Abstract
In spite of its enormous influence, Benacerraf’s dilemma admits no standard unanimously accepted formulation. This mainly depends on Benacerraf’s having originally presented it in a quite colloquial way, by avoiding any compact, somehow codified, but purportedly comprehensive formulation (Benacerraf 1973 cf. p. 29).
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I thank for valuable comments and suggestions Paul Benacerraf, Stefan Bujisman, Annalisa Coliva, Fabrice Pataut , Andrea Sereni , Göran Sundholm , and Gabriele Usberti .
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Panza, M. (2016). On Benacerraf’s Dilemma, Again. In: Pataut, F. (eds) Truth, Objects, Infinity. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45980-6_4
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