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Fault-Aware Modeling and Specification for Efficient Formal Safety Analysis

  • Axel HabermaierEmail author
  • Alexander Knapp
  • Johannes Leupolz
  • Wolfgang Reif
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9933)

Abstract

Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (Dcca) is a model checking-based safety analysis technique that determines all combinations of faults potentially causing a hazard. This paper introduces a new fault modeling and specification approach for safety-critical systems based on the concept of fault activations that decreases explicit-state model checking and safety analysis times by up to three orders of magnitude. We augment Kripke structures and LTL with fault activations and show how standard model checkers can be used for analysis. Additionally, we present conceptual changes to Dcca that improve efficiency and usability. We evaluate our work using our safety analysis tool Open image in new window (“safety sharp”).

Keywords

Model Check Fault Activation Linear Temporal Logic Reachable State Fault Injection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Axel Habermaier
    • 1
    Email author
  • Alexander Knapp
    • 1
  • Johannes Leupolz
    • 1
  • Wolfgang Reif
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Software and Systems EngineeringUniversity of AugsburgAugsburgGermany

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