6.
94.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 7; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 3; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 6 (in the context of predatory pricing).
95.
See Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 9; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 5; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 3.
96.
Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 6.
97.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, pp. 10-12.
98.
See Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 10; Papp, Hungary, p. 16; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 4.
99.
See Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, pp. 13-14.
100.
See Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 6-9; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 8; Itoh, Japan, pp. 4-7; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 7; Baker et al., US, pp. 4-5.
101.
In the UK, nine decisions concerning unilateral conduct and three decisions concerning agreements were taken in a 5 year period; Robinson, UK, pp. 29. In Norway, the competition authority has only ever intervened twice concerning unilateral conduct and twice concerning anticompetitive agreements since the introduction of the legislation in 2004; Kongsli, Norway, p. 7.
102.
Note that these reports did not discuss this question or did not have sufficient information to rely on concerning case law: Moldova, Italy, Brazil, Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria, Spain and Germany.
103.
Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 5.
104.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 9-10; Papp, Hungary, pp. 16-17; Itoh, Japan, p. 5; Fussenegger et al., Austria, pp. 10-11; Cherpillod, Switzerland, pp. 8-10; Boudou et al., France, pp. 10-16.
105.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 9; Goldammer, Lithuania, pp. 5-8; Kongsli, Norway, p. 7.
106.
Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 7; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 1; Robinson, UK, p. 5; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 12; Fournier, Hong Kong, p. 11.
107.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 10; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 9; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 8; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 11; Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, pp. 10-11; Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, pp. 14-15.
108.
See eg Itoh, Japan, p. 7; Ivanytska, Ukraine, pp. 8-9; Stawicki et al., Poland, pp. 6 -7.
109.
Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 1; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 12; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 8.
110.
Baker et al, US, pp. 1; 14.
111.
Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 13; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 11; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 10; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 7; Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 7; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 12; Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 11.
112.
Robinson, UK, pp. 4-5.
113.
Goldammer, Lithuania, pp. 9-10.
114.
Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 14; Boudou et al., France, p. 18.
115.
Baker et al, US, p. 15.
116.
Baker et al, US, p. 15.
117.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 3, 5, 11; Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 10; Papp, Hungary, p. 19; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 14; Boudou et al., France, p. 8, 21; Robinson, UK, p. 13; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 13. In the UK, the Competition Act 1998 section 60 obliges the national courts to apply the domestic competition rules (having regard to any relevant differences between the provisions concerned) in a manner which is consistent with the application of those rules by the CJEU even where the EU competition rule are not applicable (ie there is no effect on trade between Member States).
118.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 12.
119.
Bergqvist, Sweden, pp. 4, 7.
120.
Pallerosi, Brazil, pp. 7-8.
121.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 13.
122.
Papp, Hungary, p. 19.
123.
Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 16.
124.
Itoh, Japan, pp. 7-8.
125.
On the role of consumer welfare in EU case law and decisional practice on Article 102 TFEU, see eg P. Akman, ‘“Consumer Welfare” and Article 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric’, (2009) 32 (1) World Competition 71.
126.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 11.
127.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 15.
128.
These include Papp, Hungary, p. 17 (‘protect competition in the interest of long-term consumer welfare’); Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 10 (‘ensure effective and free competition and thus consumer welfare’); Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 4 (‘promote effective competition in the private and the public sector to the benefit of consumers’); Stawicki et al., Poland, p. 7 (‘competition enforcement, i.e. protection of competition, is seen as a mechanism to ensure the efficiency of business processes and the optimal allocation of resources, on the one hand, and the means of safeguarding public interest of consumers, on the other’); Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 17 (‘to ensure that market players can operate within an environment which allows them to innovate and operate efficiently, based on the assumption that the ultimate beneficiary of normal competitive processes are consumers’); Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 8 (‘protection of consumers’ welfare’); Kongsli, Norway, p. 9 (special consideration of the interests of consumers).
129.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 12.
130.
Baker et al, US, p. 19.
131.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, pp. 13-14; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 13.
132.
See eg Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 10; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 10; Cañadas Bouwen and Suderow, Spain, p. 13; Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 12; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 12; Boudou et al., France, p. 22; Papp, Hungary, p. 19.
133.
See eg Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, pp. 3, 11 (a brochure mostly relying on the Commission Guidance); Kongsli, Norway, p. 8 (a fact sheet); Svetlicinii, Moldova, pp. 16 (Regulation on determination of dominant position and assessment of abuse of dominant position); Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, pp. 11-12 (one predatory pricing and one sectoral guideline).
134.
Robinson, UK, pp. 5 and 13; Fournier, Hong Kong, pp. 1, 7.
135.
Papp, Hungary, p. 20; Ivanytska, Ukraine, p. 1 (n. 2) (practitioner reliance on the Guidance); Kongsli, Norway, p. 9; Svetlicinii, Moldova, p. 16; Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 8 (more the authority rather than the courts); Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 17.
136.
Camusso and De Cesero, Italy, p. 14; Goldammer, Lithuania, p. 10; Petrov, Bulgaria, p. 17.
137.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, pp. 12-13.
138.
Baker et al, US, p. 2.
139.
See Baker et al, US, p. 3.
140.
Itoh, Japan, p. 8.
141.
Papp, Hungary, p. 18.
142.
Bergqvist, Sweden, p. 5; Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 18.
143.
Beeston and Geilmann, Netherlands, p. 18.
144.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 11; Boudou et al., France, p. 23.
145.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 13.
146.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 13.
147.
Hartmann-Rüppel, Germany, p. 13.
148.
Sabbadini, Belgium, p. 11; Fussenegger et al., Austria, p. 14; Pallerosi, Brazil, p. 8.
149.
Kongsli, Norway, p. 10; Ivanytska, Ukraine, pp. 1-2 and 8- 9.
150.
Cherpillod, Switzerland, p. 14.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank all the national reporters for their contributions. This report has been based entirely on the information collated from the national reports with no reference to external sources regarding jurisdiction-specific issues unless otherwise indicated by the references. The author is grateful to Magali Eben for research assistance in preparation of the report.

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Pınar Akman

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Bruce Kilpatrick
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Pierre Kobel

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Akman, P. (2017). International Report. In: Këllezi, P., Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P. (eds) Abuse of Dominant Position and Globalization & Protection and Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46891-4_1

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