Abstract
In “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented an epistemological problem for mathematical realism.
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Thanks to Dan Baras , David James Barnett , Michael Bergmann, John Bigelow , John Bengson , Sinan Dogramaci, Hartry Field, Toby Handfield , Lloyd Humberstone , Colin Marshall , Josh May , Jennifer McDonald , Jim Pryor, Juha Saatsi , Josh Schechter, and to audiences at Australian National University, Monash University, La Trobe University, UCLA, the University of Melbourne, the University of Nottingham, the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques and the University of Sydney for helpful comments.
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Clarke-Doane, J. (2016). What Is the Benacerraf Problem?. In: Pataut, F. (eds) Truth, Objects, Infinity. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45980-6_2
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