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Mises and the Problem of Induction

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Was Ludwig von Mises a Conventionalist?

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Abstract

A rational reconstruction of Mises’ problem situation reveals that his primary epistemological concern is the problem of induction. Applying a regressive method, three major tenets of his philosophy of science and their implications can be identified: (1) Anti-naturalism, i.e., the postulate that there is no induction in the social universe, renders the efforts of the Historical School spurious. (2) Mises opines that his dualism concerning the psycho-physical problem, the purely methodological character of which is often overlooked, is incompatible with materialistic and physicalistic research in the social sciences. This involves a rejection of behaviorism. (3) Finally, all holistic, essentialist, and even many macroeconomic approaches contradict Mises’ individualism and are thus rejected. Further traits of Mises’ philosophy of science include realism, Wertfreiheit (value freedom), and a rejection of polylogism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    When Mises decided to start publishing his ideas about epistemology of economics in 1928 and 1929, the main features of his epistemological position were clearly recognizable, although they were not expressed as radically as later. Except for shifts of emphasis, Mises’ epistemological as well as his economic and political positions remained for the most part unaltered over the decades. This stability facilitates our investigations as we are not mainly interested in the psychological or sociological origins of Mises thoughts but in the content and implications of specific positions in the philosophy of social science. Therefore, we will – as most rational reconstructions – interpret the whole textual corpus (Mises, February 22, 1920, January 29, 1929, [1933] 2003, [1933] 2002, [1934] 2012, 1937, [1937] 2002, [1940, 1978] 2009, 1940, [1949] 1998, [1951] 2008, [1953] 1977, [1957] 2005, [1962] 2012, [1969] 2003, 1990; Mises and Greaves 2007) as an expression of one “monolithic” worldview. Remarks about slight variations over time will only be made in passing.

  2. 2.

    For the problematic use of the term “historicism”, see Section 3.2.

  3. 3.

    Mises writes “Sätze” in the original German version and intends to make use of them as elements in a chain of logical deduction (Mises 1978, 80). Therefore, the translation “sentences” seems preferable to “principles”. The latter is used in the translated version by Oost-Zinner, but principles typically inform scientific chains of deduction from a meta-level. Whenever we use “sentences”, these can be elements of an interpreted or an uninterpreted language, whereas “proposition” is what is expressed by an interpreted sentence.

  4. 4.

    Mises’ comments on the relationship between political motivations and the rejection of substantially universal laws (Mises [1969] 2003) indirectly affirm Hülsmann’s account.

  5. 5.

    Note that in some current philosophical discussions the meanings of “naturalism” and “anti-naturalism” differ and resemble what is called “monism” and “dualism” in Section 2.3. Using the terminology of Mises’ contemporaries seems more appropriate, even more so since Kaufmann, a regular attendant of Mises’ private seminar, explicitly expresses his intellectual indebtedness to Mises (Kaufmann [1936] 2014, 104). As for the relationship between Popper and the Austrian School, Long’s assessment as fellow-travelership suits it very well (2013, 62).

  6. 6.

    Kaufmann’s Methodenlehre ([1936] 2014) including a critical analysis of naturalistic behaviorism and anti-naturalistic introspectionism was carefully studied by Popper in 1937 (Hacohen 2002, 363–65). But while content-wise this becomes clearly noticeable in Popper’s influential respective treatise ([1944] 1957), which in effect entirely consists of a damnation of naturalistic and anti-naturalistic doctrines, Popper misses to mention Kaufmann by name. In comparison to Kaufmann’s and Popper’s criticisms of the presuppositions of both families of doctrines, Hayek’s discussion of the methods of the natural sciences and the social sciences ([1955] 1964) tends to be more partial toward anti-naturalism.

  7. 7.

    See (Vickers 2014) for a thorough exposition of the problem of induction, attempted solutions, and further reading.

  8. 8.

    See, for instance, (Mises [1957] 2005, 201).

  9. 9.

    Actually, it is predominantly the most difficult variant of the problem of induction that the classical conception refers to; namely cases where the conclusion is a substantially universal sentence. The distinction between formal and substantial universality is discussed in the appendix.

  10. 10.

    For a start, see (Vickers 2014) again. The sketch of the problem of induction presented above would require some amendments to do justice to some manifestations of Bayesianism and logical probability.

  11. 11.

    Elaborate versions of this argument can be found in Popper (1950a, 1950b, 1995).

  12. 12.

    It is not clear whether Mises is aware of Carl Menger’s insight that the impossibility of repeated observation and experiment is a nebulous argument against induction. From a logical point of view, it is irrelevant whether one observation or 798 observations are the basis of a generalization. See also (Milford 1989).

  13. 13.

    See, for instance, Mises ([1969] 2003, 12; [1933] 2003, lxxvii–lxxviii) for polemical remarks regarding Schmoller’s role in the Methodenstreit.

  14. 14.

    See Mises ([1957] 2005, 2; Rothbard 1960, 1961).

  15. 15.

    See, for instance, Mises ([1957] 2005, 188).

  16. 16.

    See, for example, Hoppe (1983); Hülsmann (2003).

  17. 17.

    One form of monism receives special attention in Mises’ discussion: He contends that Marxist materialism is necessarily insufficient to explain certain value judgments and thoughts on a materialistic basis (Mises [1962] 2012, 30–33). Mises’ treatment of ultimate givens as provisional stopping points could be interpreted as yet another influence of Mach on Austrian School economists, though less significant than Carl Menger’s use of the method of variation and Hayek’s theory of mind (Hayek 1999).

  18. 18.

    Mises could at least be aware of several variants of physicalism which were discussed in logical empiricism; for instance, physicalism as a choice of a particular language for all sciences (either the language of physics or a purified everyday language) or physicalism as a commitment to a scientific worldview or to an “empirical stance” (Van Fraassen 2002).

  19. 19.

    See also the similar (Mises [1962] 2012, 117).

  20. 20.

    In the published English version “monistisch” is translated with “ethical”. Obviously, this is intended to indicate the personal and content-related overlaps between the Monistenbund, the Ethische Gemeinde, and the “busy and obtrusive” (Mises [1949] 1998, 699) Vienna Circle.

  21. 21.

    The metaphysical question of “free will” is directly relevant for Mises’ epistemological foundation of theoretical social science just as little as for his utilitarian argumentation for libertarian politics. This may actually be different for natural rights libertarians like Nozick and Rothbard.

  22. 22.

    See, for instance, Rothbard (1980, 9).

  23. 23.

    The concept of demonstrated preference was developed by Rothbard ([1956] 1997). Whether Rothbard’s conception of preferences is in accord with Mises’ is still debated. So, too, are the asserted differences to Samuelson’s concept of revealed preferences. In recent years, particular interest has been dedicated to the question of realism about preference scales in Austrian economics (Hudik 2012), as well as to problems arising from Rothbard’s elimination of “indifference” from praxeology. Nozick (1977) and Caplan (1997, 1999) called attention to these problems; Block, Hoppe, and O’Neill suggest at least three different, in part combinable solutions (Block 1980; Block and Barnett 2010; Hoppe 2005; O’Neill 2010). For a Neo-Austrian evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of employing ultimate givens in Mises’ sense, see Hülsmann ([2002] 2003, 22–25).

  24. 24.

    The goal of each individual is to cross the thicket with the least possible effort. Therefore, she chooses a route already trampled down a bit, thereby trampling it down further. The same goes for the next individual, and so on. The unintended result is a trail through the thicket. For this classical example confer Hayek ([1955] 1964, 40–41).

  25. 25.

    See Long (2013, 54–56).

  26. 26.

    In Heath’s terms, Mises is no atomist like Hobbes, but a sophisticated methodological individualist like Weber. See Heath (2014).

  27. 27.

    By way of example, Mises disparages intuition of essences in Spann’s universalism (Mises 1940, 32, [1949] 1998, 41–43).

  28. 28.

    Considering Popper’s philosophical background assumptions, his more pluralistic view stands to reason. Since methodological individualism is by definition inappropriate in the natural sciences, they are in need for some other approach anyway. Unlike Mises, Popper hardly divides the natural sciences and the social sciences epistemologically. Hence, for a start the methodology of the natural sciences is a promising candidate for the social sciences. See Popper ([1906] 1997).

  29. 29.

    See Appendix for a sketch of the dichotomies analytic/synthetic, and a priori/a posteriori.

  30. 30.

    Mises critically discusses Weber’s theory of action and of rationality in considerable detail (Mises [1933] 2003).

  31. 31.

    Whereas his conceptual distinction between methodological and ontological individualism is ambiguous at times, Mises analytically separates political individualism with great intellectual sincerity. He remarks that the impracticability of methodological collectivism delights him politically, because as a result illusions of fine-tuning society that step by step inevitably lead to totalitarianism disappear. Epistemological analysis, however, must not be affected by political preferences (Mises [1949] 1998, 143–57).

  32. 32.

    See, for instance, Mises ([1962] 2012, 74–87).

  33. 33.

    Mises’ depiction of science vis-à-vis art and metaphysics is surprisingly reminiscent of formulations in the otherwise ostracized Vienna Circle. See, for instance, Mises ([1933] 2003, 42–50) and Carnap ([1932] 2004, 104–8) respectively. Furthermore, Schlick defends a methodological individualism analogical to Mises’, when he maintains that any reference to social collectives like classes, nations, parties, and states is only “a convenient way of talking”, abbreviating equipollent statements about individuals (Schlick 1934, 398).

  34. 34.

    Boettke and Coyne (2015b, 32) rationally reconstructs and lucidly reviews the relationship between individual action, interaction, and social institutions as envisaged from an Austrian perspective.

  35. 35.

    Stringent Austrians would make only extremely limited use of continuous curves throughout.

  36. 36.

    Alternative takes on the question of realism propose to remain neutral on the non-linguistic aspects of it, labeling them metaphysical pseudo-problems. In its radical form, this position is not restricted to scientific realism. See Friedman (2011); Psillos (2011).

  37. 37.

    See, for instance, Mises ([1927] 1985).

  38. 38.

    See McFalls (2007) for Weber and Section 4.4 for Mises.

  39. 39.

    In particular, the source of knowledge belongs to the context of discovery and thus cannot be used as a justification. We will make recourse to this in Chapter 6.

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  1. University of Vienna, Wien, Austria

    Alexander Linsbichler

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Linsbichler, A. (2017). Mises and the Problem of Induction. In: Was Ludwig von Mises a Conventionalist?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46170-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46170-0_2

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