Abstract
There is no doubt that development of any complex concept such as active system control (ASC) accompanied by method and analysis of possible implementation is a challenging business. This is especially true for complex systems with various, sometimes almost mutually exclusive, requirements. Transport as a whole is an example of such systems, as well as ground vehicles, aircraft, health-monitoring systems and safety-critical systems. The main concern is how best to modify, redesign, rearrange or adjust existing systems for an active system. That is why in the first chapter we addressed questions such as, “What is the object (aviation, aircraft)?” “What is active system control?” and how—at least initially—to implement the proposed active system control approach for a specific purpose, for example, safety.
Any good idea has its limits. Sometimes limits of implementation are technological, driven by market domination, feasibility, politics or existing regulations. Thus, even if we reduce our ambitions for active system control from a full-size implementation down to just an application of ASC for safety, active system safety to be exact, we need be aware of existing systems and regulations related to transport domain. The focus of this chapter is to address what the next steps might be to implement active system control effectively and efficiently.
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Authors and Affiliations
Functional Safety Standards Based Upon IEC 61508
Functional Safety Standards Based Upon IEC 61508
Functional Safety | |
IEC 61508 | Standard on functional safety, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEC_61508 |
IEC 61508 | Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related system |
Machinery | |
IEC 61511 | Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector (in USA: ANSI/ISA S84) |
IEC 62061 | Safety of machinery |
Railways | |
IEC 62278 / EN 50126 | Railways—Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) |
IEC/EN 50128 | Software, railway control and protection |
IEC/EN 50129 | Railway signalling |
Nuclear | |
IEC 61513 | Nuclear power plant control systems |
Avionics | |
RTCA DO-178C | North American avionics software “Software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification” |
RTCA DO-254 | North American avionics hardware |
EUROCAE ED-12B | European flight safety systems |
Automotive | |
ISO 26262 | Automobile functional safety |
ISO26262-1 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 1: Vocabulary |
ISO26262-2 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 2: Management of functional safety |
ISO26262-3 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 3: Concept phase |
ISO26262-4 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 4: Product development at the system level |
ISO26262-5 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 5: Product development at the hardware level |
ISO26262-6 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 6: Product development at the software level |
ISO26262-7 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 7: Production and operation |
ISO26262-8 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 8: Supporting processes |
ISO26262-9 | Road vehicles—Functional safety—Part 9: Automotive safety integrity level (ASI) oriented and safety-oriented analyses |
Medical | |
IEC 62304 | Medical device software |
ISO14971 | Medical devices—Application of risk management to medical devices |
EC/EN 50402 | Fixed gas detection systems |
DEF STAN 00-56 | Accident consequence (UK military) |
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Schagaev, I., Kirk, B.R. (2018). Active System Control and Safety Approach, and Regulation in Other Application Domains. In: Active System Control . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46813-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46813-6_2
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