Active System Control and Safety Approach, and Regulation in Other Application Domains

  • Igor Schagaev
  • Brian Robinson Kirk


There is no doubt that development of any complex concept such as active system control (ASC) accompanied by method and analysis of possible implementation is a challenging business. This is especially true for complex systems with various, sometimes almost mutually exclusive, requirements. Transport as a whole is an example of such systems, as well as ground vehicles, aircraft, health-monitoring systems and safety-critical systems. The main concern is how best to modify, redesign, rearrange or adjust existing systems for an active system. That is why in the first chapter we addressed questions such as, “What is the object (aviation, aircraft)?” “What is active system control?” and how—at least initially—to implement the proposed active system control approach for a specific purpose, for example, safety.

Any good idea has its limits. Sometimes limits of implementation are technological, driven by market domination, feasibility, politics or existing regulations. Thus, even if we reduce our ambitions for active system control from a full-size implementation down to just an application of ASC for safety, active system safety to be exact, we need be aware of existing systems and regulations related to transport domain. The focus of this chapter is to address what the next steps might be to implement active system control effectively and efficiently.


Safety critical systems Active safety Standardisation Regulations 


Active Safety

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Igor Schagaev
    • 1
  • Brian Robinson Kirk
    • 2
  1. 1.IT-ACS LtdStevenageUK
  2. 2.Robinson Systems Engineering LtdPainswickUK

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