Abstract
A major part of the debate in the philosophy of mathematics of the last forty years has been dominated by attempts at escaping the dilemma Paul Benacerraf suggested in “Mathematical Truth” (Benacerraf 1973).
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Paul Benacerraf Workshop (May 10-11, 2012, Paris, Collège de France/IHPST); at the European Epistemology Network Conference (Universities of Bologna and Modena & Reggio Emilia, June 28-30, 2012); at the ECAP8 (28.08–02.09, 2014, Bucharest). Many thanks to the audiences of those conferences for helpful comments. Special thanks go to Øystein Linnebo, Marco Panza, and Eva Picardi for fruitful discussions which led to several improvements.
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Sereni, A. (2016). A Dilemma for Benacerraf’s Dilemma?. In: Pataut, F. (eds) Truth, Objects, Infinity. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45980-6_5
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